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THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW

SIXTH SERIES.—VOL. II.—(LII).—MAY, 1915.—NO. 5.

THE DOGMA OF THE TRINITY IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

ONE of the ideals of Rationalism in its controversy with Christianity has ever been to explain the religion of Christ as one might explain the religion of the Buddha or the religion of Mohammed; to account for it and so simply to discount it; to strip it of the divine and so to humble it to the rank of any other of those strange aberrations of man's mind that are called religions. To this end it has ransacked the philosophies of Greece and the mysticisms of the East to find an origin for Christian dogmas, and professes to have discovered, as a result of its researches, that Christianity, like any vulgar man-made religion, is merely a more or less skilful blend or synthesis—syncretism is the word it prefers—of elements borrowed from the religions and philosophies prevailing in the world in the centuries during which it shaped itself to a system. As in later days Scholasticism was to build itself upon Aristotle, so primitive Christianity rose upon the obscure foundation laid by some forgotten Stoic, fortified itself with the exclusive fanaticism of the Chosen People, incorporated into its fabric all that it thought suitable of the Judaism and Hellenism of the day, and riveted together the whole by the iron framework of Rome's genius for organization and for rule. And when the component elements of Christianity have thus been neatly catalogued, Unbelief feels with scientific satisfaction that a great work has been done.[1] The claims of

[1] E. g., Grant Allen, *Evolution of the Idea of God* (Rationalist Press), especially Ch. XVII: The World before Christ.

this Greco-Judean eclecticism to dominate thought and conduct have been reduced to their due proportions and it has become well-nigh impossible for it to impose its yoke upon the enlightened modern mind.

The Christian dogma of the Trinity has afforded to the modern partisans of unbelief a peculiarly tempting and indeed promising field of speculation about Christian origins; and they have not failed to explore it. In Stoicism long before the Christian era there was a fully developed theory of the Logos. Could the Logos of the Johannine writings be other than an adaptation of this? Must not the author of these writings have been a disciple of Philo the Jew and have haunted the schools of Alexandria? So much for the Second Person of the Trinity. And the Third Person — was it not simply a combination of the phrase "the spirit of the Lord", which so often appears in the Old Testament literature, with that spirit or soul of the world which was likewise a theory of Stoicism? Again, long before Christianity, a vague doctrine about beings intermediate between God and man, the wisdom, the powers, the Shekinah—was taught in the Porch and had long since, by way of Alexandria, filtered into Jewish sacred literature. All these notions would seem to have been seized upon by the early constructors of Christianity to strengthen the new creed. As many of them as seemed to suit were concentrated upon a person—Jesus Christ, who thus became not alone the fulfilment of the age-long Jewish hope, the longed-for Messiah, but the wisdom, the Word, the Son of God, nay God Himself; while the remaining notions were concentrated upon a third person, the Holy Spirit. This in crude and plain terms is more or less the theory that has been broached and held to be satisfactory.

The patient erudition of contemporary Christian apologists has wholly demolished these theories and has conclusively shown them to be baseless and untenable.[2] This is not our present task. We wish to show the dogma of the Trinity taught in writings that are free from reasonable suspicion of Hellenistic influences, and devoid of those verbal coincidences

[2] Jules Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité* (Beauchesne), 2nd ed., 1910. Th. de Régnon, *Études de Théologie Positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, 4 Vols. (Retaux), 1892, etc.

with the language of Greek philosophy on which the theory we have spoken of is so largely based.

But first it may be well to make this general remark regarding all such theories. When the light of modern criticism has been turned upon the Church, and her seeming seamless garment has been shown, to the satisfaction of the critics, to be after all but a motley thing pieced together with the rags of moribund mythologies and discarded philosophies, is their task accomplished?[3] Can Christianity be safely laid aside as a discredited thing or kept but to adorn the modern pantheon of the Positivist? By no means. They have yet to explain how it came to pass that Jesus of Nazareth became suddenly the sole object of all these heterogeneous beliefs; how, whether during life or by the might of His memory, He fused them together into the unity of one faith. Moreover they have to explain not only the unity of that faith, but its transcendence. For not only did Jesus Christ concentrate all the doctrines in Himself, but He transformed them. He was the Messiah, but in a sense undreamed-of until then; He was Son of God, but in a sense that made Him the equal of the Godhead. And so for the rest. If, later, the language of Stoicism and Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism was used to set forth such dogmas, what of that? Such language was but the passing garment of the central and eternal truth.[4]

I have said that we have primitive writings of Christianity that, as regards the doctrines they set forth, are admittedly free from Hellenistic infiltrations, and that we may find in these the dogma of the Trinity. Such writings are the narratives of Matthew, Mark, and Luke—the Synoptic Gospels. Sane modern criticism has reached the view that in the main we have these Gospels to-day substantially as they were written down in the course of the twenty or thirty years that followed the death of Christ. It is as a whole—relying little on this or that particular text—that I mean to deal with them here.

[3] Speaking of similar attempts Lecky remarks: "The true originality of a system of moral teaching depends not so much upon the elements of which it is composed as upon the manner in which they are fused into a symmetrical whole." *Rationalism in Europe,* I, p. 338.

[4] I refer of course, not to the terminology as a whole of the early Greek Fathers but to some peculiar terms employed chiefly by the Alexandrian Fathers in the endeavor to expound the Christian doctrine for the Alexandrian intellectuals. See Lebreton, op. cit., p. 87.

It has been said with truth [5] that any historian who passes from the Old Testament to the writings of St. Paul and St. John has the impression, whatever be his religious creed, that he is entering a new world wholly different from the one he is leaving, a world in which prayer, beliefs, life in general are soaked with new ideas. The Synoptic Gospels give this impression less vividly, at least on a first reading: the central ideas—the Divine Fatherhood, the kingdom of God, the Messiah—are not new to anyone who has studied the Prophets, and the moral teaching of the Sermon on the Mount will not come with a sense of novelty to a reader of the Psalms. But it will be strange if as he proceeds he does not soon become conscious of a changed perspective. All things, he perceives, have grouped themselves anew. For the entire narrative centres round a single figure and that figure is not Jahweh—still less is it His chosen people. This new figure fills up the entire foreground of the picture. All else in it serves merely to set forth the personality of Him who "draws all things to Himself". It is not that the evangelists set themselves to exalt their hero as the writer of Ecclesiasticus to "praise men of renown". No, without dust of comment or false light of adulation, they set down His works and His words, works such as no prophet nor judge nor king in Israel had wrought, words such as until then none but Jahweh had dared to utter. And with this changed perspective has come another change. Not only are all things grouped round this central figure of the Gospels, but in Him the great ideals and hopes of the Old Testament have gained a deeper meaning. He claims to be Himself their realization, but in a manner that men had never looked for. He is the Messiah, the Son of Man; but He is also the Son of God. On the meaning of Christ's claim to be the Son of God hangs for us the whole doctrine of the Trinity.

If God be indeed the maker of mankind, then He is also our Father and we, all of us, can claim the name of sons. Even under the law of fear the Psalmist had said of Him: "As a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion upon them that fear Him" (Ps. 102: 13). How much more under the New Law could St. John say,

[5] Lebreton, op. cit., p. 207.

"Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us that we should be called and should be the sons of God" (1 Jn. 3:1)! Those who specially deserve God's love are in a special way God's sons. In the book of Wisdom the impious make it a reproach to the just man that "he boasteth himself to have the knowledge of God and calleth himself the son of God" (Wisd. 2:14). And Christ Himself said, "Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the sons of God" (Mt. 5:9). Such expressions are common in every language and at all periods. But what meaning had this word, Son of God, on the lips of Christ when He used it of Himself?

In the first place it is plain from the Gospels that to Christ belonged the title of Son of God in a sense higher than to any child of God that had gone before. He and He alone is called the Son of God.[6] The preëminence of this Sonship would seem to have been ratified by the sanction of Heaven. "He shall be great," said the Angel who announced His birth, "and shall be called the Son of the Most High." And again, "The Holy One that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God" (Lk. 1:32, 35). And at His baptism a voice from Heaven cried, "Thou art My Beloved Son; in Thee I am well pleased" (Lk. 3:22).[7] Of what human being since mankind began had God ever spoken thus? But did such words mean no more than that Christ was indeed more truly God's child than any that had gone before Him, yet after all only, in the figurative and applied sense of which we have spoken, that He was but *primus inter pares* and could in no-wise pretend to be named in the same breath with God? If there were really no more in Christ's Sonship than this, surely He had the most urgent, the most momentous reasons for making clear His position beyond the possibility of a doubt. Let me dwell upon two such reasons that lie upon the surface and must be clear to all.

[6] Pohle-Preuss: *The Divine Trinity* (Herder), 1912, p. 50. "There are texts in which mere creatures are referred to as 'Sons of God', but in all these texts the subject is either in the plural or it is a collective term, or an indefinite singular really amounting to a plural."

[7] Again at the Transfiguration: "This is My Most Beloved Son: hear ye Him" (Mk. 9:6). Note the wording in the Greek: Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητὸς. Cf. Mt. 3:17 and 17:5, Lk. 9:35.

There are men upon whom the burden of a great name sits lightly; there are kings who wear a crown as though it were the pasteboard bauble of a player. But to a man of sincere purpose and of high ideals a great name or station is a great responsibility, and a great responsibility is a burden that weighs upon his life. Already Christ in calling Himself the Messiah had taken upon Himself with that name the burden of all the hopes of Israel; He had chosen to live out in His single life what centuries of prophecy had foretold of the Promised One. Was not this enough? Could merely human life bear more than this? Could He for an instant suffer men to think, unless it were true, that upon His frail mortal shoulders rested, besides, the burden of the Godhead? Would it not have been folly, sheer madness, to risk the loss of all by letting men think that He had grasped too much? And again, if the suspicion of such extravagance of pretension once gained a lodgment in their minds, how could they any more revere Him as meek and lowly of heart? Yes, if He be not really God's true Son, we must surely meet in the Gospel's vehement and almost querulous denials of all such pretensions.

There was another and a far weightier reason why He should drive from the minds of His hearers all suspicion of His aspiring to a Divine Sonship that would match Him with God. He was a Jew and spoke to Jews; all His hope of success lay among this people to whom alone He preached. Now there was one belief to which all that was faithful of Israel had ever clung with intense devotion, one commandment to which disobedience was not sin alone but blasphemy. It was the belief in one only God and the commandment given in thunder on Sinai to adore no other God than Him.[8] In the face of this jealous monotheism that was His own no less than Israel's, could Christ permit man to think that He claimed honors that were Divine and that Jahweh had a rival in Himself? Either the truth lay in the mystery that He was one with Jahweh, or He must with horror have spurned from Him the blasphemy.

[8] Exodus, Ch. 20; Deut. 32:39, etc. But apart from particular texts it is plain that monotheism is the fundamental dogma of the Old Testament. It is reasserted in the New, e. g., I Cor. 8:6; but if there were no such explicit assertion, we can see by the manner in which the name of God is used that there could never be question of this God or that God. There could be but One God.

Yet either Christ uttered no such disavowal or the evangelists have conspired to suppress it. True, men's minds had to be prepared gradually before they could bear so great a mystery, and so at the outset of His ministry He spoke in veiled words and forbade the open preaching of His Godhead (Mt. 16: 20). But nowhere in the Gospels does He explain away this title, Son of God. On the contrary, He dwells upon it as something at once peculiar to Himself and altogether transcendent, and assumes to Himself in His own right the full powers and privileges of the natural and true Son of God. Let us by reference to the Gospels convince ourselves that this is so.

One day at Caesarea Philippi (Mt. 16: 13), Jesus turned to the men whom He had chosen to be His apostles. "Whom," he asked, "do men say that the Son of Man is?" They mentioned the notions that were current among the populace. " But whom do you say that I am?" Peter took upon himself the answer, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." [9] Long since, Peter had believed in Him as the Messiah, but now with a noble impulse he went to the full limits of the faith with which Christ had inspired him, and confessed that Jesus was truly God's Son. "And Jesus answering said to him: Blessed are thou Simon Bar Jona because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee but My Father who is in heaven." [10] Everywhere in these three Gospels the words "*My* Father" are ever on His lips. He bids the apostles say of God "*Our* Father": He Himself says only "*My* Father". " I dispose to you a kingdom as My Father hath disposed to Me a kingdom" (Lk. 22: 29). " I send the promise of My Father upon you" (Lk. 24: 49). Of this Father He speaks with reverence as one who bore the form of man, yet with the familiarity of intimacy and love. "All things are delivered to Me by My Father, and no one knoweth who the Son is but the Father, and who the Father is but the Son, and he to

[9] Σὺ εἶ ὁ χριστος ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος. Note the emphatic repetition of the article. Note, too, the form of Christ's question. "Whom do men say that I, the Son of Man, am?" i. e., What is their view of Me, the Messiah?

[10] His confession was not due to the merely human motive of nationalistic enthusiasm which was what moved the crowd to acclamation, but to the grace of God.

whom the Son will reveal Him" (Lk. 20: 21; Mt. 11: 25).[11] Everywhere we see Him take upon Himself as His mere right the utmost privileges of Divine Sonship; in other words, the prerogatives of the Godhead itself. The prophets and lawgivers of the ancient dispensation had said, "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts;" Jesus says, "It was said to you of old (that is, by Jahweh Himself), but I say to you." "Once at Capharnaum He said to a paralytic whom they had brought to Him, "Son, thy sins are forgiven thee" (Mk. 25). Knowing the law and the scriptures, those that were present started at the word. Was it not a blasphemy, for God alone could forgive sins? Jesus does not set their doubts at rest by claiming merely a delegated power. He works a miracle; that is, He uses the power of God over nature to prove that He Himself has power for the remission of sins. He claimed for Himself a power yet more awful—the power to sit in judgment upon the souls of men in the world to come.[12] The Jews that heard Him could not but be well aware that in all their sacred writings the final judgment of mankind was reserved to Jahweh alone. It was never attributed even to the Messiah.[13] With what amazement then must they not have listened to Christ speaking of Himself as their judge? "But the harvest," He says in the parable of the cockle (Mt. 13: 39), "is the end of the world." "The Son of Man shall send His angels.[14] Watch ye therefore, praying at all times, that you may be accounted worthy to escape all these things that are to come and to stand before the Son of Man" (Lk. 21: 36). "And when the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the throne of His majesty: and all

[11] Tout commentaire est ici inutile: on reconnait sans peine que la théologie johannique ne pourra rien ajouter à ces paroles." Lebreton, op. cit., p. 245. This anticipation in the Synoptic Gospels of all the essential features of St. John's presentation of Christ was long ago pointed out. It will be found stated in popular form, though with solid learning, in Liddon's *The Divinity of Our Lord.* Lecture the Fifth.

[12] "In other words, He will proceed to discharge an office involving such spiritual insight, such discernment of the thoughts and intents of the heart of each one of the millions at His feet, such awful unshared supremacy in the moral world, that the imagination recoils in sheer agony from the task of seriously contemplating the assumption of these duties by any created intelligence." Liddon: *The Divinity of Our Lord,* 12th ed. p. 176.

[13] Lebreton, op. cit., p. 238, where several authorities are quoted.

[14] Mark *His* angels.

nations shall be gathered before Him and He shall separate them one from another;" and then He describes the process of the judgment (Mt. 25:31). In many other circumstances of His life He proclaims this supreme prerogative.[15]

I pass over other passages in which the title "Son of God" is used by Him or of Him, without a hint on His part that He wished to abate one tittle of its meaning.[16] I come to the last scenes when the moment had arrived for Him to speak His last word to the people He had come to save, and then go forth to meet Him whose true Son He had dared to call Himself. He stood before the supreme tribunal of His people, arraigned for calling Himself God's Son (Mt. 26:63; Mk. 14:53). Witnesses had lied and prevaricated: it was time to appeal directly to Himself. Solemnly the High Priest rose. "I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God." There was a moment of breathless hush. Then the low voice spoke: "I am." It was enough. With real or simulated rage the High Priest tore his garments crying, "He hath blasphemed. What need of further witnesses?" Surely such a man must die. But why had He blasphemed? Not surely for claiming that Sonship which every rational creature of God might claim: not because Son of God was a Messianic title, for it was not.[17] No, but because He made Himself the Son of God, and so equivalently claimed the Divine Nature for Himself. It was for this claim He died.[18] No wonder when He hung, a beaten, broken man, upon His cross, that they should taunt Him with His claims (Mt. 27:40-43). "If thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross. . . . He trusted in God; let Him now deliver Him: for He said, 'I am the Son of God'."

[15] Cf. parables in Mt. 24:50; Mk. 13:34; Lk. 12:36.

[16] "And they that were in the boat came and adored Him, saying: Indeed thou art the Son of God" (Mt. 14:33). "And crying with a loud voice He said, What have I to do with thee, Jesus, the Son of the Most High God?" (Mk. 57). Cf. Lk. 8:28 and see the unique rôle attributed to the Son in the parable of the wicked husbandmen. Mk. 12:1-9; Mt. 21:33-41; Lk. 20:9-16.

[17] "La locution 'Fils de Dieu' n'était point reçu alors communément pour désigner le Messie, et ne se rencontre jamais en ce sens, ni dans l'Ancien Testament, ni dans les apocryphes juifs." Lebreton, op. cit., p. 246. Lagrange, in *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs*, says the same.

[18] This is sufficiently evident from the Gospel narrative itself. For a discussion of the matter see Rosadi: *The Trial of Jesus* (Hutchinson), 1905 ed. by Emil Reich, pp. 190 ff. A modern Jewish writer (Salvador, *Jesus Christ*, II, pp. 132-3, 195) proves this point.

It is enough then—Jesus is God's true Son and shares in the Godhead. Yet — we have seen it on every page of the Gospel—there is another to whom He speaks and whom He professes to reveal; from whom He says that He has come; to whom He says that He is going. This Other then is God likewise. There is therefore in some mysterious way plurality in the Godhead. Yet no word has been spoken that could cast the shadow of doubt upon that most sacred of truths—there is but one God, and there cannot be more Gods than one.

Let us go back once more to search the pages of the Synoptic Gospels. The sacred text is full of mentions of the Spirit of God, the Holy Spirit.[19] When once we are in possession of the dogma, the interpretation of all such passages becomes clear to us; but to those in search of proofs of its truth they do not, taken by themselves, yield conviction. We might, however, argue the manifestation of a third Divine Person from the words of the angel announcing Christ's birth (Lk. 1:35); and from the supernatural phenomena that accompanied His baptism (Mt. 3:13; Mk. 1:9; Lk. 3:21). But there is one saying of Christ so certainly authentic,[20] and so unmistakable that it can leave in our minds no reasonable doubt. It is the command, "Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Mt. 28:19). Let me illustrate by a familiar example what is implied in these words. When you say, "In the name of the King, Lords and Commons", you indicate powers which, though in a certain sense *one* as constituting together the government of the realm, yet are, as we know, quite distinct and separate, so distinct as to be capable of mutual antagonism. This expression of distinctness would be yet more strongly marked if we were to say, "In the name of the King and of the Lords and of the Commons". This latter is the form of Christ's words in the Greek text of the Gospel. We have seen that the distinctness of the Father and Son is elsewhere clearly

[19] E. g., Lk. 1:15, 41, 67; 2:26; 10:21; Mk. 1:12; 12:36; Mt. 4:1; 22:43, etc. Notice also Christ's various promises to the disciples of the assistance of the Spirit—e. g., Lk. 22:11; 24:19. These are related much more explicitly by St. John.

[20] The authenticity of this text is established with great thoroughness by Lebreton, Note E, pp. 478 ff.; see also Chase, "The Lord's Command to Baptize," in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, VI, 1905, pp. 481-521.

marked in the Synoptic Gospels, even if their very titles did not prove it sufficiently. The Holy Ghost can surely be nothing less than a third person, placed in this text on an equal footing with the two first, and obviously distinct from each. Are we making too much to depend upon this single phrase? Surely the whole Christian faith might well depend on it, since no man could be received into that faith without these words being pronounced over his head. That formula was destined to be repeated over every one of all the hundreds of millions who were to embrace the faith that it professed. Could Christ have allowed it to be ambiguous?

"O Lord, our God," says St. Augustine, "we believe in Thee, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. For the Truth would not say, 'Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit', unless Thou wast a Trinity. Nor wouldst Thou, O Lord God, bid us be baptized in the name of Him who is not the Lord God." [21]

With these words of the great Doctor I may close. As I have said, if occasional reminiscences in the Johannine writings of the current philosophical language of the day give some plausibility to the contention that the writer eked out his scanty Jewish theology with shreds of Alexandrian philosophy, as applied to the writings of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, such a theory is quite untenable. Yet we have found in their writings the dogma of the Trinity, not indeed developed, but indicated with such clearness that there can remain in our minds no honest doubt but that Christ was and is a warrant for its truth.

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PEACE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH.

THE efforts of the Holy See to lessen the horrors of the present war in Europe, and the hopes so widely shared by Catholics everywhere that these endeavors to bring about peace may have a favorable result, tend to revive interest in the activity of the medieval Church along similar lines.

[21] De Trin., C. 28, n. 51; Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 42, Col. 1097.

No one at all conversant with the development of those notions of social organization which, in dealing with the medieval period, are commonly called feudal, need be told that one of the worst features of that period was the prevalence of warfare. It is not easy, perhaps, for us to think of a time when war rather than peace was the normal condition of society, but there is no gainsaying the fact that from the beginning of the tenth century to the end of the twelfth, or even later still, peace was an unwonted state in Western Europe. The constant clash of ill-defined interests to which the feudal system had given rise, the hatred borne to neighbor and stranger alike, and the deep-rooted military habits of the ruling classes combined to make war almost the supreme law of the medieval world.[1]

Feudal warfare, however, as a recent writer[2] reminds us, was not war as we understand it nowadays, where with some large purpose in view one great cohesive state directs its entire military power against another, but rather private and local warfare in which neighbor fought against neighbor and members of a family against one another. In the ordinary course of events every vassal was likely to make war at least once upon his overlord or upon his several overlords in succession, upon the neighboring bishops and abbots, upon his fellow vassals, and upon his own vassals. There was very little that was ennobling in this private warfare. Any excuse was used as a reason for waging war. Ambitious nobles might wish to extend their boundaries, and this was sufficient provocation for attacking and plundering his neighbors. Vassals easily found some pretext for throwing off their allegiance to their overlord in connexion with hunting or fishing rights. Quarrels would likewise arise over titles to fiefs, over the division of a fief between two brothers, or over the claims to dower of a

[1] Considering the total amount of fighting which was going on everywhere during the medieval period, only very few great battles actually occurred. When such battles did take place, vast bodies of men-at-arms rushed at one another: each warrior picked out an adversary and the side which won the greatest number of the resulting encounters gained the day. A medieval battle, therefore, was more like a large number of single combats than a contest between different bodies of troops. See Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1885), passim.

[2] See Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*. Second edition (Macmillan, 1914), Vol. I, p. 545.

widowed mother, and, as a consequence, a whole region would be plunged in the miseries and atrocities which marked the progress of private warfare.

Under the warlike regime of feudalism, therefore, the *Pax Romana*, which Rome had succeeded in establishing in every part of its wide dominions, disappeared and Western Europe reverted to a state of chronic disorder; for when men were not actually attacking others or defending themselves, they were awaiting an attack or preparing to make one. Needless to say, this unending strife was the cause of much misery throughout the different States that were growing up amid the ruins of Charlemagne's extensive empire, but it seems to have weighed most heavily upon the kingdom of France. Toward the close of the tenth century and under the early Capetians, the history of France is largely a chronicle of private wars. Indeed, the number of great fiefs into which the kingdom was divided may be said to have represented just so many permanent private wars which threatened seriously the lives and property of the people and added heavily to their afflictions. The wretched peasantry were, of course, the chief sufferers: their villages were burned and their crops destroyed; not infrequently famine completed the work of destruction begun by the warring factions. In some places the poor were reduced to such extremities by reason of these baneful feuds that they ate human flesh or else revolted—as did the Norman peasants in 997.[3]

In the midst of this unbearable condition of affairs the Church stepped in and strove by placing certain restrictions upon the combatants to lessen the distress from which the weaker members of society were suffering. It might seem, perhaps, that, from a strictly national point of view, the enforcing of respect for the public peace was a function of the civil rather than the ecclesiastical authorities. But it must be remembered that under the feudal system the central power of the State was everywhere relaxed and that neither king nor emperor was able to stamp out the scourge of private war. These rulers were largely at the mercy of the very classes whom it was

[3] The vivid account of this insurrection given by the eleventh century chronicler Guillaume de Jumièges in his *Historia Normanorum* (850-1137) is summarized by Masson in his *Medieval France*, fifth edition, pp. 16-17.

imperative to control; they depended to a great extent upon the support of the feudal lords whose warlike propensities had to be curbed. In the eleventh century, then, as a brilliant French historian observes, the only power sufficiently intelligent to conceive the need of peace and sufficiently respected to be able to secure it was the Church, represented by its supreme head the Pope, its councils and its bishops.[4] And it was the Church, inspired by the spirit of peace and of charity, that took the lead in attempting to stem the evils arising from the prevalence of private warfare. The measures taken in this direction were at first local. They found expression for the most part in two remarkable institutions, called respectively the Peace of God (*Pax Dei*) and the Truce of God (*Treuga Dei*). It is with these two institutions, which were intended as a remedy for the powerlessness of the civil authorities to secure release from the prevailing violence and disorder, that we are chiefly concerned here.

While other medieval institutions have not failed of their due meed of consideration, the *Pax Dei* and the *Treuga Dei* have scarcely received theirs. They have been but little written of yet, and there is no work in English dealing with either.[5] This is the more to be regretted since the subject is one of primary importance in the history of civilization, and one, moreover, that illustrates the influence and action of the medieval Church in a very striking and suggestive manner. What the average reader wishes to know on this head will hardly be found except by pursuing the *Pax* and *Treuga* through a great many works of reference, which, be it said in passing, are not always accurate. The two institutions have not infrequently, in modern times, been confused. Whether

[4] See Luchaire, *Manuel des Institutions Françaises: Periode des Capétiens directs* (Paris, 1892), Part II, pp. 228-234.

[5] Those whom the subject interests are referred to the following books in other languages: Huberti, *Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte der Gottesfrieden und Landfrieden*, 2 vols. (Ansbach: Brügel, 1892); Sémichon, *La Paix et la trêve de Dieu*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1869), second edition; Kluckhohn, *Geschichte des Gottesfriedens* (Leipzig, 1857); Küster, *De Pace et Treuga Dei: commentatio historica* (Munster, 1852). Of these works, that of Huberti is undoubtedly the most scholarly and satisfactory. Its chief value lies in the fact that the author gives us all the original documents bearing upon the subject—the canons that were enacted, the resolutions that were passed, the oaths that were taken at various councils and assemblies, etc. The difficulty of disentangling the complicated early history of the *Pax Dei* and the *Treuga Dei* can only be brought home to us by a serious study of these documents.

or not this confusion arises from a too lax use of the terms *Pax Dei* and *Treuga Dei*, as though they were interchangeable, or from the circumstance that the *Treuga* was sometimes proclaimed along with the *Pax*, and vice versa—this is a point of minor importance. What concerns us is the fact that no such confusion is warranted by the original documents bearing upon the earliest stages of the two institutions. It is abundantly clear from these first-hand sources of information that the *Pax Dei* and the *Treuga Dei* were quite distinct. Both were directed toward the same end — to enforce respect for the public peace; but they differed widely as regards their origin, character, and demands. Besides this, the *Pax* antedates the *Treuga* by at least half a century, as we shall see presently. It is well, therefore, to be rid of all confusion and to treat one thing at a time.

In the first place, then, as to the *Pax Dei*. France was the cradle of this institution. Late in the tenth century we find the earliest traces of it in the efforts of the clergy of Aquitaine to relieve the wretchedness into which the prevalence of private war had plunged the country. There seems to be good reason for fixing upon a synod held at Charroux in 989 as the occasion of the first appearance of the *Pax Dei*.[6] At this synod Gunbald, Archbishop of Bordeaux, in the name of the assembled bishops pronounced anathema against those who break into churches ("infractores ecclesiarum"), those who rob the poor ("res pauperum diripientes"), and those who strike a clerk ("clericorum percussores"). The decree of 989 embodying this threefold prohibition contains the germ, so to say, of the *Pax Dei*.[7] During the following year (990) Guy of Anjou, Bishop of Puy, proclaimed a *Pax Dei* or Peace of God which was more extended, inasmuch as it provided among other things (1) that ecclesiastical lands should not be seized; (2) that peasants should not be taken captive and held for ransom; (3) that monks or "any unarmed persons who accompany them" should not be injured; (4) that merchants (on a

[6] See Huberti, *Studien*, etc., I, p. 35, and Viollet, *Histoire des institutions politiques et administratives de la France* (Paris, 1898), t. II, p. 143. There is, however, some doubt here in the chronology. See Hemmer, *Chronique d'histoire générale de l'Église* in the *Révue d'hist. et de litt. relig.*, t. IV (1899), p. 362.

[7] The Latin text is given by Huberti, l. c.

journey) should not be robbed, and (5) that cattle should not be killed or carried off "unless required for a lawful expedition".[8] Excommunication was pronounced against the transgressors of these provisions.

Such was the *Pax Dei* in its initial stage. From Aquitaine it spread outward and special decrees extending its operations were enacted by so many provincial synods between 994 and 1050 that they covered nearly the whole of France.[9] In general, these decrees called upon all men to bind themselves under oath not to make war upon consecrated persons, viz. clerks, monks, virgins and widows or upon any of the Church's protégés, viz. pilgrims, the poor, etc.[10] Furthermore, monasteries and cemeteries, with their dependencies, were declared to be "sanctuaries", the same as churches, which it was a sacrilege to violate, inasmuch as all those who took refuge in such places were under the protection of the Church. Succinctly stated, then, the object of the *Pax Dei* was to exempt certain classes of persons whose condition or profession forbade them to carry arms—in a word, all non-combatants and defenceless people—from the operations of war and violence and to mark off a sphere of peace from the surrounding sphere of feud.

Naturally enough these humane and beneficial measures commended themselves to the more law-abiding portions of the population. The direful consequences of private war had become generally apparent after the chaos of the tenth century, and the growing sense of order in society at large could not but feel the prevailing disorder insufferable. It is not sur-

[8] The precise purport of this saving clause is not quite clear in the Latin text. See Huberti, op. cit., I, pp. 123 ff., where the original text is given at full length.

[9] At some of these councils the *Pax Dei* was almost the chief topic of discussion, for, as we have seen, the most pressing problem of the time was how to enforce respect for the public peace.

[10] Some of the clauses in these decrees are extremely quaint, as, for example, the following passages from an oath exacted by the Bishop of Beauvais in 1023: "Villanum et villanam vel servientes aut mercatores non prendam nec denarios eorum tollam, nec redimere eos faciam nec suum habere eis tollam, ut perdant propter werram senioris sui, nec flagellabo eos propter substantiam suam. . . . Bestias villanorum non occidam nisi ad meum et meorum conductum. Villanum non praedabo nec substantiam ejus tollam perfide iussione senioris sui [pro fide iussione senioris sui?]. Nobiles feminas non assaliam, neque illas quae cum eis ambulaverint sine maritis suis, nisi per propriam culpam, et nisi in meo malefacto illas invenero; similiter de viduis ac de santimonialibus attendam."

prising, therefore, to find that, in the early part of the eleventh century, a movement developed in France which aimed at so extending the *Pax Dei* as to bring about a general cessation of warfare between Christians. This new movement took an immense impulse, it would seem, during the great famine of 1031-1034. Then was it that the Bishops of Aquitaine proclaimed a "universal peace" conformably with which high and low were bidden in the name of the God of Peace to refrain from war and violence of any kind as contrary to the spirit and teachings of Christianity.[11] Unhappily, there was no machinery, so to say, for enforcing this "holy peace". Compliance with its requirements meant nothing less than this, that all persons carrying arms bound themselves not to use them, but to submit their differences to the decision of the regular tribunals. Be it said here in passing that peasants were expected, as a matter of course, to settle their disputes in this way, without recourse to arms, but it was allowed that the feudal lords had the right of waging private war. This right was, in fact, one of the distinctive privileges of these half-civilized nobles and they were quite as loath to surrender it as the nations of to-day are to give up their right to wage public war. And this being so, it was really a concession if these feudal lords agreed to fight out their quarrels in court instead of embroiling the whole countryside. Practically speaking, therefore, it was no easy matter to prevail on the nobility as a whole to promise, under oath, to desist from all fighting whatsoever. Nor is there, after all, anything that should surprise us in this. For, as Prof. Emerton asks, what, at this time, "was to become of a man who made this sacrifice? His occupation in life was gone. Fighting was his trade and the basis of his social standing. As well might such a man turn monk or clerk at once; for him there was no one of the many resorts, industrial, professional or mercantile, which open up before the modern man. The demand not to fight at all was too much for medieval human nature."[12] The ecclesiastical authorities in France

[11] See Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, IV (1879), p. 697, and Pfister, *Études sur le régne de Robert le Pieux* (Paris, 1885), pp. 164 ff. The latter work deals at greater length than Hefele does with the origin and growth of the new movement.

[12] Emerton, *Medieval Europe* (1894), pp. 570-571.

realized this and very wisely modified the demand. Seeing that it was well-nigh impossible, at least for the time being, to do away with private war entirely, they resolved to try and restrict it within certain limits. Thus arose the *Treuga Dei* or Truce of God, properly so-called,[13] the object of which was to put certain times outside the sphere of private war by setting apart particular days on which no war should be waged at all. The Truce of God, then, implied a temporary suspension of hostilities and was distinct from the Peace of God, which was perpetual. As a recent writer well expresses it, "the Peace of God was intended to protect certain classes at all times, the Truce to protect all classes at certain times".[14]

The Truce of God made its first recorded appearance, according to Huberti and other scholars, at a synod held at Elne in Roussillin in 1027, which sought to establish a "close time" in each week even for the militant classes. Kluckhohn is of opinion, however, that the first trace of the Truce of God is to be found in the year 1041.[15] Certain it is in any case that by 1041 the "close time" established by the Truce of God—during which there should be no warfare at all—was so far extended as to include the second half of every week.[16] In that year several bishops and abbots, including St. Odilo, Abbot of Cluny,[17] issued a joint edict in which all men were commanded to maintain a holy and unbroken peace from vespertide on Wednesday to sunrise on Monday, "so that during these four days and five nights all persons . . . may go about their business without fear of their enemies".[18] Whosoever

[13] The derivation and meaning of the word *Treuga* are discussed by Kluckhohn, *Geschichte des Gottesfriedens*, p. 42.

[14] Munro, *A History of the Middle Ages* (1902), p. 140.

[15] See Kluckhohn, *Geschichte des Gottesfriedens*, p. 38.

[16] In the first instance it extended only from noon on Saturday to daybreak on the following Monday. There had always been some sort of agreement that no war should be waged on Sunday—a fact which seems to illustrate the local character of these private wars since they used to stop for the "week end".

[17] St. Odilo worked hard to bring about the enactment of the Truce of God and this whole movement seems to connect itself with the great Cluniac revival. See Jardet, *Vie de Saint Odilon* (Paris, 1898), pp. 700-710, and Sackus, *Die Cluniacenser*, etc. (Halle, 1894), t. II, pp. 133-135.

[18] Thursday was dedicated to God because "it is the day of His Ascension, Friday because it is the day of His Passion, Saturday because it is the day on which He rested in the tomb, and Sunday because it is the day of His Resurrection".

should dare violate this truce was threatened with the severest penalties.[19] The decree in question, which was made for the archbishopric of Arles, 1035-1045, is the earliest extant example of the Truce of God known to scholars [20]—except the earlier one already mentioned purporting to issue from the Council of Elne in 1027, the authenticity of which has been called into question—and has come down to us only in the form of a communication recommending it to the clergy of Italy.[21]

Later enactments issued by different synods in France, though they varied widely as regards details, all embraced the principle of the decree of 1041, which was more and more definitely asserted with each succeeding decade. Thus, the Truce of God proclaimed for the Diocese of Thérouanne in 1063 enjoins that all private hostilities shall be suspended from the beginning of Advent to the octave of the Epiphany; from the beginning of Lent to the octave of Easter, and from the first of the Rogation Days to the octave of Pentecost.[22] A synod held at Cologne some twenty years afterward (1083) went still farther and extended the Truce of God so as to embrace almost the whole period between the first Sunday of Advent and Trinity Sunday, besides the ember days, the vigils and feasts of the Apostles, and all other days "canonically set apart or which shall in future be set apart for fasts or feasts". The provisions of this document are eloquent of existing conditions. It decrees, for instance, that if the Truce was broken by any noble, his heirs might seize his property. A boy under twelve who fought was to be whipped; if over twelve he was to lose his hand, and so forth.[23]

[19] Thus if anyone killed another on the days of the Truce of God he was to be driven from the land and to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, spending his exile there; for any lesser transgression of the Truce of God the offender was to suffer the penalty prescribed by the civil laws and to do double the penance ordained by the canons.

[20] The text may be found in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* LL. 4to IV, I, No. 419. It is interesting to compare the text of this Truce with that enacted for the archbishoprics of Besançon and Vienne in 1041, or about that year, which is also to be found in *M. G. H.*, l. c., No. 421.

[21] The Truce of God spread from France to Italy and Germany. About the year 1068 it was introduced into Spain and in 1071 into the Netherlands.

[22] For the text of the decree see *M. G. H.*, LL. 4to, IV, I, No. 422.

[23] The text of this decree has come down to us only in the form in which it was communicated by the Archbishop of Cologne to the Bishop of Munster and which is printed in the *M. G. H.*, LL. 4to, IV, I, No. 424.

This Truce of Cologne, which appears to have served as a model for other enactments of a like character, should have secured about two hundred and forty days' peace in every year, thus leaving not more than one hundred and twenty-five days available for private warfare. So stringent, however, were the restraints imposed by the Truce in other dioceses that the number of days on which such warfare might take place was reduced to about eighty. In some cases we find that the Truce of God, which exempted certain seasons from all war, was proclaimed in connexion with the Peace of God, which, as we have seen, exempted certain persons, things, and places from its operation, the object of this combination being, of course, to obtain as much peace as possible.[24] Efforts were made in this way to restrict the right of private war without trying to abolish it outright: that, as we have seen, was out of the question.

It is of moment to note that the Truce of God was reënacted by the Council of Clermont in November, 1095, upon the occasion of the proclamation of the first Crusade. In his famous speech at that Council, Pope Urban II, after referring to the violence and utter lawlessness prevailing in some parts of France, said: "Therefore let us reënact the law made by our holy ancestors long ago and commonly called 'The Truce' [of God]. I earnestly exhort you that each one should do all in his power to have it observed in his diocese. But if anyone, misled by pride or cupidity, breaks it voluntarily, let him be anathematized by the authority of God and by the sanction of the decrees of this Council."[25] The wording of the decree enacted at Clermont renewing the Truce has not been preserved, but it is said to have extended the provisions of the Truce so as to include Crusaders, anathema being pronounced

[24] The decree issued by the Council of Tuluges, near Perpignan, in 1041 or in 1065 (the exact date is not certain), combines the features of the two institutions. The text of this decree is given by Bouquet, *Recueil d·· historiens des Gaules et de la France* (Paris, 1876), Vol. XI, pp. 510-511.

[25] Such is the tenor of Urban's words as given by Fulcher de Chartres, who was present and who has left us what is considered the best account of the Pope's speech, though he does not pretend to report it verbatim. For the Latin text given by Fulcher see *Receuil des historiens des Croisades* (Paris, 1841-1898), III, pp. 322 ff., and Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hanover, 1611), I, pp. 382 ff. There is a full translation of Fulcher's report of Urban's speech in *Translations and Reprints*, issued by the University of Pennsylvania, Vol. I (1901), No. 2, pp. 2-5.

against those who should invade the possessions of anyone engaged in the holy war.[26] The Truce of God was again reenacted at the Council of Rheims in 1119 by Pope Callixtus II with the purpose of still further restricting the useless shedding of blood in private warfare. Anathema was once more pronounced against those who transgressed its prohibitions and it was decreed that, unless they or their children made due satisfaction, they should be deprived of Christian burial.[27] In some cases the right of sanctuary was likewise denied to violators of the Truce.

The final stage of the Truce of God was reached when this originally French institution was adopted by the Second Lateran Council, which fixed the periods and duration of the Truce. This was in 1139. Forty years later the Third Lateran Council extended the institution to the whole Church by canon XXI, "De Treugis Servandis".[28] The Truce of God thus became a definite article of Canon Law,[29] and, for the rest, it remained as a recognized principle until such time as other rising forces had sufficient power to attain the same end by different means.

So much, then, as to the way in which the Truce of God passed out of the condition of a mere agreement amongst the parties most likely to disturb the public peace, and took on the character of a general law.

Perhaps it may be worth our while, before we conclude, to deal briefly with the outcome of the extraordinary efforts made by the Church to lessen an evil which it was unable to do away with entirely. Just how far these efforts met with success it is very hard to ascertain. But it seems safe to say that the Truce of God was seldom altogether effectual, and the reason is not far to seek. The Church councils and the bishops were untiring in their endeavors to bind the unruly lords to observe the weekly Truce, but, as we may easily believe, they were never able to oblige these great feudatories, as a whole, to take the oath imposed by the Truce or to keep it once it had

[26] William of Malmesbury gives the substance of the decree in his *Gesta Regum Anglorum,* Book IV, § 345, p. 392 (Rolls Series, 1889).

[27] See Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte,* Vol. V (1886), p. 441.

[28] See Hefele, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 715.

[29] See Decretal. Gregorii IX, Tit. XXXIV, De Treuga et Pace.

been taken. Breach of the Truce was punished by excommunication. To be sure, this dreaded penalty struck terror and secured attention, but its moral force was not always sufficient to enforce respect for the public peace. Clearly, then, it behooved the secular powers which were most interested in repressing private warfare to give to the Truce of God any sanction which it lacked, by adding their physical punishments to the spiritual ones imposed by the Church. For assuredly, as Professor Emerton observes,[30] the maintenance of peace was just as much in the interest of the royal causes everywhere as it was in that of the poorer and weaker classes more directly benefited by its provisions.

In some countries the sovereign did, as a matter of fact, approve and proclaim the Truce of God. A decree of this kind issued by the Emperor Henry IV in 1085 is in many respects the same as the one enacted at Cologne two years before, to which reference has already been made.[31] This imperial Truce must not be confused with the "Landfrieden" or Peace of the Land established by the same Emperor in 1103 and extended by Frederick I in 1152. The Landfrieden was an institution as thoroughly German as the Treuga Dei is thoroughly French.[32] But in practice the emperor could do little to uphold this imperial Truce and war became almost the common law of Germany. In France the king was so weak that he could not enjoin peace within his own domains. Where the ruler was strong enough to do so, he proclaimed peace and threatened with heavy fines or even with death whosoever should infringe it. This was the case in Normandy, in England, in the Two Sicilies and elsewhere.[33] For the most part, however—and this brings us back to what more immediately concerns our present purpose—the enforcement of the Truce of God was left largely, and at times wholly, to the bishops and local clergy.

[30] Op. cit., p. 571.

[31] For the text of the Emperor's decree see *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, 4to, IV, I, No. 425.

[32] The text of the Land Peaces of 1103 and 1152, which are amongst the most important enactments of this kind, are given in the *M. G. H.*, LL. 4to, IV, I, No. 74 and 140, pp. 101 ff. See also Doeberl, *Selecta*, III, No. 18; and IV, No. 32.

[33] See Seignobos, *The Feudal Regime*, trans. by Dow (1912), pp. 58-59.

During the eleventh century, then, it was not uncommon for the bishop to secure the coöperation of representative men from all classes of society in forming leagues of peace throughout the diocese. These individuals were sworn to maintain and enforce respect for the peace. It was a very practical and praiseworthy attempt to create by local effort a means of carrying out the provisions of the Truce more effectively. Thus every diocese in at least a great part of France became the centre of a voluntary peace association. This association "was directed by the bishop; it had its regular statutes, its treasury, its magistrates; and, what was vitally important, it had its armed force, capable of reëstablishing order where it was disturbed, and of punishing, by weapons more swift than spiritual menaces, the nobles who had violated their oaths to keep the peace. Violations of the peace were brought before the so-called 'Judges of the Peace', a tribunal which depended upon and was presided over by the bishop of the diocese." [34]

Those who refused submission to the decisions of this court were pursued and punished by the "Army of the Peace", which was formed chiefly of rural parishioners organized as militia and led by their parish priests. The great difficulty seems to have been to get this militia under way, and this difficulty arose from the holding back of the noble members of the peace league, who were so dominated by class interests that they would not coöperate in any attempt to punish their fellow nobles for acts in violation of the Truce of God — and the bishop was powerless to coerce them.[35] On this account largely the efforts of these local peace associations did not meet with the success they deserved. None the less the services they rendered were of considerable economic importance. And when, under Lewis VI (1108-1137), the French monarchy really

[34] See Luchaire, op. cit., pp. 228 ff. The passage here quoted is taken from the English version given in *Medieval Civilization* by Munro and Sellery (1910), pp. 183-184.

[35] A case to the point is mentioned by Seignobos (*History of Medieval Civilization*, London, 1908, p. 83). In the eleventh century Hugues, vassal of the Bishop of Cambrai, arrested a number of merchants, tore out their beards and demanded from them a ransom. The bishop, three times in succession, ordered Hugues to appear before him. Hugues came at last but refused to make any reparation. The judges of the bishop's court then condemned Hugues to lose his fief. But Hugues ignored the sentence, went home, and returning soon after arrested the bishop himself.

took serious measures to quell disorder, these diocesan peace leagues were turned to good account.

In the long run, therefore, the ceaseless efforts of the Church in one form or another to secure peace were by no means without result. But it was not until the expiration of the long period needed to weld the rough and turbulent feudal aristocracy into an orderly law-abiding class that the evils against which all these efforts had been directed were entirely done away with. It was only by degrees and in proportion as "the public authorities, royalty, the leagues between nobles and the communes followed the impulse" that war came to be confined to international conflicts. Then, at length, all need for the Truce of God wore away.

The decline, therefore, and ultimate disappearance of private wars, though brought about eventually as a result of the slow but progressive bettering of general conditions, may yet be traced back to the remedial influence of the "Peace of God" and the "Truce of God". Nothing, indeed, redounds more to the credit of the ecclesiastical authorities in France and elsewhere than their unwearied strivings to make these means of pacification a success. Often as both the "Peace of God" and the "Truce of God" were broken, they nevertheless did a great deal during the eleventh and twelfth centuries to protect the poor and defenceless and to lessen the violence, oppression, and outrages which marked the progress of private warfare. And this, beyond doubt, was the object the Church had chiefly in view in fostering and in furthering these two remarkable and most characteristic institutions of medieval times.

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THE CHURCH AND USURY.

A RECENT work on the attitude of the Church toward usury presents certain ethical theories, interpretations, and conclusions which seem to be deserving of a critical examination.[1] They have to do with the problems of just price, the justification of interest on loans, and the reconciliation of

[1] *The Church and Usury.* By the Rev. Patrick Cleary. Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son, 1914, pages vii, 213.

the present with the medieval position of the Church in this field.

The author of the book assumes that there is substantial identity between the medieval concept of just price and the modern notion of social utility, or social value. Both these conceptions, he maintains, are determined by the social estimate or evaluation of commodities. When articles possessing the same social utility are exchanged, "one is the just price of the other"; and "just price is but an equivalent of value" (p. 187). These statements are astonishingly inaccurate. They imply that the current social utilities, or market prices (for value is the comparative expression of utility, and market price is the monetary expression of economic value) are always in harmony with justice. If this view be correct, the starvation wages which the higgling of the market forces upon exploited women workers, and the excessively low prices at which the products of such labor are sold, conform with the standard of just price! These payments are the equivalent and the measure of the social utility attaching to this labor and these products in exactly the same sense as the market prices of bread, automobiles, or champagne. In all cases "the object's usefulness is determined by its capacity for meeting the desires of the community in the varied circumstances of the moment" (p. 187). And the degree of that usefulness is reflected in the prevailing market price.

The apparent resemblances between the objective categories of just price and economic value, and between the subjective processes of medieval "common estimation" and modern "social estimate", are much less important than the differences. The similarities are mainly verbal. Just price is and always has been a formally ethical conception, while economic value has no such explicit connotation. The "common estimation" that the medieval theologians had in mind was a deliberate ethical pronouncement, while the "social estimate" of a modern economic community does not even pretend to take into account ethical considerations. The social estimate which is reflected in economic value merely expresses what the determining mass of buyers and sellers think worth while here and now to give and accept for a commodity, not what they think they are *morally* required to give and accept. In

making such estimates the modern economic group does not concern itself with justice at all, but solely with comparative utility.

Dr. Cleary is not the first writer who seems to have been misled by the superficial similarities of these categories and processes. The Rev. T. Slater, S.J., declares that market prices "are settled according to the common estimate of buyers and sellers as to what are fair and reasonable prices under the circumstances".[2] There is, indeed, a sense in which market prices express what the general opinion regards as "fair and reasonable", but it is a very special sense which has no bearing on the question of justice. It means nothing more than that the persons who buy and sell at a given price would rather do so than refrain from buying and selling entirely. The majority would prefer some other price, and regard it as more "fair and reasonable" than the one actually prevailing. In the opinion of a majority of the sellers a higher price would be more "fair and reasonable", while a majority of the buyers take the same attitude toward a lower price. In the present period of high prices the majority of persons believe that lower prices would be "fair and reasonable". The general fact is that buyers think it "fair and reasonable" to obtain goods at as low a price as possible, and sellers think it "fair and reasonable" to get as high a price as possible.

Manifestly, estimates of this sort concerning values and prices, and "fairness and reasonableness", include no explicitly moral element. They are not formed with conscious reference to any moral standard. In truth, they are notions of expediency, representing what buyers and sellers regard as the most prudent course of action in given circumstances. To be sure, men may turn their attention deliberately to the ethical aspect of current values and prices, may even pronounce them unjust, and may set in motion social forces which will constrain values and prices to conform to a standard that is explicitly ethical. In that case the "social estimate" becomes an ethical process. Unfortunately, however, such cases are extremely exceptional. The typical social estimate which determines prices is something quite different.

[2] *A Manual of Moral Theology*, p. 524.

The sum of the matter is that just price is a moral conception, while economic value and market price are purely economic categories which may or may not be in accordance with justice.

Nevertheless, it may be objected that modern market prices do happen to correspond with the requirements of just price, even as laid down by the medieval theologians; for the rules of just price were applicable mainly to those transactions in which, owing to the scarcity of the articles, no current price ("pretium vulgare") had been established, and in which, therefore, the exchangers were in peculiar need of moral guidance. St. Thomas and theologians generally say that the current price may be accepted as a just price unless there exists a special reason for believing the contrary. In other words, they regarded the current price as presumably just. However, presumption is not certainty. Moreover, this favorable presumption had much greater logical and moral weight in the Middle Ages than a similar presumption would have with regard to modern prices. In the former period the current price was fixed as a rule, not by unlimited competition, but by custom or by some legal or quasi-legal authority. Hence it was determined under the immediate influence of ethical conceptions by men who were familiar with the doctrine of just price. No such moral impress attaches to modern prices, which are determined by the more or less mechanical higgling of the market in a society that rarely if ever adverts to their moral aspect. Consequently the presumption in favor of the justice of present prices is so weak and uncertain as to be practically negligible.

Indeed, the use of the phrase, "the social estimate", to describe the processes which issue in modern prices ought in the interest of clearness to be discontinued. It suggests the operation of something which is generally wanting, namely, a deliberate and corporate act of social judgment. Some current prices are established beforehand by formal agreement among the members of a controlling group; but the greater number are a resultant of individual competition and bargaining. As examples of the former class may be cited the prices of monopolized articles, and the rate of wages fixed by some of the stronger trade unions, and by collective agreements between

groups of employers and employees. In no genuine sense can the first two of these prices be attributed to the "social estimate", since they directly reflect the views of only a section of the interested persons, namely, the determining mass of the sellers. The third instance, wages fixed by collective bargaining, may properly be regarded as the product of the social estimate, indeed, but it occurs rather infrequently.

Prices determined by individual competition cannot rightfully claim to be products of a real social estimate. As fairly illustrative of this class let us take stock-exchange quotations and the prices of retail groceries. The shares of a particular security are sold at different prices during the day, owing to the different valuations put upon it by different buyers and sellers. As a consequence, the market price takes the form of a range, say, from 103 to 107. It is the result of a multitude of individual estimates. Turning to that very large class of prices exemplified by the retail grocery store, we find substantially the same process. Assuming that prices are not fixed by a combination, we see that, while the individual dealer sets the prices of the various articles, he must change them in response to changes in the conditions of supply and demand. If purchasers refuse to take a profitable quantity of an article at the present price, or if his competitors sell it at a lower price, he will reduce the price; if these conditions are reversed, he will raise the price. Prices are maintained through actual sales which involve an agreement between the two parties; price changes are due to variations in the estimates of individual buyers and sellers; and any particular price or range of prices is the outcome of a series of individual estimates.

The prices considered in the preceding paragraph are not established by a formal act of agreement proceeding from the whole body, or even from a majority, of the buyers and sellers. The "social estimate" that determines these prices is not a corporate or organic process. It is not a unified or simple entity, but a composite reflection of a multitude of diverse individual estimates. Therefore, it is social only in the sense of an average, or outcome, or resultant.

While the foregoing criticisms may seem to be little more than an exercise in logomachy, they do emphasize the very significant fact that the "social estimate" which is said to

determine current prices is devoid not only of any ethical connotation, but also of that measure of authority which is commonly ascribed to an act of social agreement, such as a legal enactment, or the resolutions adopted at a public meeting.

In his attempt to identify market price with just price, Dr. Cleary assumes that the latter is fundamentally subjective, that it is finally determined by the social estimate rather than by objective economic facts and conditions. According to his view, the social estimate is not merely a presumptively correct expression of objective justice, but an infallible determinant thereof. It is not merely "regulative" but "constitutive". In effect the common estimation *creates* the just price. However, Dr. Cleary is obliged to concede that this interpretation is contrary to the traditional doctrine (p. 187). For the theologians and canonists invariably pointed out that the social estimate was without the moral authority to fix the just price arbitrarily, that it was itself subject to certain objective factors, such as utility, scarcity, and the cost of production. So long as industrial justice is determined by human welfare, and human welfare is dependent upon economic conditions, this principle remains irrefutable. No social estimate of the just price of any commodity can possess final moral validity merely because it is a social estimate. Every such interpretation of economic justice must derive its final authority from its agreement with the facts and equities of economic life and relations.

Proceeding from his false assumption that "just price is but an equivalent of value", and that "just price is determined by social utility", Dr. Cleary logically infers the justice of interest on loans. According to the "social estimate" of lenders and borrowers, one hundred dollars loaned now is the economic equivalent of one hundred and five dollars returned one year hence. Hence the payment of five per cent in addition to the restoration of the principal is but the just price of the loan. Nevertheless, we have seen that this kind of "social estimate" has of itself nothing to do with the morality of the transaction, and does not even pretend to be an ethical judgment. The "social estimate" which impels men to demand and to pay five per cent, or any other per cent, on loans has no more ethical significance or authority than that other "social estimate" which evaluates exploited woman labor as worth only starvation wages.

Proceeding logically from another false assumption, Dr. Cleary reaches another false conclusion. Since, he contends, the "social estimate" constitutes and creates just price, interest on loans is just independently of the virtual productivity of money, and of every other objective factor (p. 190). The "social estimate" creates the economic value of loans, and economic value is the equivalent of just price. To this position the obvious reply is that given in the second last paragraph, namely, that the just price of a thing cannot be determined arbitrarily by any social group, and that it must always be based upon objective economic conditions.

Dr. Cleary maintains further that the theory of virtual productivity, which is adopted by the majority of moral theologians to-day, is not sufficiently comprehensive to justify all cases of interest on loans (p. 199). The fact that money is *generally* equivalent to producing capital, that it can *generally* be exchanged for productive goods, is not sufficient to make interest-taking morally legitimate by a lender who is *de facto* unable to put his money into a productive enterprise. When such a person does get interest for his money, he obtains a return for something that is not virtually productive *for him*. Therefore, the interest is not justified by considerations of virtual productivity.

This criticism overlooks one very important fact. Unlike the title or theory of *lucrum cessans*, the virtual-productivity theory puts the emphasis not on the lender but on the borrower. Interest on a loan is justified, according to the latter theory, because the borrower can use the money productively, and thus obtain the wherewith to pay the increment for its use. Consequently this justification applies directly to all loans that are used in production, whether or not they could have been thus employed by the lender. Loans that are not so utilized, that are devoted to purposes of consumption, can be justified on other grounds. If the lender would himself have used the money productively he has a claim to interest by the title of *lucrum cessans*. In many instances of consumptive loans, the borrower obtains from the money a service which is quite as important and as valuable as that received by the man who invests the loan in a factory or a field: for example, when the money is exchanged for an education, a much-needed

vacation, or medical expenses. These goods are not, indeed, directly productive, but they are none the less instrumental in strengthening the resources of the borrower. The very few loans that do not fall under any of the heads just enumerated, may properly claim interest on grounds of social equity and social welfare. To require every lender to be certain that he could either use his money productively himself, or that he was consigning it to someone who intended to employ it productively or quasi-productively, would be an unreasonable hardship. Those who were unable to comply with this requirement would be at an unfair disadvantage as compared with the other possessors of surplus money. Moreover, it is to the general advantage of society that money should be put in circulation rather than hoarded. Combined with the prevailing fact of virtual productivity, these considerations seem to be sufficient to justify interest-taking in the very rare cases that we are discussing. We except, of course, those instances in which the exaction of interest would specifically violate charity or justice toward the borrower.

In the opinion of the present writer, neither virtual productivity nor any other consideration or theory has yet been proved to be an *absolute* justification of interest on loans. All that is here asserted is that virtual productivity, as explained and supplemented above, renders such interest quite as lawful morally as interest on producing capital. To justify the latter kind of interest is one of the most important and difficult tasks awaiting the present-day moralist.[3]

Dr. Cleary's attempt to vindicate the reasoning upon which the medieval theologians based their condemnation of interest, and to harmonize it with his own argument, cannot be called an unqualified success (pp. 201, 202). Both he and the theologians start from the principle that interest can be justified only as part of the just price of a loan, and they both interpret just price as that which is equivalent to the "value" of the loan. But their interpretations of the value in question differ fundamentally. In the view of the theologians, money had no use or value apart from its substance; for the first use of money is to consume it, i. e. to pass it out of one's possession. A man

[3] See articles by the writer in the *Catholic University Bulletin*, April and May, 1914.

cannot use money, and retain it, as in the case of a house or a field. When he receives back the equivalent of the substance, that is, when he recovers a sum equal to the amount loaned, the lender obtains the equivalent of all the uses of the money as well as the equivalent of its substance; for none of these uses remains to either the lender or the borrower after the money has passed out of their hands. In other words, when the principal is returned, the full *value* of the loan is repaid. The value of the loan does not exceed the face value of the sum lent.

According to Dr. Cleary, however, the value of a loan is determined by the *social estimate* of its utility. "Now if society thinks that a right to present coin, or ownership of present coin, possesses a higher rate of utility than is possessed by the same quantity of coin when payable at a future date, then clearly it is not a just sale when the same physical quantity of coin is returned for a loan. In the concrete—if society thinks that 100 pounds ready cash is as valuable as 105 pounds payable twelve months hence, the true equivalent, and consequently the just price, of 100 pounds is 105 pounds payable at the end of the year" (p. 188). In the Middle Ages, continues Dr. Cleary, repayment of the principal was regarded as the full economic equivalent of both the uses and the substance of money loaned: in our time men attribute to loans a different and higher value. Consequently interest is now lawful, and the medieval theologians could to-day sanction it without violating logic or consistency.

But Dr. Cleary overlooks the fundamental difference between the medieval and his own interpretation of "value". In the former conception, the value of loans did not depend upon the estimates or evaluations made by borrowers and lenders, nor upon any notion held by society or any section of society, nor upon any economic circumstances peculiar to that time, nor upon any other variable fact or condition. The theologians of the Middle Ages did not say in effect, as Dr. Cleary would have them say: "Usury is unjust because the current desires, estimates, and practices of men regard the return of the principal as the full equivalent of a loan." They based their condemnation upon the objective, unvarying, and physical nature of money, from the physical fact that the use of

money is inseparable from its substance. Their interpretation of the value of money was founded upon this fact, and upon this fact alone. Now this fact is independent alike of social estimates and of economic conditions. It is as obvious and vital to-day as when the condemnation of interest resting upon it was first formulated in substance by Aristotle. It will continue to be a fact as long as money exists. Consequently the theological argument is quite as valid, or as invalid, to-day as it was in the Middle Ages.

Moreover, those economic circumstances upon which Dr. Cleary relies to justify interest-taking at present were operative, essentially, in medieval society. And we may be quite certain that they did not escape the attention of the theologians. In the Middle Ages large numbers of men did regard interest as necessary to complete the economic value of a loan. No better proof of this statement can be desired than the numerous instances in which men actually paid interest in spite of all the prohibitions of Church and State, and the much greater number of instances in which they would have paid interest if no prohibition had been in force. Indeed, if a large section of medieval borrowers and lenders had not regarded loans as economically worth interest, all the anti-usury legislation would have been superfluous. And yet it is precisely this social valuation of loans, this fact that lenders and borrowers are willing to accept and to pay interest, that Dr. Cleary brings forward to prove the lawfulness of interest to-day. But the medieval theologians would have none of this reasoning. They disregarded the very palpable fact that men attributed this value to loans, and based their doctrine solely upon the physical nature of money.

The proportion of the population that regarded loans as economically worth interest was, indeed, considerably smaller in the Middle Ages than it is at present. Nevertheless it was sufficiently large to create a market for loans, and to put a valuation upon them that had quite as much social and economic authority and significance as the valuation of any other commodity that is dealt in by a small section of society; for example, roller-skates and champagne. Nor is Dr. Cleary's reasoning based upon any such distinction, upon any contention that the appraisers of loans in the Middle Ages were too

few to create an authoritative social estimate, and to give to loans a value that was morally equivalent to interest. Had his argument taken this direction it would have been consistent with his general theory of just price, although it would not have brought about a reconciliation of his position with that of the theologians.

Again, he might have argued thus: the value and just price of loans is determined wholly, even arbitrarily, by the social estimate, regardless of objective facts and considerations; now the doctrine of the theologians constituted the social estimate in the Middle Ages, while the attitude of borrowers and lenders constitutes the social estimate to-day; therefore, there is no inconsistency between the medieval condemnation of interest and the modern sanction thereof. While the major premise is untrue, the argument would have been consistent with his fundamental assumption. But he does not use this argument. He brings in the *economic circumstances* of both medieval and modern times, and these, as we have seen, do not affect the force of the theological condemnation at all.

If Dr. Cleary has failed in the attempt to reconcile the medieval argument with his own position, if he has failed to justify the former, in what way can it be justified? Apparently no satisfactory defence is possible; for the argument proceeded from an inadequate analysis of the utility and value of money. Although the uses or utilities of money are inseparable from its substance, their economic value is not always fully expressed in the face value of the substance. Now it is the uses or utilities of money, not its substance, that men evaluate, and for which they are willing to pay. The exchange-use, the function of commanding goods in return for itself, is indeed the primary use of money; but not the only use. When a sum of money loaned for a year enables the borrower to get control of a farm, a factory, or some other kind of productive property, and to have at the end of the year not only the face value of the money borrowed, but a considerable sum in addition, then the uses or utilities of money evidently are not fully expressed or paid for in the mere return of the principal. In these circumstances the sum total of the utilities of the loan are economically equivalent to the substance of the money, its face value, plus the fraction of itself called interest.

Undoubtedly the medieval theologians were aware of this loan-utility of money, but they underestimated its importance, and thus underestimated its ethical equivalent or just price. Their conception of money was too physical, and not sufficiently economic; too much concentrated upon money in itself, and not sufficiently attentive to its relations.

Would an adequate view of the utilities and value of money have logically and necessarily justified interest in the Middle Ages? By no means. The practice of interest-taking can be neither vindicated nor condemned on any such narrow basis as the economic estimates of borrowers and lenders. The only sufficient ground for general action and policy in this matter is the welfare of the community as a whole. Now it is the practically unanimous verdict of economic historians that the Church's prohibition of usury was a good thing for the medieval communities. At that time the great majority of loans were for purposes of consumption, such as purchasing the necessaries of life, or for such productive ends as the provision of artisans' tools, and of the materials required for the agricultural operations of the peasants. While large numbers of these classes of borrowers would have paid interest rather than be deprived of a loan, and consequently would have regarded interest as the economic equivalent of the use of money, the practice of exacting interest would have been in most cases a hardship to the borrower. It would have been extortionate and unfair, just as the starvation wages which the sweated worker accepts to-day are extortionate and unfair. The fact that many cases existed in which the medieval borrower could have paid interest with as little inconvenience as attends the average loan at present, is no more an objection to the general prohibition than is the fact that many individuals are inconvenienced by the general institution of private landownership. It is the institution in general and the sum total of its effects upon human welfare that are the supreme considerations. Judged by this standard, the Church's prohibition of interest in the Middle Ages, and her toleration of it to-day, are equally justified.

As Catholics we should do well to bear in mind that it is the ecclesiastical prohibition itself that we are called upon to defend, and not any particular argument or reasoning employed by theologians.

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THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY.

I.

I HAD always felt that there was something unsound in one method of studying Moral Theology — the method that passes lightly over principles and discussions and concentrates itself on learning the practical conclusions in each case. But it was years before I saw wherein lay the unsoundness. It was made clear to me by a conference paper, in which the proponent thought he had tried to take the most lenient line possible, but was surprised to find that some of his hearers thought him intolerably strict. The divergence can be seen by considering one question which arose—the question of absolving a man who constantly relapses into the same sin.

Anyone who is truly sorry can be absolved unto seventy times seven times if necessary. But when there is a special reason to doubt his sorrow, the priest must take special care to be sure that the applying penitent is sorry. And certainly, constant relapses are a reason for doubting if there be true sorrow, and therefore a reason for making specially sure.

These are the principles governing the question. In a theology book these principles are followed by discussions, rules, applications, decisions. All these are to help us to master the principles and to apply them clearly and surely.

Now the sound method of study is to use these details in order to master the principles. It is unsound to let them replace the principles. Because all that follows, follows from the principles, and depends on them, and is to be tested by them.

In the case of the relapsing sinner, what follows is something like this. How am I to be specially sure that he is sorry? Well, suppose you found him crying before the altar, or suppose he had come twenty miles to get to confession, you could be pretty sure that he was sorry. So these two instances are mentioned in theology books. Then other writers say there are many other signs of great sorrow; and they each give new instances, whereby the list grows. These instances all help to clear our minds as to how we may recognize real sorrow. But this list can never replace the principle which it is illustrating; and here is just the mistake that students are liable to

make. Instead of the principle, "A man can be absolved if he is truly sorry", we are told that "a man can be absolved if he (1) weeps, or (2) walks a long distance to confession, or (3) etc., etc." This is substituting illustrations for the principle.

To begin with, the method is so narrow as to be misleading. You might carry on your illustrations to hundreds and thousands of signs of sorrow, and still not cover the case of *everyone* who is sorry. It is like trying to make a list of the ways in which a man may show politeness, or anger. The list may help you to recognize anger, or politeness. But if it leads you to say "This man is not polite, because he has not done any of the things on my list", you are letting it deceive you. So it would be simply false to say, "A man cannot be absolved unless he shows one of the signs of sorrow that have been catalogued by theologians," because a man can quite well be sorry without showing it in any of those particular ways. The truth is only to be adequately expressed as a principle—the man must be sorry; not by any accumulation of instances. The proponent of the conference thus seemed to himself lenient because he had gathered all the possible instances of sorrow from all available authors and would allow absolution in all of them, whereas to others he seemed intolerably narrow because he limited sorrow to a definite number of manifestations.

The habit of mind induced in the confessor by an unsound method of study may be disastrous. It habituates him to thinking not about sorrow, which is the all-important thing, but about signs of sorrow, which do not really matter for their own sake. It may seem fanciful to suggest that the signs of sorrow, which should of course reveal sorrow to us, may have the contrary effect if studied purely in themselves—may make us lose sight of sorrow. But anyone who remembers how easy it is to lose all reverence in one's zeal for rubrics (which are meant to be the outward signs of reverence), will see that this also is possible.

If the confessor's habit of mind is to look to the one important thing, sorrow, and if in all illustrations and instances he sees only the one great question, "Is the man sorry?" then his attitude to a relapsing sinner is quite simple. "It is very hard for this man to be truly sorry; it is my business to help him to be sorry before I absolve him"—and he devotes himself to doing so.

But the confessor whose thoughts are all on signs of sorrow is in such multiplicity of distraction as would move pity if all our pity were not needed for the neglected penitent. In extreme cases, where the unsound method has been followed with conscientious stubbornness, the result is something like this: "I can remember fifteen extraordinary signs of sorrow, and this man shows none of them. But I think there is another in Noldin, which I can't remember, and perhaps he has that. So I suppose I ought to give him the benefit of the doubt and absolve him." Or in another case: "I'm sure this man is not sorry. But he has come three and one-half miles, and there is a probable opinion that three and one-half miles is a long distance; and St. Alphonsus says that a man who comes a long distance can be absolved. So I suppose he has a right to absolution."

Needless to say, St. Alphonsus never imagined that walking a long distance was a qualification for absolution. He did consider it as some evidence to help the confessor in knowing whether the penitent *is* penitent.

It seems to me that this attitude of mind, even in less extreme cases, perverts moral science into an immoral science. It studies externals and neglects internals, studies the embodiment and neglects the thing embodied, with the usual result of alternately sanctioning the wrong and condemning the right. I will try to make clearer in what this perversion consists.

In dealing with the virtues of truth, honesty, purity, and the rest, theologians have to make clear that there are things which at first sight seem to violate these virtues, yet do not in reality. They give instances, one of which we may consider. It is pointed out that to the same question, "Have you seen the emperor?" truth may sometimes require us to answer "Yes" and "No" in the same breath. The aide-de-camp with a telegram wants to know have you seen the emperor lately, and to him the true answer is "No". The sightseer wants to know have you ever seen him, and to him the true answer is "Yes, hundreds of times". The purpose of these illustrations is to teach us to see the principle in the concrete case, and not to be misled by the external form; in the present instance, to teach us that the thing that matters is the truthfulness of the answer, and not the external accuracy of the words. The

whole point of the example is that you cannot judge of the answer at all if you merely consider it as a set of words, an external speech. The only way to judge it is to fix your attention on the truthfulness or untruthfulness that embodies itself in that answer. So in regard to apparent offences against other virtues, we constantly meet the formula *Non illico arguendus est*, meaning that you cannot straightway conclude that he is guilty from a mere external statement of what he did. To know that a man at the same time carves the meat and prays, is to know nothing. The question for his conscience is, "Did devotion lead him to pray during his work, or did indevotion lead him to carve during grace?"

By such examples theologians do all that can be done to train the student to see the act as a living whole, and not to divorce the body of it from the soul of it. Nevertheless in some instances their work is perverted by the student. The perversion takes this form:

"In the chapter on truthfulness I find that when you have seen a person hundreds of times you may still truthfully say you have not seen him.

"Also that in reply to the same question you may truthfully answer 'Yes' to one person and 'No' to another.

"In the chapter on reverence I find that it is not necessarily irreverent to carve during prayers.

"Similarly in regard to honesty, modesty, and other virtues, I find a great many equally improbable things set down as not necessarily wrong."

It is obvious that this perverting consists in ignoring the soul of the action altogether and considering only the body of it. In looking at the action, this student does not look at the truthfulness or the reverence of it at all, but only at its external form. The result is an attempt to classify actions as right and wrong merely by their external form, with consequent scruples at one end and laxity at the other. One man makes an attempt to change his ordinary forms of speech, saying e. g. "No, I have not seen him within the last thirty or forty minutes," in the perfectly vain hope of making all his words irreproachably accurate, no matter from what point of view they may be judged, instead of being content with giving a true answer.

On the other hand he permits himself and others to do things which are really wrong. His natural conscience suspects that they are violations of truth, modesty, or justice, as they are indeed; but his trained mind tells him—quite truly—that, by his method of judging, these things are indistinguishable from things which the books say are not necessarily wrong. I think the examples I have given make it clear that the fault is in his method of judging. He has trained himself—not to see instantly the soul of the action—but to compare the bodily forms of actions one with another, in complete disregard of the soul which is the one thing that matters. This is a perverted training, making moral science immoral. Imagine a man in temptation, whose greed or laziness or other passion whispers that it would like to find vent in a certain form; imagine him consulting his books to see if that external form has been catalogued as necessarily wrong, and by that test settling the rightness or wrongness of the action. His training has led him to pass by unseen the question which conscience naturally raises: "Is not this sloth?" "Is not that covetousness?" and to substitute for it a false and artificial test. It is this perversion that Cardinal Manning seems to have had in mind when he wrote that "Theology cannot hold out forever against Conscience".

II.

Here is an analogous perversion regarding the laws of the Church. A stranger once stopped me in the street to ask this question: "Am I entitled to make my Easter duties? I am visiting in a strange parish, and the priest there wants me to pay a heavy assessment as Easter dues, and refuses me absolution till I do. I don't see that I am bound to pay, because I pay my Easter dues at home, and I make all the usual offerings here, and I think I have done my duty in regard to supporting the Church."

Assuming his story to be true, it seems to me that the priest had lost sight of principles in two ways. First as to the position of the Church laws, and then as to confession.

The position of Church laws is this. Behind them is a divine command, and the divine commission to the Church that she is to teach us to observe that command. There is the

divine command, "Deny yourself", and the Church says, "Deny yourselves by fasting and abstaining; your own bishop will tell you on what days and to what extent". There is the divine command to sanctify one day in the week. The Church says, "Let it be Sunday, and sanctify it by hearing Mass; your parish priest will tell you the time of Mass". And the parish priest says, "Mass will begin at eleven, and will last two hours". There is the divine command that they who preach the Gospel shall live by the Gospel. The Church is to teach us to observe this command, and she says, "Contribute in proportion to your means". And in some places she says, "Your parish priest will tell you what proportion to give". And the parish priest draws up his assessment list.

In all of these the divine command presents itself to us embodied in a form determined partly by the Church and partly by the local clergy. Now I suggest that it is easy to lose sight of the divine element in these commands, and to attend only to the parish priest's element; and thereby to lose one's sense of proportion. If your anxiety is that this man should give to God for the propagation of the Gospel, you will probably form a reasonable judgment on his case. If your anxiety is that he should give to you according to your assessment list, then you have lost sight of what really matters and you will probably judge unreasonably.

It is true of course that in the concrete the divine command and the Church's command and the priest's command are one and the same thing. To a man who has no difficulty in going to Mass, the question "Are you going to keep Sunday holy?" means in practice "Are you going to the eleven o'clock Mass?" And it is also true that the human regulations are made by divine authority and therefore bind in conscience. To deny that the Church has the right to legislate and to appoint the local clergy to regulate details, would be to deny her divine commission to teach us. But that does not make the human regulations of equal importance with the divine command. If we ask the Church, "Has the particular form in which you have put this command the same authority as the command itself?" she answers, "No, I have put it in that form for convenience; I may change it any day. Those who can keep it in that form are bound to; I have authority to insist on that.

But I recognize that to some people the particular form may cause inconveniences which do not come from the command itself. God did not send me to bind you to those inconveniences, and I do not. A great inconvenience excuses you from one of my great commandments, a small inconvenience from a small commandment. But if you cannot obey the command in the way I prescribe, obey it in some other way; I cannot dispense you from the divine command."

Now what is true of the Church's legislation — that it is made not to take the place of the divine commands but only to help to get them obeyed—is true of the parish priest's regulations, and in a greater degree. They are not the commandment. The right view of them is that they are means to facilitate the observance of the commandment, helps to bring souls to God. Like the Church's laws they must be changed readily when the good of souls requires it; and they do not bind individuals when they cause serious inconvenience.

In the case I am speaking of, the real question was, "Had the man adequately contributed to the support of the Church?" and by his own showing he surely had. The priest might say, "He should have paid his Easter dues here instead of at home;" and the home priest might take the opposite view. It seems to me that that is putting the parish regulations in the place of the command of God. It is not by such things that a man is to be tried in confession.

As to confession also it seems to me that principles were overlooked in this case. A man who is not conscious of neglecting the duty of supporting the Church is not bound to mention the subject in confession, any more than any other commandment which he has not broken. And the confessor need not mention it either, unless he has positive reason to think that the penitent is tempted to hide something, or has a false conscience on the point. In that case the confessor must instruct. But when he has instructed fully we must come back to first principles. The only matter of confession is conscious wilful sin; and for purposes of confession, the ultimate judge of whether the penitent has done wrong is the penitent's own conscience, fully instructed, by all means, and acting honestly. But he is the ultimate witness as to the fact of sin or no sin—he and not the priest. Unless he sees that he is bound, he can-

not transgress; and without conscious transgression there is nothing to repent of and nothing to confess—no formal sin, in technical language. But further, in this case, objectively also the question was one on which the penitent and not the priest is the judge. The priest explains the law and gives his own opinion on the circumstances as far as he knows them; but in the end it is the penitent who has to make up his mind as to whether e. g. he can without serious inconvenience fast, or attend a two hours' Mass beginning at eleven, or pay his assessment as in the present case. He must of course consider the priest's opinion, as children must consider their parents' opinion before deciding about marriage. But having considered it, he must make up his own mind. And by his own conscience he must be judged in confession.

III.

In the discussions of moral problems that take place among priests, whether in conferences or in print, one sometimes finds that deductions and examples are allowed to usurp the place of the principles from which they depend, in a way that makes for confusion of teaching, and usually for laxness. The process is something like this:

A theologian gives many instances to illustrate his one principle. Some of these instances may be not very thoroughly thought out. Sometimes it may merely be that the principle he is explaining does not seem to be violated by this particular instance, and therefore unguardedly he says, "This is lawful". Then another writer takes up the instance as sanctioned by the authority of the first, argues out relentlessly the principles which are really involved in it, and then—the ways part. It seems to me that the right conclusion is only this: our author would have canceled this illustration if he had considered it more carefully, since it goes against his principles. But often the line taken is quite the opposite: our author has sanctioned this instance; in sanctioning it he implicitly admitted a new principle [this is true as logic, but false as history, for he never admitted the new principle]; therefore we shall have to remodel the principles which he and all previous writers have laid down.

This is treating the instances as being the substance of the author's teaching, and his principles as a mere fringe.

At first sight this might be mistaken for the perfectly legitimate process of testing principles by taking instances; in reality it reverses that process. In the legitimate process we say, "When you test the principle by these instances, it becomes clear that Suarez's statement of the principle needs to be corrected" — an appeal from authority to common sense. But here the argument is this: "I cannot give you common sense for this principle; but it has the authority of Suarez, since he implicitly admits it in one of his unconsidered illustrations"— an appeal from common sense to authority.

Is there much of this unguarded and unconsidered writing? In the sense in which I am speaking, there is. When a writer's mind is full of one principle or one aspect of a question, he says things that seem luminously clear in the light of that principle—so clear that it seems an excess of caution to wonder how they will look in another light. Some instances may show this better.

I should not expect Father Tanquerey to write this sentence in a treatise on the Temporal Power of the Pope:

Utriusque potestatis, spiritualis et temporalis, in eodem principe consociatio incurabili tyrannidi favet, omnemque libertatem paulatim tollit.[1]

Nor in his advice to Catholics troubled with doubts against the faith should I expect the following:

Si quis autem dubitet quaenam sit vera Ecclesia, inquirere et orare debet, donec tandem omne rationabile dubium excusserit.[2]

Similarly, if the English Catholic under Queen Elizabeth had applied to standard theologians of their time, I doubt whether this is the ruling that would have been sent them:

Nunquam omnino licitum est rebellare. Nimis perniciosum in hac re fuit principium Joannis Gersonis, qui ausus est asserere, quod monarcha potest legitime a tota natione judicari si regnum injuste regat; principium inquio non tantum falsum sed perniciosissimum.[3]

[1] *Theol. Dogm. Fundamentalis*, p. 275.
[2] Ibid., p. 439.
[3] Gury Bailerini, II, 386.

These passages are of course statements of principles, but they will serve to illustrate my point. They were written when the authors' minds were occupied with definite problems: in the first case, Mahommedanism; in the second, inquiring Protestants; in the third, probably the threat of revolt in the Papal States; and at the time no doubt they seemed to the writers to be clear as daylight. It may be logical to conclude that from these passages we know what Father Tanquerey would say about the Temporal Power and about doubt-shaken Catholics, and what is Ballerini's judgment on the Pilgrimage of Grace and on the American War of Independence. But it is just as logical and probably far truer to conclude that the passages were written unguardedly.

I think it is evident that in this sense most of the conclusions and discussions and illustrations of theologians are only partly thought out. They are thought out in their context. As part of that one definite process of thought they do represent the writer's mind. But isolated from their context, they may imply a great deal that never actually entered the writer's mind. It is unsound therefore to say that the writer admitted all these implications, and to appeal to them as established by his authority.

Now what I am arguing against is the practice of quoting decisions and conclusions and examples as if they had by now attained the rank of first principles and axioms, behind which we need not attempt to go. They can never attain that rank. The most universal consensus of opinion that they are inevitable deductions from accepted principles does not alter the fact that they are deductions, and the only safe way to argue from them is to see them in the light of their principles.

Ballerini quotes the following from St. Alphonsus: [4]

Tamen puto nullo modo posse eos excusari saltem a veniali, quidquid dicat Sanchez cum aliis.

Here evidently was a point which had not been thought out sufficiently to satisfy St. Alphonsus. Sanchez, looking at it in every way he could think of, could see no reason for condemning it. Possibly all others agree with him. St. Alphonsus feels

[4] Lib. 6, n. 918.

that there is something wrong about it, but cannot formulate it in a way to make the wrongness obvious. Possibly some day some theologian will see that there is something involved which Sanchez overlooked and which St. Alphonsus felt but could not define. Then Sanchez's conclusion will have to be revised. Meanwhile, *as a conclusion*, it stands and may be safely followed in practice. But, as a basis for further argument it does not stand. You cannot put it into the position of a first principle and say you will base your argument on the known lawfulness of this act. You cannot say that from the lawfulness of this act you will argue back to the lawfulness of all the elements involved in it. Possibly in your analysis you have put your finger on the very element that disturbed St. Alphonsus and eluded him. You cannot argue that since this act is lawful, so also are other analogous acts. Because the analogy may — may — depend on the possible undetected element of wrong. The only sound way of arguing from it is to state it in the light of the principles from which it is an as yet unshaken conclusion. If you say that it is agreed that the act does not violate this, this, and this principle by which it has been tested, you are on safe ground; you can argue by analogy as to whether other acts violate these principles. But if you leave the principles aside and take the conclusion as your foundation, you are attributing to it a solidity which it never possessed—you are treating a probably safe scaffolding as if it were the solid earth.

A theological writer may do harm by using deductions and conclusions as instruments to undermine and relax principles; —and also by treating principles so briefly and details so lengthily that the student is practically trained to occupy his mind with the details and ignore the principles—though he is warned formally that this method is wrong.

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THE JUNIOR NOVITIATE—ITS AIM AND DEVELOPMENT.

THE term "Junior Novitiate" is used to designate the preparatory department of the Normal Training of young people destined to become members of our teaching orders. It is called Junior Novitiate or Juniorate because it precedes the Novitiate both in time and purpose. To it are admitted postulants of from thirteen to sixteen years of age. The junior novitiate of our religious teaching orders bears therefore a similar relation to the regular novitiate as does the preparatory seminary to the theological seminary of the diocesan clergy.

A special interest attaches to the subject since, for some years past, the question of adequate preparation for an efficient teaching system in our primary and secondary schools has formed the principal topic of discussion at educational conventions, and in particular at the annual meetings of the Catholic Educational Association. Our clergy in particular have become interested in the matter of stimulating inquiry into methods of preparation and organization, because on them devolves the duty, in the main, of bringing our parish school system up to the high level which modern culture demands; yet in such wise that the religious training of heart and mind remain paramount. Hence we deem it of interest to the readers of THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW, as the leaders in the field of Catholic education, to set forth the system of preparation adopted by our religious teaching orders, and in particular by the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools of which the writer is a member. To understand the full bearing and importance of the subject it is necessary to enter somewhat into the history and development of the Junior Novitiate.

ORIGIN OF THE JUNIOR NOVITIATE.

The junior novitiate is not the creation of recent times. Coeval with the dawn of the cloistral schools, we find the junior novitiate. The conditions that required the establishment of such an institution were quite as imperative in the fourth century as are those prevailing at the present time. The cloistral schools were composed of youths aspiring to the monastic life, as well as of those intended for worldly pursuits. They were nurseries of noble minds and generous souls—schools for the advancement of virtue and science in those who

wished to serve God through the noble ministry of teaching youth. For the proper organization of the cloistral schools, we are especially indebted to Saint Benedict, the father of monastic life in the West. To this Saint and his disciples the world owes a debt of lasting honor and gratitude for their services in behalf of religion, science, and culture. Saint De La Salle writes on this subject: "The education of children appeared of such great importance to Saint Benedict that a great number of them were admitted into the monastery, where they were instructed in the sciences and in piety. Saint Maur was only eight years old when he was received. Some of his associates were of the same age. They were brought up with the greatest care and attention, never being allowed to go abroad except in company with one of the monks. Thus they became such models of virtue that it could be said of them, the more their purity resembled that of the angels the less the knowledge they had of the malice of men." [1]

At the early age of seven, the Venerable Bede was given over to the charge of Benedict Biscop. This zealous promoter of learning, piety, and useful arts founded the monasteries of Wearmouth and Jarrow. Under his guidance Bede grew up, keeping intact from the world and its evil ways and dangerous examples. As he advanced in years and his intellect matured, he became the light and leader in culture to his confrères, and their model in every virtue. "Bede is the living encyclopedia of his age. His knowledge embraces all that time has left of Greek and Roman civilization. He stands out the greatest intellect in the whole range of the Old English period." [2]

The happy and favored children of the cloistral schools were constant witnesses of beautiful deeds of piety, kindness, and simplicity, and they responded to these advantages. Charity united their innocent hearts; benignity rested on their tongues, and purity mantled their bodies. They were filled with a goodness that was reflected by their serene and pleasing demeanor. Kind in words and happy in thought, no restraint by fear or threats or stripes ever marred the consciousness of their innocent lives. In the classroom no trace could be seen of the sickly and enervating influence of idleness or effeminacy. The

[1] *Meditations,* Vol. II, p. 394.
[2] *The Development of Old English Thought,* Brother Azarias, p. 155.

old halls were lighted by high and grated windows, furnished with benches of hard oak that bore the marks of scholastic industry. On its plain walls hung the Cross and the image of Our Blessed Lady, to quicken faith and inspire devotion. The fears, troubles, and rumors of a distracting world ever remained outside the monastic walls. "The master of the monastic schools was not to be hard, clamorous, and reproachful; but putting on the bowels of a mother, he was to be gentle and affectionate, so that whatever the scholars had at heart, they might securely and sincerely trust to him." [3]

Racine draws a beautiful picture of the cloistral school: "O thrice happy the child whom the Lord loves, who hears His voice betimes, and whom God Himself deigns to instruct; nourished far from the world, adorned from first youth with all the gifts of heaven, the contagious company of the wicked taints not his innocence. So grows the young lily, in a retired vale, on the banks of a limpid stream, sheltered from the wind of the north, the object of nature's love!" [4] Under such conditions vocation to the religious life ripened early in the young mind. Thus we learn that when the sons of Tecelin were leaving their father's castle in order to enter the monastery of the Cistercians, they met Nivard, their younger brother, at play. Guido, the eldest, embraced him and said: "My little brother Nivard, do you see this castle and these lands? Well, all this will be yours—yours alone." "What!" replied the child, with more than a child's thoughtfulness, "are you going to take heaven for yourselves and leave earth for me? The division is not equal." [5] He joined his brothers and set out for Citeaux.

At all times it has been the privilege of the young instinctively to perceive the reflection of that interior calm and contentment which possesses the soul of the humble, prayerful and retiring religious. There is about such religious a charm that captivates, a gentle courtesy that attracts even the man of the world, because it manifests the desire to honor Christ as His disciple and to serve and render happy the children of God. By this influence the young are drawn to the religious state;

[3] *Mores Catholici,* Digby, Vol. I, p. 617.

[4] *Athalie,* II, 9.

[5] *Life and Times of St. Bernard,* Ratisbonne, p. 54.

the members of a community not only reflect honor upon the order, but make their convent a paradise whence emanate continually inspiration to whatever is good and holy. Cardinal Newman, speaking of the two kinds of schools in the Benedictine houses, says: "However, true as it was that boys, who were there from childhood intrusted to the monks, bound themselves by no vows, but could leave when they pleased, marry, go to the court, or enter the army, still a great many of the cleverest of them were led, either by the habits which they acquired from their intercourse with their teachers, or by their persuasion, to enter the monastic life." [6]

JUNIOR NOVITIATE OF ST. JOHN BAPTIST DE LA SALLE.

Two hundred and thirty years ago, in the city of Rheims, France, a bright and pious boy, fifteen years of age, came to Saint De La Salle and besought him to be accepted as a member of the Brothers of the Christian Schools. The Saint, fearing that one so young would find the exercises of community life too trying to nature, pointed out the difficulties in the way of accepting him, and advised him to wait for some time. The generous youth, however, expostulated and repeated so earnestly his appeal to be admitted that the Saint acceded to his request. No sooner had acceptance been granted than three others applied for admission. After examining into the health and dispositions of each, the Saint received them. It was this chosen little band of four which caused Saint De La Salle to decide upon the formation of the junior novitiate. The needs of these boys were most carefully studied before he gave them a rule respecting their conduct and their physical, intellectual and spiritual formation. The heart of a Father and the prudence of a Founder are beautifully exemplified in the rules he drew up for this tender portion of his spiritual flock. Few exercises of a spiritual nature were assigned, and each for a short period of time; studies suited to their age and talent were mapped out, with frequent intermission for recreation. An experienced and elderly Brother was placed over them. An adjoining building to the community house afforded excellent classrooms, dormitory, refectory, and recreation hall for the juniorate. Within two months, the number of postulants had increased to twelve. So gratifying was this venture that a

[6] *Historical Sketches,* Vol. III, p. 156.

similar institution was opened in Paris. During the Franco-Prussian war the Brothers became very popular, owing to the devotion with which they undertook every sacrifice in the cause of suffering humanity for love of their country and of God. As a result, after the war there were numerous accessions of those who wished to enter the novitiate. Among them were many too young for the senior novitiate. To accommodate such, many junior novitiates were opened in the various provinces of France. Prior to the recent suppression of the religious houses in France, the Superior General, in anticipation of drastic laws, removed the junior novitiates to other parts of Europe, and thus secured the permanence of this fruitful feeder of the institute. It is needless to state here that the Junior Novitiate has the approval of the Holy See. To the Brothers of the Christian Schools founded by St. De la Salle a special endorsement was granted for their Junior Novitiate on 14 December, 1910. His Holiness Pius X with wonted benevolence sent his benediction not only to the junior novices, but to their parents, to the Brothers employed in the junior novitiates, and to all who aid in the recruitment of these novitiates. Following is the translation of the Apostolic Benediction:

To the beloved Junior Novices of the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, to the zealous priests, Brothers and laity who are occupied in their recruitment, to the families who consecrate them to God in the Institute of Saint John Baptist de La Salle, to the Directors and Professors who bring them up in the holy fear of God, we impart with all our heart the Apostolic Benediction. From the Vatican, 14 December, 1910.

With the disciples of Saint De La Salle, the junior novitiate is a preparatory normal school for boys wishing to enter the Institute, from between thirteen and sixteen years of age. Their time in this department is divided between prayer, study, recreation, and manual labor. They are separated from the departments of the novitiate, and have their own study-halls, playgrounds, and gymnasium. The junior novitiate brings the boy simply to the threshold of the novitiate, to which he can be promoted only when he has attained the required age and given satisfactory evidence of possessing the essential qualifications for one aspiring to become a member of the Brother-

hood. When a student fails to show signs of fitness for the life of a Brother, the parent is notified by the Brother Director, and arrangements are made for the return of the boy to his home. The Brother Director sets aside all sentiment in such cases, and considers himself simply as the representative of the Brotherhood who is obliged to protect the interests of the parent, the boy, and the religious society. Comparatively speaking, few boys desire to withdraw. The pleasing companionship and the happy, active life, appealing to the boy's best aspirations, found within the junior novitiate, have a special charm for the young heart.

How greatly the Brothers of the Christian Schools value the importance of Christian education, need not be emphasized. It is the chief aim and business of their lives. Leo XIII, addressing the Brothers, pointed out in soul-stirring words not only their sublime vocation but also the great need of an increase of laborers in their chosen field:

> I charge you to increase your numbers in order to resist the efforts of atheists and materialists who are endeavoring to destroy Christian education, which can alone regenerate society, and to engage your subjects everywhere to consecrate themselves to this most necessary and deserving work. Multiply your schools, and let them everywhere reflect the zeal and devotedness of your Founder. . . . Go with my blessing; continue the great work that the Church has confided to you.[7]

The late venerated Brother Philip—Superior General of the Brothers of the Christian Schools 1838-1874—speaking of the excellence of the religious life, writes: "The religious state is, after the priesthood, the most suitable to promote the knowledge, love, and service of God, to raise up to Jesus Christ disciples entirely devoted to Him, and to form apostles whose hearts throb solely for His glory, and for the progress of the Church."[8] The same authority, referring to the advantages of the religious life, reminds us that, "Here we have all that is necessary; we do not possess superfluous things which would only serve to excite or countenance sensuality, vanity, and ambition, and which would only increase the void of our hearts.

[7] In private audience, 1888, granted to the Superior-General, Brother Gabriel-Marie, and his Assistants.

[8] *The Religious Life*, Vol. I, p. 26.

Here there is no anxiety for the future; there is no position to be made; there are no envious people to shun; no competitors to defeat; no domestic broils; no goods to acquire; no rights to defend; here we find friends and devoted Brothers, a family which, in our needs and infirmities, lavishes upon us the most constant and tender care."[9]

Qualifications for the Junior Novitiate

At a recent "Conference of Catholic Educators", one of its members, himself a prominent teacher, expressed his views as to the best method of fostering vocations to the ecclesiastical state and the religious teaching orders. His personal experience in the matter had taught him that adequate results are obtained only by invoking assiduously the light of the Holy Spirit for the fostering of divine vocations. He assured his hearers in the next place that his regular semi-monthly instructions, on vocation in general, for the classes and sodalities received the greatest care in their preparation. He would describe for his hearers the advantages and difficulties of the clerical, religious, and secular states. The privileges, benefits and dangers connected with each were honestly and clearly presented. He thought it a mistake to clothe the religious life in mystery, or to make of it a kind of secret or exclusive society. There are no secrets to be found in their rules, and the true statement of facts will always meet with the respect and esteem of sensible minds. Possibly some little points of discipline might be left out, as the mind of the young may not properly grasp at once their purpose. The fitness of candidates for the religious teaching orders must be judged by certain marks of personal character and moral disposition, not by exclusively intellectual standards. A deserving, pious young man or boy might not be suited to the work of teaching, whereas he would probably be successful in some other sphere of labor, and therefore serve the order in one of the many temporal employments connected with the teaching orders. Such applicants received the same attention and consideration bestowed on those who, being intellectually gifted, are fitted for the duties of teacher in the order. The marks which indicate as a rule the presence of a vocation in a young person

[9] *The Religious Life,* Vol. I, p. 31.

are the following: regularity in the frequentation of the Sacraments, the services of the Church; punctuality in the performance of one's private daily prayers; love for and obedience to parents, care and affection for brothers and sisters; an attraction toward the Divine Prisoner of the Tabernacle; a liking for objects of devotion, and a dislike for distinctly worldly pleasures; a fear of sin and the loss of grace; a general desire to do something for God; a certain pleasure and contentment felt in the presence of religious; admiration for the state of virginity; love for the peace, merit and reward promised to the good religious; the desire to have a vocation, with prayer accompanying it; a disposition to be lenient with the defects of others; sympathy with the pains, difficulties and annoyances of companions; a readiness to enter into whatever gives pleasure and joy to others; readiness to accept the innocent views and opinions of others, and to applaud the success of companions; a certain solicitude regarding the feelings and wants of classmates, a habit of seeking opportunities to oblige and render service; sufficient strength to endure the little fatigues connected with the religious life; a mind calm and deliberate, and capable of meeting the demands of study and the spiritual exercises; with a temperament not too nervous, and a conscience not too scrupulous; fair talents and a sound judgment; a generally happy and cheerful disposition; a firm and constant will, not easily unsettled or annoyed by changes and repugnances, by wavering and passions; serious and thoughtful in the choice of companions; taking pleasure in good reading; a ready disposition to obey and conform to the rules of the novitiate. Such are in general the indications that would prompt acceptance of a candidate for the junior novitiate.

But the demand of these qualifications must not be exaggerated. Occasionally one meets lay persons who have exaggerated opinions respecting the dispositions necessary for a candidate for the religious state. They refuse to credit the vocation of boys or girls because they observe in the latter outbursts of temper, signs of levity, and a love of legitimate pleasure. It must be remembered that the religious state is not intended to be the anchoring ground either for those who have absolutely no faults, nor for the world's wrecks, the "hard to please", for sour hearts and gloomy faces. In the

junior novitiate and the novitiate the young are expected to do their utmost to correct their faults and improve in virtue. Cardinal Wiseman, referring to this subject in his sketch of Pius VII, says: "If one sees the youthful aspirants to the religious institutes, here or abroad, in recreation or at study, he may easily decide who will persevere by a very simple rule. The joyous faces and the sparkling eyes denote the future monks far more surely than the demure looks and stolen glances." [10]

Special emphasis is to be placed upon the following suggestions: that the teacher be in close sympathy with the boys or girls manifesting premonitory signs for the religious state; that the teacher be first to approach the candidates, so as to remove all possible timidity from the young person; that short and frequent, happy and encouraging talks be had with the young, referring to the religious state; that the parents be spoken to in favor of the candidate, for the purpose of explaining the requirements and advantages of the religious state, and of removing any possible opposition, or rather to secure their consent; that parents be put in possession of literature referring to the religious state, for the intelligent direction of the boy or girl; that the intention proposed to the pupils for the regular class prayers be, once a week, "to know my vocation, and to obtain the grace of correspondence to it"; that candidates be encouraged to have implicit confidence in their confessor; that candidates make confidants of their intention only to the priest, parents, some disinterested friend or teacher; that communication with the superior, or member, of the religious community to which the candidate inclines be established as early as possible; that the actual entrance of the candidate into the religious state be effected without unnecessary delay; that the candidate be recommended to pray most earnestly, and to approach the Sacraments as often as the confessor directs, to secure God's assistance in this important matter. Referring to delay, the Rev. C. G. Rossignoli, S.J., remarks: "When you have not a strong reason for delay, and one which is approved of by your spiritual Father, carry out your design as soon as possible; for experience teaches that youths rarely maintain the fervor of vocation for a long time. A witticism

[10] *Recollections of the Last Four Popes*, p. 39.

from a companion or a few words from a relative are sometimes sufficient to stifle the good thought. . . . The devil is never better pleased than when a person delays his entrance into religion; for then he is almost sure that he will never enter." [11]

It has often been pointed out by those anxious to secure religious vocations, that many promising girls are wearing out their lives in stores and factories under most distressing conditions, when they could have a life spent in the service of our Blessed Lord, enjoying greater happiness in life, laying up great treasures in heaven, and doing incalculable good among the souls of the young.[12] The same may be said of many bright American boys, who, being industrious, obedient and well disposed, would be thoroughly capable of meeting the requirements of the religious teaching orders with comparative ease and pleasure. A fervent prayer, an encouraging word, some advice given as to the requirements for religious teaching orders, a reference to the happiness found within convent walls, will often suggest to the boy or girl to seek counsel on the subject of a religious vocation from his confessor. Many excellent boys and girls are most anxious to do something for God. Were they told of the welcome awaiting them within the religious state, of the special opportunities of doing good irrespective of wealth and rare talents and influence, of the security from the many troubles and annoyances that beset even the best and favored in the secular state, the religious teaching orders would have reason to rejoice over the increase of subjects in their junior novitiate and novitiate. Occasionally, we find dislikes and aversions to early business occupations, as well as failures and misfortunes, detaching the heart of the young from the love of creatures, raising from their eyes the shadows of delusive hopes, giving them a distaste for the things prized by the world, directing their love for the things of God, and suggesting the contentment and advantages surrounding the true religious. It is not difficult to secure such for the religious state. An experienced religious, referring to the Decree of 15 July, 1912, framed by the Commission appointed to examine the work of Canon Joseph Lahitton, *La*

[11] The Rev. Francis Cassilly, S.J., in *Choice of a State of Life*, pp. 192, 195.
[12] *Messenger of the Sacred Heart*, September, 1913.

vocation sacerdotale, says: "It may not be rash to conclude, in a similar way, of a religious vocation 'that nothing more is required of that person who is a candidate for religious life, in order that he may be admitted to the novitiate by the lawful superior of an order, than that he have a right intention, and such fitness of nature and grace required by the order, as will give a well-founded hope of his rightly discharging the obligations of the religious life in that order." [13]

At times we hear of a general want of vocations to the clerical and teaching orders. The grace of God is certainly not wanting, and the interests of religion demand laborers. While God has provided in the vegetable and the animal kingdoms for the continuation of the species, would it not be rash and unjust to Divine Providence to say that God has left sterile His Church? There are decidedly abundant seeds among the young. The seeds, however, require care and development so that they may not be exposed to sin, the lack of proper spiritual nutriment, and the evil influence of wicked companions. The spirit of the worldly-minded veils the convent and monastic life with gloom and despair, sings a requiem over the favored ones upon entering these asylums of peace and pleasure, and extends a blandishing smile to the foolish ones seeking happiness in the seductive pleasures of a sinful life. In an interesting and suggestive paper, "The Higher Life", the Rev. Walter Dwight, S.J., writes: "Superiors of religious orders and congregations in the United States are complaining of the difficulty they experience in securing suitable subjects as novices. . . . Yet our academies and high schools surely are rich in boys and girls whom God has intended from all eternity should become religious, and who have all the qualifications too for such a career. Yet through lack of prayer, instruction, guidance or opportunity they never find the place in the Divine plan that is theirs, and in consequence attain neither on earth nor in heaven that measure of happiness they would have had, if they had only taken the vows of religion." [14]

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

BROTHER DENIS.

Ammendale, Maryland.

[13] *What Shall I Be?* p. vi.

[14] *America*, 25 November, 1911, p. 161.

SOCIALISM OR FAITH.

XII.—The Prisoner of His Soul.

IN the trial room of the court house of Mohawk County a farce was being acted out.

High up on the west wall of the room, on a broad panel of black walnut, the Scales of Justice, "that are tipped by a hair", hung graven to a gigantic measure. All men might see that the business of this room was the business of Justice herself. On the bench under the panel sat Ichabod Whitcomb, a judge reverend of mien, unswerving of eye, inexorable as the falling sword in judgment. On the tall walnut rampart that ran nearly the whole width of the room in front of the judge there was carved a great open book, a symbol that here in this place the doings of men were to be truly read. At the right, in two rows of stalls, one raised above and behind the other, sat twelve men, citizens, peers of the realm, each man a sworn judge. At the side of their enclosure stood an officer of the law's own majesty, sworn to guard these twelve from any and every outside influence.

The farce was that all of this impressive machinery, from the graven scales on the wall down to the stupid image of the law who stood at the door of the jury-box, was set for the one purpose of proving guilty a man who was not guilty, whom nobody thought guilty.

The farce was a tragedy, too. But the tragedy was not so much that Jim Loyd, who sat in a raised, railed box at the left of the room, might and probably would be convicted of a crime which he had not committed. The tragedy was one darker than that. Half a thousand years ago men fought for trial by jury. They achieved it. It became a fact, a sacred institution. The security, the life, and liberty of two hundred millions of civilized white men rest upon it to-day. Trial by jury in the beginning was a crude safeguard for the weak individual against the law in the hands of a powerful enemy. It was argued that the powerful enemy could not coerce or persuade twelve free men to condemn unjustly one of their neighbors. Or at least, men agreed, it would not be easy to so coerce or corrupt twelve free men. That was as much as one could say positively for the system, that it would not be easy to make it serve the will of a powerful bad man.

That is all that men can say of the system to-day. It is not easy to place twelve corrupt or corruptible men on a jury together. After civilization has worked five centuries upon the jury system, the bulwark of a man's life and liberty, we can go no farther than to say that the individual is usually protected by it. We know that the very precautions and guards that we have put about the system can be and are sometimes used to work for the condemnation of innocent men.

Here was the tragedy running under the farce of the trial of Jim Loyd for conspiring to blow up John Sargent's mill. It was not Jim Loyd that was on trial. The jury system was on trial. The community which supported that system was on trial. The State was on trial. So, on the one hand, the "State" was trying Jim Loyd. And, on the other hand, Jim Loyd was trying the State.

The "State" was moving rapidly to find Jim Loyd guilty. Jim Loyd had already decided that the State was guilty. He would wait, however. He had promised to wait. He would give the State every opportunity to clear itself. He would wait for the farce to be played out.

He was a man just turned thirty, but his corrugated, sharp-cut face might have belonged to a man of fifty. It was a face of iron and white steel and smouldering furnace fires. Because, for eighteen years these things had been his playthings and his tools.

He was paying but little attention to this farce of trial of which he was the central figure. He understood the marshaling of the forces against him. He foresaw every move of the prosecution and knew its effect. He had not been surprised at any of it. His knowledge of the politics and greed and coercion by which John Sargent's money dominated Mohawk County had prepared him for it.

In his mind it was a foregone conclusion that the "State", in the person of a servile prosecuting attorney, a venal judge, and twelve studiously selected jurymen, should convict him of this particular thing.

But there was a larger question than that. The State, in the larger sense, had always condemned him. That was the important thing. The State had condemned him, a boy of twelve, to go into John Sargent's mill and catch red-hot bolts

in a bucket for forty cents a day. It was just about that time that he had decided to become a famous baseball catcher. The State had made different arrangements for him, had given him a heavy bucket instead of a catcher's mitt, and had made balls out of rod steel for him to catch.

But it was a game, too, in that day. He never minded it. He pitted his eye and his hand against the speed and bad aim of the men as they threw the bolts to him. The only difference was that an "error", in this game, meant a badly burned leg or arm.

How proud he was that night when he straightened his aching back and strutted home to his mother, carrying his first week's pay—minus twenty cents, fines for bolts dropped! He remembered now, with a choke in his throat, how his mother slyly laughed and cried at him that night as he marched about the house, thumbs under his suspenders, patronizing the other children—Jane and baby Harry that was killed—and lecturing her on how to get the most for the money.

It was a game, and because he grew fast and was bigger and quicker and stronger than others, he played it better. He played it so well that at fifteen he was drawing the pay of a good man. At twenty he was running a section of the casting room with forty men under him. At twenty-five—John Sargent believed in young men and the scrap-heap was always near—Loyd was given charge of the furnace room and the casting room together.

His pay was thirty dollars a week. During the first year that he had charge of those rooms he increased the net apportioned earnings of those two rooms by eighteen thousand dollars.

He increased those earnings. There were no changes in machinery during that year. There were no additional overhead expenses. There was no increase of capital invested in those two rooms. By his skill, judgment, and personal force Jim Loyd that year *earned* eighteen thousand dollars for the Milton Machinery Company. The Milton Machinery Company acknowledged it — they gave him two dollars a week more pay for the next year. If during the next year he increased the earnings of those two rooms an additional eighteen thousand dollars, they would probably give him another two dollars increase in pay.

That increase was impossible, of course. By gigantic efforts he had during that one year set a record for himself which he could never better. The rest of his life — or so long as the company allowed him to keep his position—would be spent in a heart-breaking, tooth-and-nail fight to keep up to the record which in the foolish and wasteful pride of youth he had set for himself. It would not be long before some young college-turned superintendent, himself with a record to make, would be looking for a man who could do more than Jim Loyd.

So, coming into his twenty-seventh year, Jim Loyd saw that something was wrong. He had played the game at which the State had set him. He had played the game honestly, faithfully, and *better* than any other man he knew of. And this was the result. He saw other men, men of his own age, men who had none of his ability or power, drawing their three hundred dollars a month, or more. And that was not all. Those men, at from twenty-five to thirty-five, were just beginning their careers. They had twenty, maybe thirty, years ahead of them in which every good piece of work they did, every record they made would count for them, would bring them on up to more money, to a surer place in their business.

Jim Loyd's career was done. He had reached a dead-line. He knew it. He had come swiftly up to the line beyond which a man who begins work with his hands and without technical training and education cannot go. He had no quarrel with those other men, chemists, engineers, experts, executives, who, though older than he, had still years ahead of them in which to advance.

The State, Society—whatever you called the organization of things as they are—had given them education and a start which it had not given to him. He had no quarrel with that. Those men actually earned the money that the company gave them. They were worth it, or they would not be getting it.

But the State, Society, Things as They Are, had set him at a certain game. He had been told to work honestly and faithfully, and to push on as rapidly as possible. He had done all that. But the State failed to see to it that he should get what he won in the game. The State stood by and supported John Sargent in the position that John Sargent should get about seventeen dollars out of every eighteen that Jim Loyd earned.

He had no quarrel even with John Sargent. John Sargent found Things as They Are, and he used them, that was all. John Sargent found a state of things in which he could make men earn for him two, five, ten, or even fifteen times what he was obliged to pay them. It would be foolish to blame John Sargent for using things as he found them.

Jim Loyd's mind went cleanly through the problem and he saw that his quarrel was directly with the conditions of things, with the ways in which men were organized into the commonwealth, with the State, in fact.

It was not that his father had died in the Sargent mill, leaving the mother and three children unprovided for. It was not that John Sargent was a bad man and a legalized extortioner. It was the whole organization and constitution of things that worked the injustice.

It was not in Jim Loyd's aggressive nature to stand looking dumbly at this dead wall against which he had come. Immediately he began looking for the way through. It was natural that he should hear and study the arguments of Socialism. It was in the air. He listened avidly to the vaporings of men who had had a better surface education than he, but who lacked his bold, clear sight. He found them shallow and unready. They gave smart half-answers that did not answer anything. He shook them all off and got books, dozens of books, bushels of books. He read them all, impatiently, greedily, without direction and without sequence. Some were merely hysterical rant. Some were able to see what was wrong with the constitution of things, but as soon as they began to deal in remedies they became vague and rambled into futile, childish generalities. Their remedies ran all the way from the courts and the ballot-box to slow and ignoble death for every man who owned property.

One book held him so that he battled with it for months at a time. He came to hate the book; but he went back at it again and again. That book began with the plain statement that the idea of an omnipotent God creating and ruling the world was the greatest existing obstacle to the progress of democracy. It went on to prove that the whole existing industrial system whereby one man was able to exploit the work of another man could be traced directly back to the idea of the

authority of God. That idea of God and the authority of God must be stamped out of men's minds before there could be any real change in things, because men held the power and the wealth of the world on the theory that power was God-given, that wealth was in some way a dispensation of God.

It was a powerful and a clever book, and Jim Loyd fought with it page by page. Somewhere in it, his native wit told him, there was concealed a clever, damnable lie of logic. But he could not find the lie.

However, his mind drove on through the windy fog of words and books until it came out on the other side and he found himself just where he had started. He was still facing the fact that the State upheld John Sargent in taking away from him the great part of his earnings.

He went into the Socialist party in politics, not because he thought that that party would ever win or would ever accomplish anything lasting if it did win, but because it was a means of advertising certain good measures which, if they were well advertised, would finally be taken up by one of the great parties. So far as he could see, that would be the only thing that Socialism would ever accomplish in the politics of the country. It could advertise and create a demand for certain reforms. One or another of the great parties would then see good politics in them and would take up those reforms and accomplish them.

Temperamentally he hated the arm-swinging demagoguery of Socialism. He was a self-contained, almost a sullen man. By instinct he distrusted men who talked and wrote fluently. He had all of a silent man's aversion against baring freely to the world the things that he felt deeply. He had a feeling that if these Socialists really believed and expected to back up the things they said, they would not be so ready of speech.

Then came this strike. He had opposed it from the moment he saw it coming. It was coming at the wrong time. The cause of the strike was not a good, clear-cut issue that would appeal to the imagination of the country. The Milton Machinery Company had an enormous stock on hand, and the market was falling. He had weighed all these things and had fought desperately to keep the men at work. Once declared, however, he had thrown himself into it and had used all the

power of mind and body that he possessed, and even sometimes the weight of his two big fists, to hold the men together, to keep them orderly and to feed them.

Everywhere men gave way to him. The heads of the different local unions gradually shifted their responsibilities to his shoulders. In the end he found himself in sole and absolute control of the whole strike. He found more than that. He found weaker men beginning to lean upon him. He came to cringe from the patient, appealing looks of women, especially the mute foreign women, when they came to him looking for the food that he did not have for them. His soul quivered when he caught the eyes, hungry and big, of little children looking up at him. They had been told that food came from Jim Loyd; and they looked up at him as though at some god who might any moment, if he were so pleased, throw down food to them.

The strike came to be *his* strike. It took on a personal, bitter, desperate nature, such as he had never thought a strike could possess.

Then John Sargent came to Milton to take personal charge of his side of the strike.

Now the issue was fairly set. Jim Loyd was a fighting man naturally. And like every fighting man, he was better suited to have a personal enemy to fight against. But he was not now fighting John Sargent for the difference between the money that he earned and the money that John Sargent gave him. He was fighting the fight of weaker men, the fight of starving women, the fight of puny, dying children.

John Sargent struck first. He could not know how deeply he struck that night when he had offered Loyd fifty thousand dollars to settle the strike; and Loyd had been tempted—no, not tempted, but blinded momentarily—by the flash of money and the possibilities for life that the money revealed.

John Sargent struck again. Harry Loyd—baby Harry—was killed in front of John Sargent's gate.

John Sargent struck again. Jim Loyd was taken away from the coffin of his brother. He was marched to the county jail. He had been there now nearly four months, awaiting trial for a thing which he could not have done.

John Sargent was striking again. Jim Loyd had been indicted by a grand jury controlled by John Sargent on the charge of inciting and conspiring to blow up the plant of the Milton Machinery Company. He was now being given a trial by jury. The judge who sat under the Scales of Justice was a well-paid employee of John Sargent. He received three thousand dollars a year from Mohawk County for his work as judge. He received ten thousand dollars a year from John Sargent, as a retainer—and he was worth every cent of it.

No man who had ever had any connexion with or sympathy for organized labor was allowed upon that jury. Three of the jurymen were secretly small stockholders of the Milton Machinery Company. Six of them were farmers whose farms were heavily mortgaged to one or the other of the Milton banks —controlled by John Sargent. The remaining three were weak, negligible men who could easily be browbeaten into voting with the majority.

Thus John Sargent was striking a final blow. And Jim Loyd had not struck back. Why? John Sargent had struck cruelly, foully, at his manhood, at his brother, at his life and liberty. Why had Jim Loyd not struck back? He was a fighting man. Why had he thus held his neck to the blows? For years his mind had been steeping itself in the outpourings of Socialism and the kindred bloodthirsty doctrines that follow it. They had taught him nothing that he had not known before. They had shown him no way to deal with his situation or with the state of things that made that situation possible, and inevitable. But, at the bottom of them all, when he had floundered his way through their shallow, school-boyish theories and schemes, he found always one concrete conviction. Tacitly or openly, they all agreed that the existing things could not be changed without force. Force meant killing. It meant the rising of the many in a sweeping upheaval of blood and destruction to wipe out the few.

Although he had not easily agreed to this, it had appealed strongly to him. He knew it was the truth. He knew that at least it was the truth for the present. There was no other immediate way.

Socialism had been able to convince him of only one thing: that was that the Law, the State, the thing that holds men

where they are, is simply the will of the strong. That was government, that was law, that was society. This was the bed-rock of Socialism. It was a thing that he could understand and plant his feet upon.

And who was stronger than he? Where was there a man who could command four thousand strong men as he could command the men of Milton? Who in this country were the strong if they were not the millions of men who toiled with their hands?

Why had he not struck? Why had he stood, like a cow in the stanchions, in John Sargent's little jail? A word from himself would have freed him.

All was a farce. The jail was a farce. The governor, marching his troops to Milton, and marching them away again on John Sargent's word, he was a farce.

The will of the strong was the only real thing. Jim Loyd had the will, and he was strong. Why had he not struck?

He knew. On that night, so long ago now, when John Sargent had struck at his manhood and his truth to his fellows, he had wanted to kill John Sargent with his hands, his bare hands, so that he might feel the man's life beat out between them. God held his hands. Later, that same night, with the rage of destruction upon him, he had taken from its hiding-place enough dynamite to wreck the entire mill. He had expected to die in the ruins. And he had looked across the valley to the church of his faith upon the hill. And he had seen Christ—so that his hand was stayed. On another night, the night after Harry Loyd was killed, he had been ready to walk out of his jail, head his four thousand, kill John Sargent's guards, and take into his own hands everything that men said belonged to John Sargent. He could have done it, following the will of the strong. But an old man with Christ in his heart had stopped him.

Sometimes, tramping and champing in the cage where the will of the strong had put him, he had railed at himself for a loose-lipped threatener, a mouthing Socialist like the fluent ones he despised, without the heart to do the things that he willed. But he was wrong in this. He did not lack the courage. The element of fear had been left out of his composition. He was a man strong to the roots. Things took a mighty hold

upon Jim Loyd. His passions ran in deep and terrible riots. That one final lesson of Socialism, that the will of the strong is the only law of men, had taken a mighty hold upon his imagination. But, deeper than passion, deeper than blood riot and the lust to kill, deeper than imagination, there were still depths in Jim Loyd.

In those unplumbed depths of Jim Loyd's soul there lived God and the Faith of Christ. Out of those ultimate depths, at the crucial moment, came the Prisoner of His Soul, Christ's Grace, to hold his raised arm. He did not know it; but his faith, the Catholic faith of his heart, of his blood, of his mother, was the last, the ruling force of his nature. It was stronger than the riot of unruly passions in his blood. It was stronger than the hold that any teaching could take upon his imagination. It was stronger than Socialism. It was stronger than he.

So Jim Loyd sat listening to testimony that would make of him a felon, a pariah, an outcast of men. The big trial room was packed to the doors with eager, scowling men. They were men who had worked all of the night before and who had snatched a little breakfast and an hour of sleep before the court opened. Heavy with sleep, their eyes still black with the grime of the night's work, they sat or stood doggedly watching and listening. They could not believe the thing that was going on here before them. But the conviction had settled upon them that it *was* going on to the end. They knew that Loyd was not guilty. They knew that Roger Winters, the prosecuting attorney, knew that he was not guilty. They knew that Ichabod Whitcomb on the bench was aware of Loyd's innocence. They knew that there was not a juror on that bench who would in his heart be convinced that Loyd was guilty.

Yet they saw the unbelievable thing going on before their eyes, just as John Sargent had willed that it should go on. What they saw was the failure of civilization. It was one of the proofs that men have not yet found the way to protect themselves against the power of the strong. That they had never before seen anything so patent or so flagrant, merely proved that it was not easy. The tragedy remained, that, after ages of struggle for personal security, it was still possible.

The men, however, were not concerned with the battle of civilization. They were wondering how long Loyd would go on with the thing. A word from him would have brought four thousand men to tear down the very Scales of Justice from that room. Would he give the word?

Roger Winters was examining one of the principal witnesses for the "State". This witness, Victor Sorrel, was one of a gang of professional dynamiters who had come to Milton early in the course of the strike to offer their services to the strikers. Loyd had taken the explosives from them and had driven them from the town.

"When did you first come to Milton?" asked the attorney.

"Last July."

"Why did you come here?"

"To bring dynamite to help the strike."

"Did you use the dynamite?"

"No. Jim Loyd took it from me."

"Explain."

"He had an office in State street. He handled the strike there. I went there one night with the stuff. I carried it in a mason's tool-bag. I told him what I had and what I could do with it."

"What did Loyd say?"

"He said, 'Put it in there'. He showed me a closet in the office. I put it in there on the floor."

"What then?"

"The closet door had a spring lock. I snapped it shut. I just heard the snap when Loyd took me by the throat, from behind. He has big hands made of iron. He made no noise; neither did I. It was late at night. He carried me under one arm and held my throat with his hand. He took me out through the alley at the back and down through other alleys to the main tracks of the U. & B. I kicked and fought, but I could not get away or yell. He stood on the east-bound track holding me, waiting for a freight that was coming up on the west-bound track."

"Go on."

"He was going to throw me under the wheels as the train ran by, but he changed his mind. A string of empty coal cars came by. He loosed my throat and took me in his hands,

around the body, and threw me, like a bag, into a car. I was in Buffalo next morning with my neck nearly broken."

A hum of comment ran round the room. The men had not heard this story before. They had seen this man in town at that time. Many of them had known what his business was. But none of them had known how he went. The witness was probably telling the exact truth. It was just one of the things that Loyd would do.

When the court became quiet again the prosecutor continued:

"Why should Loyd wish to get you out of the town, while keeping the dynamite here?"

"He wanted to do everything himself. It was not a Union strike. It was his own strike. He wanted to be the big man of it. He did not want anyone to get credit for anything."

Winters turned the witness over to Stanley Morgan, counsel for Loyd.

"Were you ever convicted of any crime?" asked Morgan.

"I object, Your Honor," said Winters quickly. "The witness is not on trial."

"Sustained," growled the judge.

"I take exception to the ruling," said Morgan in a monotonous and weary voice. It was the single melancholy privilege accorded to him in that court. The same play had gone on now for two days. Practically every question that he had attempted to put to any of the "State's" witnesses had been objected to and ruled out. He had not been allowed to draw out the glaring inconsistencies of their stories. He had not been given a chance to question the record or the credibility of any witness. The prosecution had been allowed to put statements, guesses, and opinions upon the record as sworn evidence, and he had been reduced to the mere formula of taking exception after exception.

Long ago he had told Loyd that it was foolish to look for any semblance of a fair trial in Mohawk County, and that he should appeal for a change of venue. But Loyd had stubbornly insisted that Mohawk County was his home, and that he would try justice here just as much as justice would try him. The lawyer did not know what Loyd meant.

"Do you know John Sargent?" Morgan tried again.

"I object," repeated Winters. "Mr. Sargent is not relevant to this case."

It was barefaced. In view of facts and law, it was almost indecent. But the judge nodded his assent and the objection stood.

Morgan threw up his hands in disgust, and let the witness go. The judge warned the lawyer against a show of contempt for the ruling of the court.

The next witness was Tony Michelis, a cross-grained little hunchback who had once been discharged by Loyd and who had ever since held a cripple's unreasoning hate for him. In the stormy days of the strike he had spied upon Loyd's every action. He had carried reports nightly to the mill. He had been as tireless as Loyd himself, and in the eighteen and twenty hours of each day in which Loyd was awake and working he had scarcely let him out of sight. The men had told Loyd that Tony was tracking him, but, characteristically, he had brushed the little hunchback out of his mind.

"That last witness," said Winters, when Tony had been sworn, "did you ever see him before?"

"Yah. I seen that fallah."

"Where and when did you see him?"

"Thas the night he tole you 'bout. I seen him. Big Jim Loyd he got him on the neck."

"Where were you?"

"Me? I outsides stands on the sidewalk und looks in."

"Did you see a bag?"

"Yah. I seen her. White bag. That fallah fetch her."

"What was done with the bag?"

"That fallah he shove her inside on closet door."

"What happened then?"

"Big Jim Loyd he carry that fallah out back doors."

"What did you do?"

"Me? I wait. Ten minute come back Big Jim Loyd. He take out that bag outside. Put her in the middle on floor. Take out them things inside."

"What things?"

"Thas dy'mite. Seben stick."

"Do you know dynamite when you see it?"

"Yah. I know her. Work on quarry with her."

"What else was in the bag?"

"Got nitro, too. Six tube."

"What else?"

"Got one clock. One spool wire. One box caps."

"What did Loyd do then?"

"He put that back inside bag, soft. Then he put out that light und come outside und start down the street."

"Did he see you?"

"Me? No, I stand in the wall darkside."

"Did he have the bag?"

"Yah. He got that bag. He come down street. Turn, then he come upstreet by mill. Come on river. I come too. Got boat there. Big Jim Loyd cross river. I stand on bankside. He go on hill otherside. Got tree up there. He stay. Bimebye come back. Got bag empty. Throw bag on river. Go home."

Morgan felt that there was nothing to be gained by attempting to cross-examine the hunchback. He had told the truth, as Morgan knew it and as perhaps a hundred other people knew it. Loyd had buried the explosives up there on the hill across the river.

There was a stir near the east door of the room, and Loyd turned in his seat to see. Father Driscoll had just come in. Men were making place for him.

The Dean had not been present at the trial on any of the preceding days, and Loyd wondered dully why he had come now. There was nothing that he could do. Though he knew that the old priest loved him and understood him, he found himself nervously wishing that Father Driscoll would keep away from the court. He could not tell what might happen. His will was set upon a certain course; he did not know when the moment for action might come, and he had come to feel that the appearance of his friend was always disconcerting.

The business of the trial went on.

The next witness was a private detective in the employ of John Sargent.

He fixed the night when Jim Loyd had gone to the mill to see Sargent. He told how he had seen Loyd rush out of Mr. Sargent's private office and how he had followed him almost at a run up over the hills and on a long tramp through the country until he had finally doubled back to the river.

Questioned professionally, he explained at considerable length that Loyd's actions at the time were those that would be expected of a man who felt that he was being watched. A man wanting to go to a certain place and feeling that it was dangerous to go there openly, would very likely run off in an opposite direction and take his time doubling back to the point of his objective. Loyd's actions were those of a man intending to commit a crime.

In spite of Morgan's objections, the man's argument was allowed to go into the record as expert testimony. Even Ichabod Whitcomb saw a sort of grisly humor in the ruling as he gave it.

The man had followed Loyd across the river in another boat. Had crept up the hill after him and had seen him dig at the roots of a tree. Loyd had picked out the sticks and tubes and the contrivance of clockworks and wire. The latter was the very thing, the detective swore, that had been used in the explosion of the mill. Loyd had stowed the things about his person. Had stood a while looking down at the mill and then started slowly down the hill. The detective had been obliged to let Loyd get a considerable distance ahead of him in crossing the river, but had easily caught up with him when both were once on the Milton side. He had followed him up through a side street of the village and had come upon him seated on the steps of the Catholic church. He was then talking with the priest.

Loyd dug his nails into the wood of the railing about him as he recalled the agony of that night.

The detective was excused. The prosecutor wrote something on a slip of paper and handed it to the clerk, who read out the name of the next witness:

"The Reverend James Driscoll."

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

RICHARD AUMERLE MAHER, O.S.A.

Havana, Cuba.

Analecta

S. CONGREGATIO CONSISTORIALIS.

NOTIFICATIO CIRCA MISSIONARIOS OPERIS "DE ADSISTENTIA OPERARIORUM ITALICORUM AD EXTERAS EUROPAE REGIONES MIGRANTIUM".

Litteris S. C. Consistorialis diei 18 ianuarii anni 1915, de mandato Ssmi D. N. Benedicti XV, Episcopo Vicentino, qua praesidenti ad honorem et socio a consiliis Societatis pro Adsistentia italorum operariorum ad exteras Europae regiones migrantium, commissum est ad nutum S. Sedis officium quod hucusque proprium erat ecclesiastici coetus Mediolanensis, vulgo *Consulta*, in eodem pio opere.

Idcirco memoratus Episcopus una cum coetu ecclesiastico ab eo constituendo facultatem habebit quaerendi idoneos sacerdotes qui missionarios agant penes italicos operarios ad exteras Europae regiones migratos; et habito consensu Ordinarii singulis sacerdotibus proprii et Ordinarii loci ad quem hi proficisci debent, necnon beneplacito S. C. Consistorialis, eos mittere poterit ad loca missionis propria; ibique eos vigilare debebit sive directe sive ope alicuius visitatoris aut alicujus sacerdotis ab eo deputati, et maxime per Ordinarios locorum; a quibus iidem missionarii pendere omnino debent in omnibus quae ad ecclesiasticam disciplinam pertinent.

Poterit etiam iusta de causa eosdem ab uno in alium locum transferre vel etiam prorsus revocare ab officio iisdem commisso.

Sed *in casu revocationis* rem statim communicare debebit cum Ordinario cuiusque missionarii proprio ut iterum eum in dioecesim recipiat, cum Ordinario loci *a quo* et cum S. C. Consistoriali: *in casu vero translationis* cum Ordinario missionarii proprio, ut ipse sciat ubi sacerdos suus degat, et cum Ordinariis locorum *a quo* et *ad quem:* cum S. C. Consistorali autem rem communicare statim debebit quoties casus aliquam difficultatem praeseferat; aliter in fine cuiuslibet anni.

Datum ex S. C. Consistoriali die 31 ianuarii 1915.

✠ THOMAS BOGGIANI, ARCH. EDESSEN,
Adsessor.

S. CONGREGATIO DE DISCIPLINA SACRAMENTORUM.

DECRETUM DE SACRA COMMUNIONE ET DE CELEBRATIONE MISSAE IN CASTRIS.

Sacra Congregatio de disciplina Sacramentorum, bono animarum consulere cupiens, attentis extraordinariis praesentis belli circumstantiis, iisque perdurantibus, de speciali auctoritate Ssmi Domini nostri Benedicti Pp. XV, quae sequuntur declarat et statuit:

(1) Milites ad proelium vocatos (*i soldati sul fronte*) admitti posse, *servatis servandis*, ad S. Mensam Eucharisticam per modum Viatici.

(2) Sacerdotes militiae adscriptos qui militibus sauciis infirmisve deferendis vel curandis destinati sunt (vulgo, *lecticarios* vel *infirmarios*) si in ecclesiis Missam celebrare nequeant, in quocumque loco, decenti tamen et tuto, et etiam sub dio, Sacrum litare posse, remoto quovis irreverentiae periculo: eos vero qui armis dimicant, Missam eodem modo, iisdemque sub conditionibus celebrare posse, at Dominicis tantum et diebus festis de praecepto, dummodo omnes praedicti sacerdotes nullo alio canonico impedimento irretiti sint.

Contrariis quibuscumque minime obstantibus.

Datum Romae, ex Secretaria sacrae Congregationis, die 11 februarii 1915.

PHILIPPUS CARD. GIUSTINI, *Praefectus.*
ALOISIUS CAPOTOSTI, EP. THERM., *Secretarius.*

ROMAN CURIA.

PONTIFICAL APPOINTMENTS.

10 November, 1914: Mgr. Andrew B. Meehan, Professor of Canon Law at St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, New York, made Privy Chamberlain, supernumerary, of the Pope.

19 January, 1915: Mgr. Alfred A. Sinnott, of the Diocese of Charlottetown, made Privy Chamberlain, supernumerary, of the Pope.

3 February, 1915: Mgr. Thomas Walshe, archpriest, and Mgr. John McKenna, Vicar General, of the Archdiocese of Wellington, made Domestic Prelates of the Pope.

11 February: Mgr. Severian Sainz, Vicar General of Havana, appointed Bishop of Matanzas.

23 February: Mgr. Francesco Perez de Acevedo, of the Archdiocese of Santiago di Cuba, made Domestic Prelate of the Pope.

26 February: Mgr. Edward Patrick Roche, administrator of the Archdiocese of St. John's, Newfoundland, appointed Archbishop of the same see.

26 February: Mgr. Thomas Francis Doran, Vicar General of the Diocese of Providence, made Titular Bishop of Halicarnassus and auxiliary to the Bishop of Providence.

Studies and Conferences.

OUR ANALECTA.

The Roman documents for the month are:

S. CONGREGATION OF CONSISTORY publishes a memorandum regarding the supervision of priests who are chosen to minister to Italian workmen who emigrate to countries outside Europe.

S. CONGREGATION ON THE DISCIPLINE OF THE SACRAMENTS decrees (1) that soldiers at the front may, *servatis servandis*, receive the Blessed Sacrament as Viaticum; and (2) that priests in the war zone who are attached to the ambulance or hospital service, when they cannot say Mass in a church, may do so in any safe or becoming place, or in the open air, when there is no danger of irreverence; whereas priests who are actually under arms are permitted to celebrate Mass, under the same conditions, only on Sundays and holidays of obligation.

ROMAN CURIA announces the recent pontifical appointments.

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE HOLY CHILDHOOD.

The voice of the Roman Pontiffs urging upon us the institution of a work of zeal is the voice of Christ. Their desire, insistently repeated, is the pleading of the Sacred Heart. Seldom have such appeals been more frequently and fervently made than in regard to the Association of the Holy Childhood.

Passing over the first approbation given this work, which was founded in 1843 by Bishop Forbin-Janson, we at once come upon the request of Pope Pius IX asking for its establishment in every diocese. How completely since that time the sentiments of the Sovereign Pontiffs have been united upon this subject a few quotations will make apparent. A careful consideration of them is of particular importance at the present moment in view of the distressing condition of the missions of the Church. A special call of charity is directed to us as the one great nation least affected by the dreadful calamities of the world-war. The appeal of the present Holy Father has therefore been made in a particular way to our own United States. The reasons however which have at all times powerfully moved

the Holy See to foster this Association with a peculiar love are evidently not of a temporary nature.

Going back to the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII we have from his lips the following clear pronouncement: "It is my earnest wish that all the children of the Catholic world should become members of this beautiful Association." [1]

Pope Pius X could not refrain from expressing his enthusiasm in even more fervent words. He proclaimed himself "filled with the ardent desire of seeing all Catholic children enrolled in the pious and most salutary Association of the Holy Childhood".[2] To his vision it assumed the appearance of an international army, marshalled by nations for the spreading of the Gospel and the salvation of souls. "Our Holy Father's most ardent desire," wrote Cardinal Vannutelli during the last months of the life of Pope Pius X, "is to know that all Catholic children belong to the Holy Childhood."

Need we wonder at this solicitude? The ancient crusaders gave their lives to redeem from the infidels the Holy Sepulchre of our Lord. Surely a worthy cause. But by the modern crusade of sacrifice and prayer on the part of our favored Catholic children we would gain for Him instead millions of living tabernacles where God shall dwell within the souls He loves so much, the souls of little children.

"We make our own the desire of our lamented predecessor of holy memory: to see the ranks of the Holy Childhood increased," was therefore the declaration of Pope Benedict XV soon after his accession to the chair of St. Peter. His wishes have been made known to us even more explicitly than those of his predecessors. Writing through his Cardinal Secretary of State to thank the American Cardinals for the reception and encouragement given the Director General of the Association during his propaganda tour of the United States, the Holy Father sent to them a special message of appreciation. We quote in part from the letter addressed to His Eminence Cardinal O'Connell. "His Holiness," wrote Cardinal Gasparri in the name of the Holy Father, "while continuing to show toward this pious work the paternal benevolence so generously bestowed upon it by his immediate predecessor of holy mem-

[1] *Sancta Dei Civitas.*

[2] Autograph of 7 December, 1913.

ory, has not failed to manifest his own lively and strong desire that the Association of the Holy Childhood be established *in every school and college of the United States and Canada.*

" His Holiness moreover calls attention to the fact that this Society is not only helpful to the missionaries in making our dear Lord known to millions of pagan children, but also most useful for the sound moral education of Catholic youth." [3]

He then adverts to the present critical situation in Europe which " has dried up the fountains of support that formerly flowed from the charity of Catholic Europeans ", and hopes that our own charity " may be pleased to supply in some measure the loss of the customary revenue " upon which the missions of the Church depend. He therefore is confident that the efforts of the hierarchy will be seconded by the clergy and by Catholics in general and in particular by Catholic teachers.

This work, however, is to be more than merely an emergency enterprise. It is recommended to us with the greatest earnestness, and at all times, because of its own intrinsic value for the education of our children no less than because of its helpfulness in providing the means indispensable for the sustenance of our missions. Let us not reply that we have already many other works; that there are needs nearer home. Full account has been taken of all such arguments by the Holy See. The same reason might well be alleged by everyone—and what would then become of the apostolic missions of the Church? Our interests at home will only prosper the more because we have heeded the divine call to remember likewise the field afar and have not permitted our own mole-hill to hide from us the rest of God's creation.

Here, therefore, is a great work. It has been urged upon us by the Sacred Heart of the Saviour pleading with us through His Vicars upon earth. It is their "earnest wish", their "ardent desire", their " lively and strong desire" that "all the children of the Catholic world " be enlisted in this sacred enterprise, that "every school and college" be turned by it into a Christian palestra of charity and apostolic zeal.

"God wills it!" was the cry of the old crusaders. Let us mobilize the vast world army of our children. There is no

[3] The Vatican, 9 January, 1915.

time to lose. Those not of the fold are eager and active. Our opportunity lies in the present moment. Our help is imperatively, instantly needed. The Propagation of the Faith and other splendid organizations for the promotion of Catholicity in our own country and in the missions afar call for our assistance; but our children above all must be prepared to seize the vast possibilities of the future. They are the hope of the universal Church as well as of our own parishes and dioceses. "It is of the greatest importance," wrote Cardinal Farley, "that we train our Catholic children in love and generosity toward our Catholic missions." This training will prepare them for every other kind of Catholic social and religious work.

It is not our purpose here to discuss the advantages of the Holy Childhood, to enumerate the millions of souls saved by it through the baptism of dying infants in pagan lands, the thousands of orphanages and schools maintained by its help, the hundreds of thousands of dollars contributed by it each year where help is most direly needed, the apostles trained by its assistance, and all the other countless good works accomplished by its means. It was sufficient to make known the mind of the Church to those who are her ministers, to call attention to the wish of the Sacred Heart as authentically expressed in the clear, earnest and even ardent appeals of each of the successive Pontiffs who have guided the Church during the days in which our own lives have been cast. The wish of the priest will in turn determine the action of the teachers in the classrooms and will influence the parents in their homes. "I believe," rightly says the Apostolic Delegate, "the well-known generosity of Catholics will not fail to help a work so evangelical in its scope as the Holy Childhood, especially now when it cannot receive assistance from the war-stricken countries of Europe." But it is the priest who must make it known to them.

The general supervision of this work for the United States is in the hands of the Fathers of the Holy Ghost; and those interested in its establishment or its more adequate development can obtain all necessary information from the Central Director of the Holy Childhood, the Rev. Ed. J. Knaebel, C. S. Sp., Lock Box 598, Pittsburgh. With the forces of every kind advancing for the extension of the Faith, at home and

abroad, the children's crusade, if properly directed, will combine to form a mighty and triumphant army. It is a spiritual as well as a material power, and both these facts must be well borne in mind by him who would develop it to its utmost strength. By prayer, sacrifice and alms it will help to conquer the world for Christ. He surely will know how to reward in a particular way our charity toward the little ones so dear to Him.

JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J.

New York City.

MAY A BROTHER CONDUCT STATIONS OF CROSS PUBLICLY?

Qu. An answer to the following difficulty will be gratefully appreciated by the resident chaplain in a school for boys which is conducted by Brothers who profess simple vows.

When the Brothers and the boys are in the chapel, one of the former, who is so instructed by the superior, makes the Way of the Cross, unaccompanied, but otherwise in the same manner as is accustomed to be done by a priest. Those present act and respond just as the people usually do. While the Brother passes from station to station, the organ is played and a choir sings a verse of the Stabat Mater in Latin. Is such a service to be approved or tolerated?

Resp. There are two ways of performing the devotion known as the Stations of the Cross, and gaining the indulgences attached thereto. The one is private, the conditions for which are that (a) one should, according to one's ability, meditate on the Passion of our Lord; (b) he should move from one station to another, or, at least, where the custom exists of remaining in the same place, he should rise and genuflect for each station; (c) that there should be no notable interruption in "making" the fourteen stations. The other method is public. The conditions for this are described in the REVIEW for January, 1915, page 96, and for March, 1915, pages 348 and 349. In the various instructions referring to the public mode of making the Way of the Cross, there is mention of a priest, or cleric, going from station to station and reciting the prayers. No provision is made for such a case as our correspondent mentions.

ABSENCE OF ORGAN ACCOMPANIMENT AT BENEDICTION.

Qu. At Benediction in our school chapel it has happened that, after the priest has solemnly exposed the Blessed Sacrament, he learns for the first time that the organist is absent, and the O Salutaris, etc. are being sung without the accompaniment of the organ. Is it permitted, in this case, to give Benediction with the monstrance?

Resp. Decrees of the S. Congregation of Rites (3058 and 3513) which prescribe the singing of the Tantum Ergo before Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament do not mention the necessity of organ accompaniment. The minister in the case proposed need not hesitate to conduct the service in the usual manner, in spite of the absence of the organist.

MIDNIGHT MASS AT CHRISTMAS IN BROTHERS' CHAPEL.

Qu. Does a school conducted by Brothers with simple vows enjoy the privilege of Christmas midnight Masses, according to the decree of the late Pope Pius X, 1 August, 1907?

Resp. If our correspondent will turn to the REVIEW for December, 1907 (pp. 629 and 654), the January number, 1908 (p. 83), and April, 1915 (p. 479), he will see that the Motu proprio to which he refers grants the privilege of Christmas midnight Masses to chapels of religious communities, seminaries, and similar institutions in which the Blessed Sacrament is habitually reserved.

IS SOCIETY OF LADIES OF THE EASTERN STAR BANNED?

Qu. Please inform me through the REVIEW what is the teaching of the Church with regard to the society known as "The Ladies of the Eastern Star". Are they condemned by the Church as Freemasons are? Can a priest absolve Catholic women who are willing to withdraw from the Society?

Resp. The society is not condemned by name. However, if it is an official branch of Freemasonry, it is, of course, subject to all the penalties placed upon that organization. In any case, if it comes under the general head of "sects which plot (*machinantur*) against the Church or the Government", it falls under the condemnation of these sects by the Holy See. In

either case, members incur excommunication *latae sententiae*, simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff (*Const. Apost. Sedis*, II, 4). The confessor in the case can or cannot absolve members who are willing to renounce the organization, according to his faculties.

CATAFALQUE IN MISSA CANTATA DE REQUIE.

Qu. Is it always obligatory to use the catafalque in a Missa Cantata de Requie or a Missa Solemnis de Requie, *absente cadavere?*

Resp. If the Absolutio is given, of course there should be a catafalque, or tumulus. (See Decree 3535, ad V, S. Congreg. of Rites.)

ANTICIPATION OF MATINS AND LAUDS AT 2 P. M.

Qu. At what hour may we, without any special privilege, begin to anticipate the Divine Office, even when the days are longest?

Resp. All authors agree that, by legitimate custom, Matins and Lauds for the following day may be begun at an hour that is half-way betwen noon and sunset; for example, at two o'clock in December and at four o'clock in June. There is, however, a probable opinion, maintained by many distinguished authorities, that the anticipation of Matins and Lauds may be begun at two o'clock P. M. throughout the year, without special privilege or indult. Sanchez, Viva, the Salmanticenses, Ballerini, Palmieri, d'Annibale, Sabetti, Bucceroni, Génicot are enumerated by Noldin in favor of this opinion. And, since the S. Congregation of Rites, in response to a query on this very point, has answered "Consulantur probati auctores", it would seem that no one need scruple to begin Matins and Lauds at two o'clock. (Noldin, *De Praeceptis*, p. 809.)

IS IMPRIMATUR REQUIRED?

Qu. If a priest possesses a small printing-press, does he need the Imprimatur of his bishop to print:

1. prayers approved by the Pope; for example, the prayers to be recited after Mass?
2. prayers approved by the bishop of another diocese?

3. prayers to a Servant of God, who died in the odor of sanctity, though he is not yet canonized (in this case there is printed on the back of the picture the remark "For private recitation only")?

4. spiritual maxims?

Resp. The Constitution *Officiorum ac munerum*, issued by Leo XIII, 1896, now regulates all matters of this kind. It makes no distinction between the case of one who is a public printer and one who, like our correspondent, has a private press. Where the text of the Constitution has "edere", "publicare", etc. there may be room for differences of interpretation. In any case, the few details furnished in the query lead us to surmise that, while there may be doubt as to whether the priest in the case would incur the penalties of the Constitution *Officiorum ac munerum*, prudence should urge him to secure the approbation of his bishop. Besides, he is not only printer in this case, but, so far as the "prayers to a Servant of God" are concerned, apparently author also. And, as author, he should have the approval of his Ordinary.

STIPEND FOR THE SECOND MASS.

Qu. A priest from the college celebrates two of my four Masses on Sunday. I offer him two stipends, asking him to say these Masses for my intention; but he has the scruple that he can take but one. A neighboring pastor tells me that his assistant, who binates on Sunday, has the same scruple. It seems to me that a priest who is bound neither "ex justitia" nor "ex caritate" can take the two stipends.

Resp. The assistants are, of course, right in the matter, and our correspondent, if we understand the case, is in serious error, if he is serious. By repeated decisions of the S. Congregations it is forbidden to receive two stipends for bination, even when the practice is to devote one of the stipends to pious uses. If the celebrant is bound "ex justitia" to celebrate one Mass, then he too is not allowed to receive a stipend for the second. This, naturally, is to be understood as referring to a parochial benefice. There are, indeed, indults by virtue of which a priest may receive a second stipend, on condition that he transfer the full amount of the stipend to the support, for instance, of some charitable institution definitely named in the indult. For example the priests of the archdiocese of Bamberg are allowed

to accept a second stipend on condition that they remit it to the archbishop for the support of the seminary. Of course, if our correspondent offers two stipends for Masses to be said, one on Sunday and the other on Monday or Tuesday, for his intention, and the priest from the college were to decline to accept them for the reason given, it would be a case of "scruple".

LIFE IN SEPARATED TISSUES.

To the Editor, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

While it seems to be the more common opinion that the substantial forms of elements remain virtually in the compound, there are those who maintain that these same forms exist in the compound *formaliter*, i. e. *secundum totam suam realitatem*. This is the opinion of no less an authority than Father Tilmann Pesch; and it would seem to be more in keeping with well-established theories of modern science.

Salva reverentia, I still maintain that, "The principle of life of the spermatozöon or of any other cell in the organism is identical with the principle of life of the organism as a whole". For if it be true that the germ-cells "must have within themselves a principle of life other than the rational soul", then it would seem to follow that the *origo viventis a vivente*, which is generation, is to be attributed to these cells; hence also that they possess in themselves the *potentia generativa*. But St. Thomas is not of this opinion. "Omnis operatio animae," he says, "atque adeo generatio, procedat ab aliquo principio intrinseco agenti et viventi. Quum autem semen non sit quid vivum, non potest generativa potentia esse virtus illa, quae inest semini." And again: "Manifestum igitur est, quod potentia generativa est virtus existens in generante distincta a virtute existente in semine." Nor do these statements of the Angelic Doctor need any modification in view of the facts of modern biology. St. Thomas was a metaphysician and wrote from the metaphysician's standpoint. The standpoint of the modern biologist is quite different, though of course there is no opposition between the two; for truth cannot be opposed to truth. Perhaps if this fundamental fact were not so often lost sight of there would be less difficulty in many instances in perceiving the real harmony that exists between the teachings of

Scholasticism and those truths of the physical sciences which have at last been scientifically and permanently established.

STEPHEN M. DONOVAN, O.F.M.

Allegany, N. Y.

LATIN—THE LANGUAGE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

To the Editor, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

Let it be granted that Scholastic Philosophy can be adopted only in a Catholic seminary, and it will follow that the proper language to be employed is Latin. Not because it is Latin, but because this language alone received a special adaptation to Scholastic Philosophy by the accident of its having been used in the building-up and development of that particular system of thought. Had English been employed by the Scholastics instead of Latin, it would now be the proper tongue; not because it happens to be our vernacular, but because of the particular aptitude it would have received from such special employment. It is easy to infer from actual observation the difficulties encountered and overcome by the Scholastics in giving outward expression to their thoughts. Are we to encounter similar obstacles by endeavoring to express those same thoughts in English? And if it took centuries to give full expression in Latin to that complete body of thought, how can it be possible for any man to express the same in a day or in a lifetime? It is an impossibility, parallel to that of making a new English literature. No one is competent to recast in another language the Scholastic system. Moreover, that which was already clear from the nature of the case, is corroborated by the utterly inadequate results obtained by the efforts of clever men to turn the content of a "summa philosophica" into English. This judgment of the vernacular version is not based upon the constantly recurring barbarisms, which likewise characterize the original; but upon the essential ground that it does not reproduce the thought with anything like fulness, precision, and clearness. Any student having a fair knowledge of Latin should gain a readier insight into Scholastic Philosophy, expressed in that language with extreme niceness and comparative clearness, than through a meagre and misty translation in his native tongue. To offer a text-

book in the vernacular to beginners in the study of Scholastic Philosophy is to equip them with smoked glasses, to deny them the sole medium of acquiring an exact and profound knowledge of the subject, and to place rather than to remove an obstacle before them.

There is nothing to hinder the omission in a Latin text of antiquated questions, that do not and never did belong to the essentials of the science; as there is nothing to hinder the professor in the classroom, at suitable intervals and in the vernacular, from discussing living questions of the hour in the light of Scholastic principles. The proof of it is, that both these things have been done before now. But the student must begin at the foundation, by mastering the Scholastic system in the main, or so far as that is possible in a seminary course. If the Church so favors that system, it is because she finds therein not alone the means of making a man mentally, but also the germs of a valid refutation of prevailing sophistries. These rudimentary arguments have to be known before they can be applied. Besides, the most efficient manner of applying them to convince the reason must be acquired in the philosophy class. Wherever else one needs the art of presenting a solid argument with captivating grace, such as often characterizes the unsound productions of eminent and influential writers, it can hardly be in the classroom of philosophy. Nor would the ungraceful version alone feasible be greatly contributory to a student's facility for giving elegant expression in English to Scholastic ideas. At all events, truth is of more importance than the expression of it. Effective as the winning graces of a popular style may be, it is no part of the purpose of a course in philosophy to furnish them. The seminary student is certainly denied the important advantage, enjoyed by those who read philosophy in their native tongue, of acquiring thereby a ready phraseology in English for the discussion of philosophical subjects; but this loss is attributable entirely to the system of philosophy adopted, and not to the necessity it entails of using the language in which it has come down to us. We suffer a minor loss for the sake of a great gain. It is to be deplored that the system of philosophy most acceptable to us did not grow up among a people speaking our language. Meanwhile, since we cannot have both, we prefer

the substance of truth to the accidental advantage of easily and gracefully expressing it in that native speech which comes so natural to us. Besides, the loss is not irreparable, since there are various ways of making it good.

J. A. M.

OCCULT COMPENSATION.

Qu. In order to obtain ready money a business man is obliged to sell notes at a discount, and thus is forced by a firm which is aware of his predicament to pay them twelve per cent interest. Later on, through some mistake, he receives from the same firm two hundred dollars to which he has no right. He desires to know whether or not he would be excused from restitution of this amount, since the firm deprived him of larger sums, even though they did it by the legalized way of discounting notes rather than by charging direct interest.

Resp. Moralists wisely warn the confessor against the too ready recognition of the principle of occult compensation, although they acknowledge that, after the fact, the obligation of restitution may not be imposed, if the requisite conditions for occult compensation exist. In the case before us it seems that the arrangement with the firm is unfair to the "business man", and he should be urged to enter into an agreement with them that would be more just to him.

SELLING BLESSED CANDLES.

Qu. Is it ever allowed to sell candles that are blessed? For instance, in the case of a poor parish, where there is difficulty in raising money to defray the annual bill for candles, must the pastor, if applied to for candles for funeral purposes, furnish them free? In case he is forbidden to ask for payment, may he accept what is freely offered?

Resp. Blessed candles, rosaries, etc., are classed as temporal things to which a spiritual value has been annexed. The general principle is that the selling of such objects after they have been blessed is not simony, so long as the price is not increased on account of the blessing, because in that case the price would be paid for the temporal thing, not for the spiritual benefits attached to it. However, it is expressly forbidden by decrees

of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences to sell or buy or expose for sale rosaries, medals, etc., once they are blessed, and part of the penalty for infringement of this order is the loss of the indulgences attached to the articles in question. General custom places the sale of blessed candles in the same category, although in some places it is customary for the faithful either to offer at Candlemas a certain number of candles to be blessed and retain them for possible use during the ensuing year, or, when the need to use blessed candles occurs, to offer to the church a certain quantity of candles unblessed and request, in exchange, blessed candles. The danger of misapprehension or scandal is very slight when such an exchange, rather than a money transaction, takes place.

VENERATION OF VEILED STATUES DURING PASSIONTIDE.

Qu. Please let me know if during Passiontide and Holy Week the images of the saints as well as crucifixes should be veiled, and, in case they are veiled, may they be venerated during that time?

Resp. The S. Congregation of Rites has repeatedly affirmed that not only crucifixes but also the images of saints should be veiled from the Saturday before Passion Sunday until Good Friday (in the case of the crucifixes) and Holy Saturday (in the case of images of Saints). Decrees 3638 and 3448, however, except the images of the Way of the Cross, and in general images and pictures *extra altare*. There is no reason, therefore, why these should not be venerated during Passion and Holy weeks.

ONE ORATION IN VOTIVE MASS ON FIRST FRIDAY.

Qu. Should the Votive Mass of the Sacred Heart celebrated on the First Friday have only one prayer, or may another prayer be added "sub una conclusione"?

Resp. The Votive Mass on the First Friday, whether solemn or low, follows the rite of a solemn votive Mass, with Gloria and Credo and one oration (Decrees of S. Congr. of Rites, Nos. 3731, 3773, 3791). When the votive Mass of the Sacred Heart is celebrated with the Blessed Sacrament solemnly exposed, the commemoration of the Blessed Sacrament is to be omitted (Decree No. 3924).

RING BEADS.

Qu. Are the ring beads in use any more? Who can bless them? Are they blessed in such a way that whoever says the beads gains the indulgences, whether they are his property or not?

Resp. A priest of our acquaintance has a ring of that kind bearing ten small knobs for the Hail Marys and one large one for the Our Father. It was blessed by the confessor of Pius IX over thirty years ago. At that time it was uncommon; but he blessed rings of this kind for priests on their ordination, and it was looked upon as a great favor.

WHEN GOOD FRIDAY IS A FIRST FRIDAY.

Qu. A certain person made several efforts to complete the devotion known as the nine First Fridays, but was prevented in some way or another. This year, after he has made eight First Fridays, he finds that the ninth falls on Good Friday. Can he satisfy the requirements by going to the Sacraments on Holy Thursday or on the following Sunday?

Resp. The novena of First Fridays is a pious practice suggested by our Lord to Blessed Margaret Mary.. To those who complete the novena with fervor He promised a particular grace. The material continuity seems, therefore, to be a condition attached to the granting of that grace. However, we may not suppose that that condition holds when the material continuity is interrupted because of the liturgy of the Church, and not because of any other circumstance. A parallel is found in the Gregorian trentain of Masses, which is not considered interrupted by the occurrence of the last three days of Holy Week. When, therefore, as this year, one of the First Fridays falls on Good Friday, it is not counted as an interruption. The novena in the case proposed may be completed by the reception of the Sacraments on the first Friday of May. (For the Gregorian trentain of Masses, see Mocchegiani, *Collectio Indulgentiarum*, Quaracchi, 1897, pp. 490 ff.)

Ecclesiastical Library Table.

RECENT BIBLE STUDY.

THE MYTHIC CHRIST.

I. Dr. Cheyne's Christ. At the outset, it was not our intention to carry on these Christological studies through several issues of the REVIEW; else they would have been more logically set together. Either the historical development of these alien Christologies would have been followed, or the various theories would have been grouped according to whatsoever of concord might have been noted therein. Thus far we have traced the school of Ritschl that strives to save some semblance of the Christ. Broadly we may group the Ritschlian theologians into the Harnack-Wellhausen-Schmiedel school and the Weinel school. The former clings to "Q", *Quelle,* the *Source*—a few facts that are said to be the Christ of history; the latter waives the question of an historical Christ. Harnack's branch of Ritschlian Christology has been recently dubbed the Either-Or school. It starts with the assumption that the Jesus of history was an utter failure; and, at His death, His followers were face to face with an Either-Or—*either* Jesus had to be admitted to have been a mere visionary and a failure, *or* the Christian conscience had to deify Him. The latter horn of the dilemma was chosen. Thus we have Christianity.[1] This theory of the origin of the Jesus-cult is pretty much the same in Wellhausen's essays at Christological origins. So, too, must Schmiedel assign to the duping and gullible Christian conscience the strange rôle of having set the whole structure of the life, the Christhood, and the Divinity of Jesus upon the frail fabric of a few pillar-passages of the Synoptic narrative.[2] These manifold Christological theories must be distinguished from the purely Ritschlian theology, of which Dr. Weinel is a chief exponent. To him, as to all who, with Ritschl, follow logically the Kantian epistemology in matters religious, the Christ of history matters not at all; what matters is the value

[1] Cf. ECCL. REVIEW, December, 1914, pp. 740 ff.
[2] Cf. ECCL. REVIEW, January, 1915, pp. 100 ff.

of Jesus to the Christian conscience.[3] This slur at the historical Christ is the starting point of the Congregational minister, Dr. Roberts;[4] though his co-religionist, Dr. Fairbairn, late principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, less logically clings to both the Jesus of history and the Christ of the Christian conscience.[5]

1. *The Christ or El-Bab?* The latest perplexing answer to the question "Jesus or Christ?" comes from Dr. Thomas Kelly Cheyne, Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Sacred Scripture at Oxford and Canon of Rochester. For years he has stood in the lead of Anglican liberalism by a reckless divisive criticism of the Old Testament. This chaotic division of the inspired Word of God has resulted in a chaotic condition of the doctor's religious beliefs. His Yerahme'el theory, or the North Arabian origin of Israelitic religion, was criticized as a most arbitrary piece of tampering with the Sacred Text.[6] And yet the doctor went on undoing the little bit of really scientific work he had long ago done; substituting mere vagaries for truth. North Arabian heroes took the place of Israelitic in the early Hebrew history. Not satisfied with so fantastic and arbitrary a twisting of Old Testament history, Dr. Cheyne has now tried his hand at the New. In *The Reconciliation of Races and Religions*,[7] he does not yet see North Arabian heroes stalking in the person of Jesus. That may be the term of his higher criticism of the New Testament which will shortly be reached. Thus far he sees merely that Jesus was not the Christ any more than was that mountebank, Baha'ullah. The great critic Cheyne, the Oriel Professor of Scripture at Oxford, is become a Bahaist, while he at the same time remains an Anglican clergyman—in fact a canon of Rochester.

Baha'ullah, "the Glory of God", a Persian, claimed to be a reincarnation of the Deity, caused havoc in Muhammedan circles and was persecuted by the Ottoman government. His son, Babel-Baha, "the Gate to the Glory of God", took up

[3] ECCL. REVIEW, March, 1915, pp. 367 ff.

[4] ECCL. REVIEW, February, 1915, pp. 361 ff.

[5] ECCL. REVIEW, April, 1915, pp. 488 ff.

[6] Cf. *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel;* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1907.

[7] London: Black, 1914.

the work of spreading the worship of his father. During some years of exile in Khaifa, this exponent of a non-Christian cult became an object first of curiosity, then of religious emotion to English and American tourists. Freedom came to the Bab when the Young Turks got hold of the government. Shortly thereafter he visited England and the United States and got a considerable following. Among these "converts" was Cheyne, who received from El-Bab the title Ruhani, Priest of the Prince of Peace. How all this transformation came about, the Oxford doctor tells us. He endeavored "not to fetter" himself "by any individual teacher or party"—not even by Jesus; he strove "to get nearer to a human-Catholic religion"; and so "sought the privilege of simultaneous membership in several brotherhoods of Friends of God". In this wise, while drawing the salary of Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Sacred Scripture at Oxford and holding the grand old Catholic benefice of a canonry in Rochester, Dr. Cheyne has become "Member of the Nava Vidhau (Lahore), the Bahai Community, etc., Ruhani, Priest of the Prince of Peace, etc." And he now dares stand out in the open and jumble together all these strangely inconsistent titles upon the title-page of his latest book.

2. *El-Bab first.* The Oxford man has no fear of excommunication; he tells his readers that Anglicans virtually have none. As to the historical Christ, the doctor is not seriously concerned. The crucifixion of Jesus he finds to be very uncertain; and of the traditional matter of the Gospel, very little is historical at all. Indeed, "it is more than doubtful whether critics have left us enough stones standing in the life of Jesus to serve as the basis of a Christology". So it is he would substitute Bahaism for Christianity. Abdul Baha and Baha'-ullah will do for our age what Jesus did for His. Nor is it enough to degrade the Christ of the Gospels; Canon Cheyne, of set purpose, gives preference to the Persian charlatan over the Christ. Baha'ullah is said plainly to have surpassed Jesus; and throughout the book, Abdul Baha, the son of "the Glory of God", is honored with a capital "H" in such pronouns as *his, he;* while this little courtesy is refused the Saviour. Such adulation of the Bab will doubtless bring more fulsome praise—maybe, deification to Cheyne. For Abdul

Baha writes to the Anglican canon, "My divine philosopher"; and yearns for the time when both East and West will come to look upon Cheyne as a "divine philosopher".

3. *Origin of such theories.* Vagaries such as these are force perforce tolerated in Protestant communions. For Protestantism is founded on private judgment. And a Christian form of worship that is founded on private judgment and not on authority, is what you have the whim to make it; nor is there in such a religion that organism and life which are necessary to slough off what is rotted and to lop off what is gangrened. In the Catholic Church, there is that organism and life. The Kingdom of God — i. e. the Catholic Church — is a living, organic whole; not an invisible, vague, sum-total of disparate entities. Note the parables of the Kingdom. They bring out in clear relief this visibility, unity, organic compactness of the Church. Jülicher, of Marburg, and most Protestant commentators strive to read into these parables some other than a visible Messianic Kingdom. Fr. Fonck, President of the Biblical Institute, has signally refuted Jülicher on this point.[8] To bolster up their theory of an invisible church, Protestants fall back upon a stock-text—"The Kingdom of God is *within* you".[9] We have shown that the meaning of our Lord is "The Kingdom of God is already established *among* you" — the Messianic Kingdom, the Church of Christ, has already begun.[10]

Catholics should be careful not to interpret this important text in a misleading way. The danger of such misinterpretation is due to the fact that the various revisions of our Douai-Rheims version have the translation—"*within* you".[11] Indeed, the original first edition of the Rheims N. T.[12] so reads; but it adds the illuminating note: "Whiles they aske and looke for a temporal kingdom in pompe and glorie, loe their king and Messias was now *among* them, whose spiritual kingdom is within all the faithful that have dominion over sinne". Ac-

[8] Cf. *The Parables of the Gospel*, by Leopold Fonck, S.J.; New York: Pustet, 1915.

[9] Lk. 17:21.

[10] ECCL. REVIEW, December, 1914, p. 747.

[11] Cf. the John Murphy edition.

[12] "*The New Testament of Jesus Christ*, translated faithfully into English. Printed at Rhemes, by John Fogny, 1582."

cording to the Rheims translators, then, the kingdom of God was come in that the king and Messias was *among* the Pharisees then and there. Unfortunately this note has, in the course of time, been lost to the various editions that are still called the Rheims New Testament; and, as a consequence, we now and then hear the Protestant interpretation given in our pulpits.

According to this Protestant interpretation, the Kingdom of God which our Lord preached was an invisible and not a visible. According to Catholics, Christ established a visible Church—a visible Messianic Kingdom; and, in the passage we are considering, He told the Pharisees that that Kingdom was already come—"The Kingdom of God is *among* you".

True, the Vulgate *intra vos* and the Greek ἐντὸς ὑμῶν could mean *within you;* but only in the sense of Jo. 1 : 26—"medius vestrum stetit", μέσος ὑμῶν ἔστηκεν, "in the midst of you". This is not the sense Wellhausen wishes by "innerhalb von euch"; he would do away entirely with any external Messianic Kingdom.

The reign of Christ by grace in the soul is the effect of this visible reign in a visible Kingdom or Church. Another effect was expected by the Jews—the reign by visible pomp. All this is contained in the note of Rheims. The omission of such illuminating notes and the change of the translation in various editions made Cardinal Newman deem it inaccurate any longer to call the various editions of our English Catholic translation by the name of "Rheims New Testament".

II. The Babylonian Christ. We have several times spoken of Pan-Babylonianism.[13] It started out to explain the Babylonian origin of all religious ideas of the Old Testament. The result was inevitable. Now the religious ideas of the New Testament are in like manner made to be merely the expression of Babylonian mythology.

1. *Foundation of theory.* The attempt to give a scientific basis for this theory was, as we have shown, rendered futile by the Jesuit astronomer and Assyriologist, Fr. Kugler. And so a new and less tangible foundation was sought and set by the Berlin and Leipzig Pan-Babylonians—Gunkel, Winckler, Delitzsch, Jeremias, etc. The new theory is founded on

[13] ECCL. REVIEW, November, 1910, pp. 621 ff.; January, 1914, pp. 92 ff.

mythology. Old Testament narratives are noted to resemble Babylonian myths; and, therefore, are nothing more than these myths rehashed. The whole theory is a series of gratuitous assertions. Babylonian stories are torn from their settings; so, too, the Old Testament narratives. Both elements of comparison are squeezed and squeezed; and, in the end, a few items are found that seem to indicate a common source. We might let all this mutilation and squeezing and separating go without fault-finding, if the arbitrariness stopped here. But follows the most arbitrary thing of all. Because some resemblance is seen between the two narratives, the conclusion is jumped to, that therefore the Old Testament drew upon Babylonian mythology. There is another and a much more plausible conclusion; it is that therefore both Babylonian mythology and Hebrew theology had a common source. This source was primitive revelation and the history of the human race. The tradition of this primitive revelation and history was kept clean by the inspiration of the Old Testament and by a special Jahwistic providence of the Hebrew folk; it was polluted in Babylonian and other mythologies.

2. *Jensen's Christ.* In the University of Marburg, while Jülicher teaches students for the Lutheran ministry that we should cut loose from Paul and go back to the Christ of history — the formless, Christless, Godless, Jesus of "Q" — Dr. Peter Jensen, Professor of Semitic Philology, urges them to cut loose even from this *liberal* Christ and to go back to the Babylonian source of the Jesus-cult. For, according to this wizard in Christian origins, the source of the Gospel narratives is the Gilgamesh epic of Babylon. Weinel, whose liberal Christ we have presented,[14] says: "There can be no doubt that this epic has influenced the Old Testament and the Homeric poems. This was recognized long ago." [15] From such an admission it is not a difficult step to the Jensen-theory that the life of Jesus is simply a "variant" of the Babylonian epic. Here is the result of Jensen's squeezing and sorting and mutilating! Note the parallels; but do not omit the Babylonian twaddle that Jensen fails to record from the epic.

[14] ECCL. REVIEW, March, 1915, pp. 867 ff.

[15] *Jesus in the XIXth Century and After,* by Heinrich Weinel, D.D., and Alban G. Widgery; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914, p. 442.

In the Gilgamesh Epic.	*In the Gospels.*
A storm arises and subsides.	A storm arises and subsides.
Xisuthros lands with his family far from his dwelling-place.	Jesus lands in Perea, beyond his home.
Sinful humanity and most animals, and among these swine, are drowned in the flood.	Two thousand or more demons and two thousand swine are drowned in the lake over which Jesus voyaged.
Xisuthros with three closely related persons ascends on a seventh day the summit of the mount of the flood, and is deified.	After six (sometimes about eight, then certainly originally about a week of seven) days Jesus climbs with three most closely related persons a high mountain and is transfigured and declared to be the son of God.
Voice of the invisible Xisuthros out of the air to his companions upon the mountain of the flood, that they should be pious.	Voice from a cloud on the mountain of transfiguration that they should hear Jesus.

That and similar "deadly parallels" are the reason Jensen gives for his conclusion: "In our cathedrals and houses of prayer, in our churches and schools, in palace and cottage, we serve a Babylonian god, Babylonian gods!" And this is the sort of theology given to the students for the Lutheran ministry in the University of Marburg! No stronger refutation is needed than the mere suggestion of the above argument.

III. Dr. Smith's Mythic Christ. We need not go to Germany for the theory that there never was a Jesus Christ. The Lutheran clergymen Kalthof of Bremen, Drews of Berlin, Jensen of Marburg, have fit company in Dr. W. J. Smith of Tulane University, New Orleans. In his *Ecce Deus* and *Der Vorchristliche Jesus* [16] the American professor strives to make it out that the Jesus-cult is merely a Joshua-cult, a pagan cult, carried over from Judaism.

That is rather a wild theory to ask us to accept. It should be backed up by very strong reasons. What are they? We look in vain within the covers of the ponderous doctor's books. These volumes are a veritable hodge-podge of undigested stuff, hurled at the reader in the raw and without order or sequence. We find at most a few analogies and coincidences.

[16] Cf. ECCL. REVIEW, December, 1914, pp. 740 ff.

Small wonder that Catholics have refused to take the doctor seriously. He gives them nothing worth their serious taking. Only a student to whom Harnack and his school had appealed would think Dr. Smith worth the while to answer. Such students are fondly hopeful to save something of the Christ after they have given themselves over to a method which readily rules him utterly out of the realm of reality. In the absence of any English refutation of Smith by a Catholic, we recommend the answers given by Dr. Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*,[17] and Dr. Thornburn, *Jesus the Christ*.[18] Case is a Modernistic Baptist and makes a weak defence of the *liberal* Christ.

Let us seriously consider what seems to be the strongest *evidence* Dr. Smith has to prop up his Jesus-myth. There must have been a Jesus-cult existing in the first century B. C. Witness the Joshua-Jesus cult of which we have traces from earliest times among the Jews. Witness most of all the fact that Apollos preached "the things of Jesus", while he was acquainted only with the Baptism of John (Acts 18:25). These "things of Jesus" must have been doctrines peculiar to an old pre-Christian cult-god. They cannot have been the teachings of an historical Jesus; because Apollos knew not the Baptism of Jesus but only that of John the Baptist. Apollos cannot have been a Christian at all. He was only an enthusiastic member of a pre-Christian sect of Judaism—a Jesus-sect of Alexandria. So the doctor runs on.

As to the Joshua-cult, it is a thing of the imagination. Fr. Kugler, S.J., has proved that the Pan-Babylonian school start with a false astronomical assumption. False, as a consequence, must be their conclusion that Moses, Josue, and the other characters of the Hexateuch are mere moon-myths or star-myths. And even though there never were an historical character named Josue, the son of Miriam, nothing would follow against the clear New Testament evidence in favor of the central fact of Christianity, Jesus, the Son of Mary. It is a sin against elementary logic to conclude from the mythical character of an Old Testament hero—a premise we emphatically disavow—to the mythical character of the central figure of the

[17] University of Chicago Press.
[18] T. & T. Clark, Edinburg, 1912.

New Testament, and this merely because the name Jesus is from the same root as Josue and the mother of each hero was Mary.

The Apollos-argument is also too long a stretch of the bow. First, note that Dr. Smith admits the historical worth of this reference of Acts to Apollos. Why? Because it suits his purpose. Why not admit the contemporaneous writing of the Synoptic Gospels? Because their historical worth would be counter to his purpose.

Secondly, it is unblushing effrontery to say that "the things of Jesus" which Apollos preached cannot have been the teachings of an historical Jesus. Why not? Only one shadow of a reason is forthcoming—because, forsooth, Apollos knew only the Baptism of John. By what mathematical process does the Tulane professor of mathematics reason out that conclusion? Apollos knew only the Baptism of John and not that of Jesus; therefore he belonged to an Alexandrian Jesus-sect and came to Ephesus to teach the doctrines of this pagan Jesus. This reasoning is very bad logic and is flying in the face of facts as Acts narrates them. Since Dr. Smith admits the historical worth of Acts in the statement that Apollos taught "the things of Jesus" at Ephesus, he must also admit the other facts narrated in the same chapter. We are there expressly told that Apollos "had been taught in the way of the Lord"; and the verb is one which indicates he had taken part in the catechesis of the early Church. The way of handing down the faith was by oral and written catechesis; and to have been instructed in such a way in "the things of Jesus" means to have received the faith of Jesus and not of a pagan god.

But why did not Apollos know the Baptism of Jesus? Simply because he had not been properly instructed. His catechesis was given him by disciples of the school of John the Baptist; and among the disciples of this school the faith of Jesus was not always preached in its purity. This explanation seems clear from the following chapter of Acts (19). After Apollos had left Ephesus for Corinth, St. Paul came to Ephesus and there found disciples who had been baptized with the Baptism of John the Baptist and had never even heard there was a Holy Spirit. Such poorly instructed disciples could not give Apollos a better catechesis than they themselves had received. The result was, he knew only the Baptism of John

until Aquilla and Priscilla, those great friends of Paul, made up the deficiency of his first instruction in Christianity.

An open-minded reading of Acts thus explains plausibly enough the rather defective Christianity that Apollos at first preached. There is no need to throw over all belief in the existence of a human Jesus, in order to explain this little episode in the history of the early Church. Why, in his attempt to bolster up a theory, the doctor leaves this very episode less understandable than before. If Apollos got his pagan cult from Alexandria, wherever did he get his Baptism of John? He taught the Ephesians "the things of Jesus, knowing only the Baptism of John"; so he seems naturally to have got "the things of Jesus" from the source of which he got "the Baptism of John". Was Alexandria this source of "the Baptism of John"? Then the doctor should be mathematically correct and tell us how in the world the Baptism of John reached Alexandria at this early period.

The coincidences which Dr. Smith insists on seem trivial to one whose mind is not biased. Some of the sayings of Jesus are found to resemble those of Plato. Therefore Jesus never said those things and never existed. There is no hope to answer such a silly argument. It starts with the absurd premise that no man ever existed who said anything like what any man before him said. Our Lord said many things that were according to natural law and imbedded in human nature; also many things that pagan philosophers had held before Him. Their noble ideas were due to the nobility of human nature. Christ did not destroy that noble nature; He built upon it. Grace is the supernatural perfection of human nature, not its destruction. Jesus never said nor implied that His biddings and counsels were each and every one of them hitherto unheard-of.

It is hard to understand how, for such flimsy reasons, a reasoning man would throw aside the historical worth of the Gospels; would rule out of court the reasons of those who, all the world over, have for eighteen centuries and more accepted the Synoptic account of the Saviour as fact-narrative; would set up his own puny mind in impudent, Lilliputian judgment against the unanimous verdict of well nigh nineteen centuries of Christian intellects.

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Criticisms and Notes.

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ST. COLUMBAN (542-615). By George Metlake, author of "Ketteler and the Christian Social Reform Movement." Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press. 1914. Pp. xx-258.

In November will fall the anniversary of the death of a priest who as an apostle of European civilization takes first rank with Honoratus of Lerins, Cassian of St. Victor, and the great Benedict of Nursia. With his exit from the monastic home of Bangor, in the north of Ireland, art and letters, as well as religion and industry, the mother of modern inventions, awoke to a fuller realization of power in England, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. We have good reason, then, to remember this Irish monk, and to pour forth our gratitude to him on the occasion of his anniversary. Americans too, since they have become heirs of the old Christian civilization through the great discoverer who bore the name of Columbanus, have cause for congratulation, because the Irish patron saint of Christopher Columbus appears to have communicated to the Genoese mariner the missionary spirit that led him to seek a new world for Christ, where the light of faith and culture might perpetuate the principles that constitute the praise of St. Columban for all time.

Our Saint hailed from the province of Leinster. His Christian mother guarded with jealous care her little Columban (dove), whom she had seen in the form of a bright star, the night before his birth, illuminating the dark emerald swards of the southern coast, until he was old enough to follow the inspirations and longings of his young heart, and to learn the ways of imitating Christ, and to preach Him to others. In the school of Sinell, at the monastery of Cluain-Inis, the echoes of the wondrous piety and learning of the monks at Bangor in the north roused the enthusiasm of the youthful students; and one after another they went to seek hospitality and training in knowledge and in the science of the soul at the feet of St. Comgall. Caught by these same fires of holy ambition, the boy Columban bade farewell to Lough Erne, and with scrip and pilgrim staff set out for the Ards of Ulster. The twenty years or more which he spent at Bangor made of him a man endowed with the wisdom of the saints and all the lore that could be acquired by the study of the Fathers and from the genius of teachers rich in experience of a world which they had renounced, and from the practice of the arts and the science of the Greeks and Romans whose traditions they had stored in their

scriptoria. Then, in the full strength of mature manhood, he set out with a dozen companions, minded like himself, to gain fresh knowledge in foreign lands and at the same time ready to sow the seeds of what they had acquired, in soil which they were prepared to water with their sweat and, if need be, their blood.

The figure of the strong and noble personality of Columban, drawing to himself disciples at every turn by the earnestness of his preaching, the gentle prudence of his indulgent discipline, and the glorious ideals which he unfolded to their open minds, is one of transcendent beauty. There were others in his train, as nobly great in aspirations, if not in actual presence, as himself; men, like St. Gallus, who seconded and multiplied the graces and successes of their peerless leader. From Ireland they went to England, thence to that other Brittany across the sea, through Burgundy into the heart of France, leaving the marks of a blessed activity, to bear fruit to the end of time, in Annegray, Fontaine, Luxeuil, and the numerous monastic institutions that became offshoots of these. The rule he gave to his monks was severe, for austerity alone could bring home to the wild and untrained Frank and Alaman the vital purposes of fallen nature struggling to gain new habits in the service of the cross, whence was to spring the grace of permanent interior peace. Persecution, too, was to come in the wake of zeal for what is true and good. Brunhilda, the ambitious queen, saw her domain of innate vanity and her influence crumbling under the growth of Christian asceticism around her, and with the cruelty of selfish power she drove Columban from her realm. Clothair gave him hospitality, and then bade him seek other fields for his preaching. Thus the valiant band of Irish monks went up the Rhine, to Bregence, and thence to Italy where their master died the death of the saints in the little town of Bobbio, which henceforth became famous as the resting place of Ireland's noble apostle, than whom there is probably no greater besides St. Patrick.

Columban's strong personality, his quality as a fighter not merely for the truths of the gospel of Christ, but for the principles of religious and civic order, are splendidly brought out by our author, especially in the controversy which the saint had with the Gallican bishops concerning the Easter celebration, and in his conflicts with Arianism, to which, it may be said, he gave the deathblow.

It must be remembered, in gauging the importance of this volume at the present time, that we have no English biography of St. Columban that is in any sense an adequate portrait of him or the circle in which he moved. The fact is typified by two books, written by an English lady (1892 and 1895), Margaret Stokes, under the title of *Six Months in the Apennines in search of the Irish Saints in Italy* and *Three Months in the Forests of France in search of Vestiges of*

the Irish Saints. Apart from the writings of St. Columban, which have been happily preserved to us in great part at least, and which consist of his letters (to Popes Gregory the Great, Sabinian, and St. Boniface), his Rule, and *Ordo Vitae*, and some hymns or songs which attest his genius as well as his taste for the finer things of life, the bulk of the short biographical sketches of our Saint is taken from a collection of lives by Jonas of Bobbio. Jonas, a Benedictine Abbot, who was born about the time of St. Columban's death, was educated by the monks at Bobbio. Later on, after his return from Belgium, where he had been sent to convert the pagan clans, he came back to Bobbio, and was there prevailed upon to write the lives of some of the notable men of the foregoing generation, among whom the chief was St. Columban. This work has been preserved to us under the title of *Vitae Columbani Abbatis Discipulorumque ejus Libri duo.* Some ten years ago, a German writer, Dr. Bruno Krusch, undertook to collate the existing manuscripts of this life to the number of about one hundred and twenty. Since the majority of writers who have occupied themselves with further investigation of the subject are German scholars, we are not surprised to find that this latest and most complete characterization of the Saint comes from Germany. When we say Germany, we ought to add that the writer is an American priest who, while resident in Germany, has special opportunities for pursuing original studies of this kind. How deeply German scholars as a rule appreciate the work of the missionary pioneers that came forth from the Island of Saints, may readily be gleaned from the sources referred to by our author in his bibliography (which also includes works in other languages in which anything of value may be found on the subject of the Irish Saints).

The biography treats of St. Columban in logical and chronological order, first in his native land, next in the kingdom of the Franks, then in German lands, and finally in Lombardy. There is an interesting introduction which deals with the early Life of the Saint by Jonas of Bobbio, and this is preceded by a brief preface referring to the celebration of the thirteenth centenary of the death of St. Columban on 23 November of this year. In addition to the graphic details of St. Columban's life, the author presents a well-reasoned study of the chronological question referring to the disputed dates of his birth and death. The Appendix contains also a tentative chronology of the Saint's career, with the Paschal table from 590 to 614, the period in which the chief phases of the dispute regarding the celebration of Easter are to be placed. The bibliography pointing to the literary sources of St. Columban's history is full, though we miss among minor biographical sketches the mention of the name of Bisphan (New York, 1903).

In view of the centenary celebration and the fact that the life of our Saint deserves to be in every Irish and American household, the publishers contemplate issuing a new edition at a reduced price.

MANUALE THEOLOGIAE MORALIS secundum principia S. Thomae Aquinatis. In usum scholarum edidit Dominicus M. Pruemmer O. Pr. Prof. in Universitate Friburgensi Helvetiorum. Tomi tres. Friburgi Brisg. 1915. B. Herder: St. Louis, Mo. Pp. 422–539–689.

Fr. Pruemmer gives at the beginning of his work a list of text-books of Moral Theology covering nearly thirty pages. The three hundred or more theologians represented are all of more or less high rank in the profession of scholastic theology, and not a few of them are sufficiently recent to have covered the grounds of inquiry into the present needs of pastoral science. Why then another manual? Our learned Dominican answers by a reference to his former published work on Ecclesiastical Jurisprudence. That work finds its completion in the present. Moreover his students are benefited by this printed text which allows simultaneous reference to the entire academic course in Moral Theology.

The chief purpose, however, of the present Manual is the far more important one which affects a much larger circle of students than those of the University of Fribourg. It is to emphasize a protest against the excessive casuistry which has become characteristic of many moral theology text-books. Attempts have been made of late years to get away from this inheritance of abnormal scholastic speculation. But there are still too many moralists of whom it may be said that "neglecta seria perscrutatione principiorum ac virtutum totos ita se dedunt enumerandis, distinguendis, ponderandis, mensurandis peccatis, ut eorum theologia moralis jam nil sit nisi elenchus seu codex peccatorum". In opposition to this tendency to extremes our author proposes to present a handbook of Moral Theology which excels in the exposition of solid principles rather than in the discussion of the values of sins.

The main purpose of the work is therefore to furnish an exposition of the virtues to which we must aspire, and to treat of sin as accidental to their neglect. Thus the tractatus "De Peccatis" is deprived of much of its customary isolated prominence in the text.

In method Fr. Pruemmer remains of course true to St. Thomas. The statement of definitions, of principles and deductions alternates with the systematic demonstrations of their truth and correctness, so as to bring out their application to actual conditions, and incidentally to train the student in dialectical defence of them. In claiming that his text is a *Theologia Moralis Thomistica* the author does not intend

to ignore the value and authority of other theologians and other schools, as is attested by his occasional references to St. Alphonsus Liguori, Hugo of St. Victor, St. Raymund of Pennafort, St. Bonaventure, and other recognized masters in the field of theology.

It is needless to say that the recent legislation of the Church has been duly considered, and that the work is supplied with the usual apparatus for the information of students and directors of conscience. The indexes and typographical aids, in the traditionally excellent style of the Herder publishing house, make the work a desirable addition to the series of authorities on the subject it treats.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS. By Thomas Verner Moore, Ph.D., C.S.P., Instructor in Psychology at the Catholic University, Washington, D. C. Introduction by the Right Rev. Thomas Shahan, S.T.D. American Book Co., New York. 1915. Pp. 172.

If history is philosophy teaching by example, philosophy is the theory of the example. This is true no less of the history and the philosophy of the inner life than of the outer. The history of thought and theory gives us the examples of philosophy at work, while philosophy begets the theory exemplified. We therefore may approach history through philosophy, yet there will be an advantage in approaching philosophy through history. Particularly will the latter be the case with the philosophy of the moral life, Ethics, the roof and crown of all philosophy. And from this point of view a special value attaches to the little volume before us. The title is significant. The book is not quite a history, nor is it a summary, of Ethics. It is not the one, because it selects only the types, the salient types, of ethical theory, which stand out in the course of the ages; nor is it a textbook of Ethics, since it is confined to the central problem of Ethics, the criterion of the morally good and evil. Perhaps the easiest way to give an idea of the scope of the volume will be to present the author's schema of ethical systems.

ETHICAL SYSTEMS.

MORALITY CONDITIONATE.
- 1. On Pleasure.
  - Of Individual. Egoistic Utilitarianism. Epicurus, Hobbes.
  - Of Society. Altruistic Utilitarianism. Bentham, Mill, Spencer.
- 2. On the Customs of Society. Rousseau.

MORALITY ABSOLUTE.
1. Known by a Special Faculty. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.
2. Known by a Feeling of Sympathy. Adam Smith.
3. Known by Instinct. The Stoics.
4. Known by Intuition. Cudworth and Clarke.
5. Known by Reason.
   a. By an analysis of the concept of duty. Kant.
   b. By an analysis of the relations and functions of man. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Each of the systems here bracketed is taken up in turn and exposed—largely in the very words of the founder: an excellent plan, as it insures accuracy. In the concluding section of the volume each system is in turn criticized and evaluated. Ample bibliographies are appended to the several chapters. In these book lists the author has occasionally noted the viewpoint of certain works. It had been still better if this method had been adopted throughout. The titles of books are of very little practical service unless the reader has some guide to the tendency of the contents.

The book will be most helpful in our seminaries and colleges. To the educated laity it should prove no less useful in enabling them to estimate correctly the theories of right and wrong that meet them in life and in literature, and by establishing in them the conviction that only in that system of *absolute* morality wherein reason and faith harmonize and combine—the system of St. Thomas adopted by Catholicism—is the true ideal of life set up and vindicated. All other systems are at best true only in part, while the remainder is error.

THE SOCIETY OF THE SACRED HEART. By Janet Erskine Stuart. Convent of the Sacred Heart, Roehampton, London. 1914. Pp. 116.

VENERABLE PHILIPPINE DUCHESNE. G. E. M. A Brief Sketch of the Life and Work of the Foundress of the Society of the Sacred Heart in America. New York: The America Press. 1914. Pp. 44.

To compare the merits of religious communities is odious, because it implies that we measure societies by their success; and success is no criterion of the real value of the apparent causes that contribute to it. But beauty is not merit; and to say that each Order has something of its own, something of beauty or of strength, or of high utility that brings souls within its circle because they feel

a special attraction for it, is simply to recognize that God's image is as visible in the diversity of religious vocations as it is in the variety of plant life. Hence it implies no depreciation of other religious congregations when we say that the Society of Blessed Mother Barat has in its Constitutions something that makes those upon whom it is allowed to exercise its full influence shine with a peculiar halo that at once beautifies and attracts whatever it illumines. What is this distinctive feature? We can hardly express it. It appears most often as a perpetual joy in those who live by it, making them radiant with thoughtfulness of Christian affection, which is warm and chaste, and rich in the grace of perpetual readiness for sacrifice, whilst at the same time it is humble in the desire of generous self-effacement and the prompt distribution of all that it has gained by its attraction.

One need but read the annals of the Society as recorded in the Lives of its noble foundress and those who followed in her wake, to realize that the order is capable of training women such as met their beloved Master on the ascent to Calvary, with the wine of consolation and the veil of mercy ever in their hands to catch the beautiful image of Christ as He passes through the byways of modern Jerusalem.

Mother Janet Stuart's sketch gives us this impression; only she separates the spirit of the institute from all personal illustration, and summarizes its fundamental principles by emphasizing its special manifestations and activities. Nothing produces a truer likeness of the real character of the Society of the Sacred Heart than this simple delineation by its late Superior General; and all unconsciously she draws her own portrait. There is in it a breadth of intellect, a deep spiritual insight, and that fine scorn of worldliness which betokens the nobility of the Christian soul, a dowry, by vocation, of the true religious, which cuts deep and clear as the diamond-edged burin upon finely polished steel. Like all revelations of true soul-life, Mother Stuart's book is the outcome of circumstances, without her own designing. She had been requested to contribute a sketch of her institute as part of a series of small volumes illustrative of the life of the Church which the Jesuit Fathers at Roehampton were preparing. Being much occupied, she did not find time to write until a lengthy voyage, undertaken for the inspection of the houses of her Order, gave her a kind of enforced leisure. The book was planned on the Adriatic, begun on the Red Sea, written for the most part on the Indian Ocean, and finished on the South Pacific. This was in 1913. She died in the following year. In a brief introductory chapter she speaks of the Society sketch as a fleeting picture, though a true one, of the corporate body to which she belonged,

that owes a debt of gratitude to God, to the Church, and to its first author.

This unaffected and beautiful sketch by Mother Jane Stuart is indeed but an outline, as we said, yet clear and limned with a sure hand, of the origin and history, the growth and development of the household in which Martha and Mary compass the Heart of Jesus. It describes the training which leads to the worship of that Divine Heart as the central motive of religious activity, the work that occupies the members of the institute, and sends its influence abroad. The final chapters in particular give us a perspective of this influence, and at the same time an insight into the author's rare qualities of observation, her practical sense in the expression of high ideals, and her loyal temper of heart in defending the principles on which the Society of the Sacred Heart is grounded. It is the aim of the institute, as some one has aptly expressed it, to impart values and to give anchorage. Studies, discipline, and training in conduct, as part of the educational method of the Order, are calculated to make the children value their innocence and protect it by sacrifice. A child typical of the results was said to be "very strong, very innocent, and determined to do something for God". With characteristic frankness Mother Stuart states that "the Society of the Sacred Heart is essentially a woman's order", seeking in its whole tone, spirit, training, and manner of life "the perfection of womanhood and God's ideals and Mary's of what a woman can be". This disposes of any attempt at aping the masculine methods which some of our educational establishments deem in line with progress, the emancipation of woman and her elevation to an equality with man in things which hitherto have been considered as his exclusive prerogatives. Mother Madeleine Sophie, when formulating the rules of her Order, realized that the equality of the sexes is not only a futile aim but a noxious one, inasmuch as it destroys the essential qualities in woman which give her a superior influence over man. His strength constitutes power by which he acts and protects; her grace and sympathy constitute influence which moves and directs that power. In proportion to the adoption and acquisition of manly rights by woman, womanly privileges are being absorbed by the self-assertiveness of man. It was for this reason that Mother Barat strongly resisted the effort made at one time to bring the rule of the institute into closer accord with that of the Society of Jesus. She wisely maintained that an order of women could not be governed like an order of men. While she intensely valued the spirit of the Society of Jesus, and indeed moulded her own institute to a close resemblance of it in fundamentals, she would not blindly adopt the manners and customs approved for a body of men trained to a military discipline and de-

signed to fight the battles of error and worldliness. What she saw of chief value in women was affection, insight, tact, sympathy, and quick intuition, on the one hand; and on the other, submission, reserve, and intelligent humility. She realized that there were congruities and fitnesses which, without being written precepts, were law that served women as a defence, though they had no significance for men.

In speaking at length of this little book, because of the great light it throws upon the spirit of religious training, and because of the exquisite suggestiveness it contains of how spiritual values are to be treated in the concrete, we also had in mind to draw fresh attention to the practical aims that are to be kept in mind with regard to the education of our young, and especially of the training of womanhood. Our efforts are largely in the direction of intellectual development; and one can understand why Catholics feel themselves in a manner compelled to keep step with the many who follow a popular standard of education. But in this we run the risk of losing the very strength which we mean to husband in our defence of the religious element as the primary factor of all true and complete exercise of the soul faculties which constitute man's distinctive superiority over the merely well-groomed animal. Mother Barat, while leading her teachers to the very highest elevation of intellectual culture, never lets them lose sight of the fact that this intellect is merely the lamp which, held high, must nevertheless be fed by the oil of faith, to be prudently guarded by a hand whose steadiness is all the more necessary the higher the light is raised. She kept them mindful of this, in practice as well as in theory, by the provision of poor schools to be taught by the nuns who might teach simultaneously the highest branches of polite culture.

This thought suggests our saying a word about a recently published sketch of Mother Duchesne, who is called the Founder of the Society of the Sacred Heart in America. Though the process of her Beatification has apparently come to a temporary standstill, its very beginning is a proof that she died in the odor of sanctity. We need American saints, and above all patrons of our educational system. Mother Duchesne represents the best type of patron saint in our land, for she acted as a pioneer educator for the abandoned Indian, who loved her as a mother, with no less fervor than she spent on the descendants of noble French and Spanish emigrés who sought her Christian wisdom and religious guidance.

The abbé Baunard wrote a life of her which was translated into good English by Lady Georgiana Fullerton. But that was more than thirty years ago, before the process of her Beatification had been started. The facts of her heroic life need to be revived to stir

educational zeal of the right kind and keep us from faltering in the sacrifices our religious educators are being called upon to make, sacrifices of a new kind in which the heroic comes less to the foreground than of old. Nuns like Mother Duchesne are the pioneers who have made our present successes possible; they sowed in tears of blood what we reap in joy. The present biographical sketch is brief and without pretence, as is characteristic of the source whence it comes; but it is well written and full of the interest that awakens vocations to the religious life and lifts us above the commonplace level.

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. By Richard Ely, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Wisconsin. Vol. I, pp. xlvii–525; Vol. II, pp. 470. The Macmillan Co., New York. 1914.

It may safely be asserted that probably no writer in this country speaks with more justly founded and generally acknowledged authority on the subject matter of the present volumes than Professor Ely. His many years of study, research, writing, and lecturing upon themes economical have all more or less led up to the production of this work, as any one can see who is acquainted with the long list of books and papers on allied subjects that have hitherto come from his indefatigable pen.

It will be noticed at once that "Property" is viewed in the work at hand from the single standpoint of "distribution". The other economic factors which make up the substance of similar treatises—that is to say, production (including exchange) and consumption—are, if not eliminated, at least considered only inasmuch as they are implied by or merged in distribution, for the latter factor or function is broadly inclusive. It may not be amiss to cite the "formal definition" laid down in the introduction to the first volume: "Distribution . . . relates on the one hand to the ultimate shares of accumulated wealth and income-wealth owned and received by the various social units, and on the other hand to the shares of income-wealth assigned by the various factors engaged in production; as a preliminary to both orders of inquiry it examines historically and critically the fundamentals in the existing socio-economic order" (p. 2). The definition is obviously a very broad one and, as the author indicates, subsumes three lines of inquiry. The first has to do with the distribution of property income among individuals—that is, social units. Wealth versus poverty, the rich and the poor and the intermediates—what are their relative incomes, and how comes it to pass that some have so much, others so little? Why or how has A an income of

one thousand dollars, B an income of a million dollars, and C one of two hundred and fifty dollars? How did D become a millionaire, while the total assets of E would not bring five hundred dollars at public auction? What are the sources of fortunes and incomes? And so on. Big questions these, *et felix harum qui potest cognoscere causas!* Next comes the inquiry into the distribution of income-wealth among the various agencies of production — capital, labor, manager, and the rest. What share of income *de facto* accrues, and what *de jure* should accrue to these several factors? Lastly, the foregoing definition includes an inquiry into the groundwork of economic institutions.

These fundamentals have not, Professor Ely thinks, been adequately considered by English and American economists, their attention being chiefly centred on the problems of income distribution. The Germans are more thorough and scientific in this matter. Adolf Wagner's well known *Grundlegung*—the first part of his *Lehr und Handbuch der politischen Oekonomie*—is mentioned as an illustration in point and as a work to which the author acknowledges indebtedness. However this may be, it can hardly be said after the completion of the work before us that "the fundamentals" of distribution have not received adequate treatment by at least one American economist, since the two goodly volumes, comprising more than a thousand pages, are entirely devoted to "the fundamentals". The two volumes together embrace but one "Book" of the projected contents, and even this book will run over into, if not beyond, a prospective third volume. The entire plan calls for four other "Books" which will treat respectively of (II) the separate shares in distribution, (III) individual fortunes, (IV) actual and contemplated modifications of the distribution of wealth, (V) social progress and wealth distribution.

The first "Book", which, as was said above, deals with fundamentals, embraces five parts: (1) property, private and public, (2) inheritance, (3) contracts, (4) vested interests, (5) personal conditions. These titles obviously are not very graphic. It may therefore be worth while stating that under the first general heading are considered the economic technicalities regarding property, private and public, but particularly the social aspects of private property, the grounds for the maintenance of the latter, its present and future development, the various modes of transformation of private property into public and vice versa, the management of public property as regards distribution, the origin of private property, etc. Of the subjects here mentioned, the one that engrosses the most attention concerns the development of private property. In this connexion the problems relating to equalization of opportunity, to surplus value,

regulation of inheritance, fluxity of property, socialization of private property, etc. are discussed.

Within the third part of the work, dealing with contracts, falls the discussion of the opposing theories, individualistic and social, of contracts; the labor contract; class legislation; the courts and the Constitution of the United States, etc. These are just a few of the more salient topics treated *in extenso* in the two volumes. They are treated on the one hand in the light of the author's economic principles and opinions, points of view which, it need hardly be said, are on the whole sound and sane. The justness of private property is ably defended, whilst at the same time the social claims and limitations entailed by individual rights are made manifest. On the other hand, a very considerable light is thrown on the discussion by the immense number of cases and judicial decisions cited throughout the work. The mere list of these legal cases takes up almost thirty pages in the table of contents; from which fact it may be inferred that no pains have been spared to indicate the influence of positive legislation upon the obscure problems relating to the distribution of property.

The foregoing suggestions may suffice to show to the reader interested in economic inquiry the general character, importance, and value of the work. It is unmistakably a production of superior merit. The outcome of wide experience, patient investigation, keen analysis, and forceful argumentation, it is all presented in a style so lucid and simple as almost to make "the dismal science" bright and even attractive.

There is just one chapter that has struck the reviewer as not so commendable. It is the one which deals with the origin of property (Vol. 2, pp. 531-551). The treatment seems at first sight quite thorough, *nine* theories being discussed, whereas only three or four are usually mentioned by writers on the subject. The larger number, however, may easily be reduced to the smaller, since several on the list are substantially identical. On the other hand, some of the theories are rather meagrely stated, the names of their defenders omitted, and the refutation is somewhat summary. It is a pity Professor Ely did not consult Heinrich Pesch's *Nationalökonomie* on this and allied topics. Unfortunately, no mention of this masterly treatise is to be found in his pages. Rudolph von Ihering is reported to have said that, had he previously known of the work of St. Thomas on finality and purpose, the *Zweck im Recht* would not have been written. This may or may not be true. It may well be, however, that if Pesch's great work on *Nationalökonomie* were more widely known, some of the economists would, if they were wise, begin to study and stop writing. This, of course, does not apply to Professor Ely; for apart from his own eminent ability and attainments his

works are written principally in view of conditions, economic and social, in this country, which of course is not the case with those of Heinrich Pesch. None the less, acquaintance with this German scholar would have been to the advantage of our American economist. The same would hold good as regards Cathrein's *Moralphilosophie*. A passing mention of this important work does indeed occur in one of the present volumes (note of reference, p. 157). A closer study, however, of Cathrein's treatment of the right of property might easily have improved the corresponding portion of the work before us.

MANUAL OF CHURCH HISTORY. By Francis Xavier Funk, late Professor of Theology at the University of Tübingen. Translated from the German by P. Perciballi, D.D., and edited by W. H. Kent, O.S.O. Two volumes. Burns & Oates, London; Benziger Bros., New York. Pp. xiv—430, and viii—392.

More than a quarter of a century ago Dr. Funk, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the University of Tübingen, published a text-book of church history for his students. His purpose was to give a summary of facts that would furnish them with a sufficiently broad and solid basis for further inquiry into the accessory branches of ecclesiastical study. The work was at once recognized as a great improvement over text-books which, like Dr. Alzog's Church History, were too diffuse for scholastic purposes. However, the work of Dr. Funk did not escape criticism. It was feared that too great conciseness and unqualified statements in the presentation of facts might afford room for deductions tending to lessen a just appreciation of the dogmatic function of the Church. The author was quite willing to admit the defect, and promptly set about correcting it. Thus the four succeeding editions of his work were each largely revised and supplemented. When in 1907 he died, Prof. Charles Bihlmeyer, who was his associate at Tübingen, succeeded him in the chair of Ecclesiastical History. In 1911 the latter issued a new edition (the sixth) of Dr. Funk's treatise and thus brought it up to date in point of historical facts and the pertinent reference literature. The work has since remained a standard text-book in German schools.

Meanwhile it had also been translated into French, the several editions following the author's revisions. In 1903 an Italian version was made by Dr. Perciballi, from the German edition of 1902. Dr. Perciballi also undertook, it appears, to make an English translation; but in 1910 Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., of London, published an authorized English version by Cappadelta, which bore the imprint of B. Herder for America. This English translation was made from the fifth German edition, and the translator was also able

to utilize a series of historical commentaries which the venerable author was at the time publishing under the title of *Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*. The latter was intended as a supplement and safeguard for students who wanted additional information on points that touched the matter of doctrinal motives and ecclesiastical discipline.

The Italian translation found its way into a number of seminaries, but as it had not kept up with Dr. Funk's revisions, and had, in 1913, neither been amended nor brought up to date, the Pontifical Commission appointed during that year by Pius X to reform the curriculum of studies in the Italian seminaries, saw good reason to find fault with the book, and ordered it to be stricken from the list of text-books used by Italian students.

Not very long ago the announcement was made, by Burns & Oates (London), of an English version of Dr. Funk's *Manual* from the pen of Dr. Perciballi. It was naturally expected that, since at the time of their announcement we possessed an excellent English version, based upon the fifth German edition, the translator would have taken for his version the amended original, then fully four years in the hands of students. This expectation was all the more reasonable since the editor of the German work, Dr. Bihlmeyer, not only thoroughly revised the same, but found it necessary to add some ninety pages of new matter to it. In place of this we are asked to accept a translation of an early edition, and one which in several respects is inferior to the English version published by Kegan Paul four years since. There are indeed some alterations in the text and references which at first sight give one the impression of a recent revision. As a matter of fact these additions are of little or no importance, and bear no relation to the work done by Dr. Funk's latest editor. Apart from a studied diversity of expressions, such as the substitution of "opponents of the Church" for "reformers", "parochial clergy" for "parish clergy", "Russo-Greek" for "Graeco-Russian", "Aix la Chapelle" for "Aachen", "Wycliff" for "Wiclif", etc., we have here a translation of an older edition than the one translated by Cappadelta, with additions of a few names, e. g. Cardinal Bourne's, the word "Ireland" in the table of contents, and the names of some unimportant authors in footnotes. The present version does not contain even the older statistics, given in the English translation by Cappadelta.

This is plainly an imposition on the public. *Catholic Book Notes* (London) gently calls attention to the volume's glaring omissions touching the history of the Church in England, especially for the first half of the seventeenth century, and to the absence of mention of really important reference works published within the last few

years. What is said by *Book Notes* regarding England is true also of the Church in Belgium, Denmark, and Russia. In the earlier English version a separate chapter is devoted to the Church in America. But in the volume under review that matter is relegated to the head of "Missions" and is altogether an insult to American intelligence. The last word on the Church in the Philippine Islands leaves us at the end of the seventeenth century, without any mention of the Spanish-American war and the consequent changes in the Catholic regime of those islands. Father Kent's name appears to have been used merely as an advertisement to effect the sale of a valueless and misleading book. We find mistakes in dates, references to old editions, and mistranslations which, though easily corrected, are not found in the Cappadelta version. Moreover, the latter is fuller; its typography, which gives the important names in bold type or italics, is better, and the work is altogether more carefully done than in this volume of Burns & Oates.

No doubt these strictures must seem severe; but we deem it a matter of justice to a large class of American students and priests who are likely to fall victim to a publishing house that bears a Catholic name yet shows itself forgetful of what is due to its patrons. No apology is possible, since Cappadelta's English version and the revision of the original by Dr. Bihlmeyer were fully accessible and known to be so to all the parties concerned. It is simply a question of a publisher's foisting an inferior article on a supposedly unsuspecting public. Of course the Benzigers are in no way responsible for this fact, as they are simply the agents for the book and hardly supposed to know the history of its making.

HISTORY OF EDUCATION. By Patrick McCormick, S.T.L., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Education in the Catholic University of America. With an Introduction by Edward A. Pace, Ph.D., S.T.D., LL.D., 1915. The Catholic Education Press, Washington, D. C. Pp. 435.

All things come to those who wait. How often a priest is asked by a Catholic young man or woman, teaching perhaps in the public schools, or else passing through a normal school training, or again attending lectures in the department of pedagogy in a secular university, for some book on the history of education! The inquirer is looking for a guide book that tells what the Catholic Church has done and is doing for education. She—the inquirer is usually feminine—has somehow imbibed the conviction that the Church was the mother of education—at least within Christian times and lands; that she has always fostered and promoted education, and that she still remains the most consistently and perfectly organized educa-

tional force, if not the most thoroughly equipped instructional agency, in the world. On the other hand, the inquirer has read in many a book, heard in many a lecture, that the Church has been, if not an enemy, at least a slow, unprogressive promoter of education; in proof whereof the backward state of education in Catholic countries—Italy, Spain, Portugal—is triumphantly adduced. Moreover, your inquirer is sorely puzzled to know just what estimate to put upon the great "reformers" of educational systems and methods in modern times. When you have confronted such an inquirer you perhaps have been puzzled what answer to give. You have had some general ideas on the lines just indicated, but they have been far from self-satisfying; and as for any pertinent literature, you have been at a loss what to suggest. Brother Azarias's illuminating educational *Essays* occur to you; and perhaps you remember Fr. Hughes and Fr. Schwickerath on the Jesuit system of education; nor do you forget Fr. Burns's scholarly histories of Catholic education in the United States. But these titles bring you to your wits' end. Is there no succinct history of education that you can recommend, no manual that gives a conspectus of the growth and the progress of educational systems and methods throughout the ages? No, not one —in our English speech at least. Happily you may negate this negative now, and make it an affirmative.

The title of, if not to, this happy possession stands in bold type at the head of this paper. You have here what the subtitle of the volume promises, "a survey of the development of educational theory and practice in ancient, medieval, and modern times", an outline of the ways in which children were taught and schooled in ancient China, Japan, Egypt, India, Persia, as well as amongst the Semitic peoples, the Greeks, and the Romans; the educational activities of the Church in the early and the patristic times; likewise and especially in medieval centuries; then the educational influences of the Renaissance and the Reformation, followed by the Catholic Reaction against the latter movements—all this is succinctly exhibited. Next came modern times with their prominent educational theorists, Bacon, Commenius, Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, Herbert Spencer, and others, all more or less hostile or at least alien to the never-ceasing educational agencies of the Church, with her religious organizations—the Christian Brothers, the many congregations of women, for instance. These and many other allied subjects are set forth in the volume. Finally there is a brief survey of modern school systems prevailing in various countries—Germany, France, Spain, England, as well as the United States.

From these headlines the reader will easily see that, since the work embraces the entire history of education, the treatment allotted to

any one period, movement, system, method, or person must necessarily be very brief. The work is professedly and in fact a "survey". Moreover, it should be noted that the volume takes its place as one of a pedagogical series projected by the Catholic University at Washington. It has been preceded in the series by three other volumes, and it is to be succeeded by yet seven in which the several sections of the work at hand—ancient, medieval, and modern education—are to be more fully elaborated, while the psychology and the philosophy of education as well as the "art of study" are to receive each a special volume to itself. The program in prospect is certainly a splendid one. As to its execution—"O, let it be soon!" Hope deferred maketh the pedagogue's heart sick.

The fact that the very brief treatment of vast subjects in the present volume looks forward to a fuller development in the future volumes makes what suggestions the reviewer has in mind almost superfluous or premature. Nevertheless one can hardly help expressing the wish that the critical portions of the work had been at least just a trifle fuller. For instance, it will be of very little use, not to say harm, for the average non-philosophically trained reader—and very many readers of the volume will be of this class—to know Herbert Spencer's theories on education if he (or she) is not provided by an expert with a just criticism of them. Again, while the bibliographies appended to the several divisions of the book are sufficiently abundant and full, it would be well had some brief critical estimate of the relative value of the works mentioned been added in order to guide inexperienced readers through the devious ways and danger-spots of this rather vast book world. So too a similar estimate of the histories of education more commonly recommended to secular teachers (for instance, Compayré) would have been desirable. And some allusion to the much talked of Montessorian method of education would not have been superfluous. These and other lacunæ can of course be filled up by the various complementary volumes of the series; but these volumes are only *in potentia* and not improbably will be long a getting *in actu*. It is to be hoped that the suggested addenda may receive attention in a second edition of the present volume which being fundamental and fairly comprehensive is likely when further perfected to be in general demand as a college text-book.

ADMINISTRATION OF BAPTISM. Address delivered before the Guild of Sts. Luke, Cosmas and Damian, at the rooms of the Catholic Historical Society. By the Rev. A. J. Schulte, Professor of Liturgy in St. Charles Seminary, Overbrook, Pa., 12 October, 1914. Pp. 20.

The Philadelphia Guild of Catholic physicians is a singularly representative body of professional men, including among its members a number of eminent specialists, who maintain the high standard of ethics set them by the requirements of their Catholic faith. The Guild has a custom of inviting from time to time to its meetings men of other professions to lecture on subjects closely connected with medical science. They also invite scholarly priests to discuss matters of pastoral medicine and kindred topics within the domain of religion and theology. An example of the latter is the printed address by Fr. Schulte, professor of Sacramental Liturgy at Overbrook Seminary. He explains the purpose and effects of the Sacrament of Baptism, the manner of its administration under normal and abnormal circumstances, such as come frequently within the province of the medical practitioner. The subject of baptism is introduced by a clear outline of the sacramental system and the place it holds in the economy of the Church. The author does not delay in abstract considerations of the subject, but goes directly to emphasize the matter which is apt to claim the attention of the doctor or, under certain circumstances, of the nurse. The pamphlet deserves to be widely spread in order to popularize an intelligent appreciation among physicians of what is pertinent to the Sacrament of Baptism, and the important function of religion in general. It would be desirable to have a series of such pamphlets on all subjects connected with pastoral medicine and the moral side of surgical operations, as a help not merely for Catholic physicians, but also for priests who frequently find themselves at a disadvantage in explaining such matters to the doctor whom they meet in the sick-room.

THE CATHOLIC HISTORICAL REVIEW. For the Study of the Church History of the United States. Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1915). Published quarterly by the Catholic University of America. Pp. 121.

The special purpose of the above magazine is indicated by its subtitle: "for the study of the Church History of the United States". Its import is explained by an introductory article entitled "Spirit of the Catholic Historical Review" by the Rector of the University, Bishop Shahan. There is also a "Foreword" by Cardinal Gibbons, commending the periodical to the thoughtful men and women of the country, "to garner the lessons, and select the truths that are

of greatest need or afford the best intellectual enjoyment". The four leading papers may be taken as typical of the scope and aim of the *Catholic Historical Review*. They are: "The Flemish Franciscan Missionaries in North America", by Bishop Camillus Maes, of Covington; the Dominican Bishop "John Fenwick", by Fr. V. F. O'Daniel, O.P.; "The First Ecclesiastical Synod of California", by the Franciscan historian, Fr. Zephyrin Engelhardt, and "Columbus and the Santa Hermandad in 1492". These articles are well written and informing. The departments: Miscellany, Documents, Notes and Comment, Book Reviews, and Bibliography, add the academic flavor which a publication issued from the University is expected to have.

It would be mere pedantry to say that the new publication fills a need, or that the spirit of historical research has been hitherto neglected amongst us. Far from it. We have had, apart from the individual efforts of scholarly men like John Gilmary Shea, Dr. Corcoran, Bishop O'Gorman, Fathers Parsons, Lambing, Engelhardt, Campbell, S.J., Mr. Martin I. J. Griffin, Prof. McCarthy, and numerous others, not to mention those outside the Catholic pale who have furnished great help in establishing facts of Catholic history in missionary America, evidences of eager interest in the study of American Church history, in the publication of excellent periodicals, such as the *American Catholic Historical Researches, Records of the American Catholic Historical Society*, and the like. These have done admirable work for many years. There have also been less long-lived periodical publications of similar character under the auspices of societies and diocesan corporations which have contributed their share of active Catholic historical research. The significance of the present publication lies, therefore, not so much in its furnishing matter of historical research or in stimulating special study in that direction, as in the fact that it enlarges the active scope of our Catholic University in a most suitable direction. For it is, we take it, the province of a university to do and to lead in this kind of work. If the absence hitherto of such activity on a larger scale is to be regarded as a want, there were no doubt good reasons and justification for the neglect, to be found in the pioneer condition which absorbed all the intellectual strength of the institution in the processes of organization. A magazine dealing with social science in its Catholic aspects would seem to be a similar province of the University. Indeed we should say it is a more decided necessity in view of what is being done by academic bodies outside the Church in America. But each such enterprise needs a leader. It is not enough to establish a magazine and to sound it forth with a flourish of trumpets. The element that gives it stability

is the consciousness of work to be done, and of a purpose to be realized, with a generous exclusion of all personal factors that would merely indicate patronage or acclaim. Dr. Guilday has apparently the qualifications for the task he has undertaken in organizing this new magazine, and in enlisting in its support others who are competent. There should be also abundant material to keep it afloat. The Catholic clergy are the ones who have it in their power to furnish both the material and the support, and that means sustaining the zeal of its projectors and the laborers who have to bear the burden of making the magazine not only useful but attractive as well. The first number is a good augury of what we may look for in the future.

THE GRAVES OF KILMORNA. A Story of '67. By the Very Rev. Canon Sheehan, D. D., author of "My New Curate", etc. Longmans, Green and Co., New York. 1915. Pp. 372.

LONELINESS? By Robert Hugh Benson. P. J. Kenedy and Sons, New York. 1915. Pp. 371.

These two novels share the pathetic distinction of being the last published works of their authors. Few priests in the history of English letters, and perhaps in the literature of any nation, have accomplished so much in the same brief time of their activity as writers. Within the last dozen years they put forth as many volumes, securing for them a permanent place on our Catholic library shelves. Of the two writers, Mgr. Benson was probably the more rapid worker. He was younger when, at the age of thirty-four, he began to exercise his newly accepted priestly mission as an apologist of the faith of his forefathers. Fortunately for his zeal he was not burdened with the engrossing duties of a large district parish, although his intermittent missionary work as preacher and lecturer was considerable, and he kept little margin for free time. Canon Sheehan, on the other hand, had the responsibilities of an extensive parish which kept him engaged in pastoral labors continually, allowing only a few hours each day for writing. But these hours he regarded as recreation.

Both writers had for their distinctive aim to make religion known, understood and honored among their countrymen; and the works of both have more or less of a national stamp. Hence, while moved by a single supernatural purpose, they stand widely apart in their immediate aspirations, as well as in the form of their expression. Yet, just as Mgr. Benson in his *Lord of the World* could point to Ireland as the ultimate earthly home of the Catholic Faith, so did Canon Sheehan point to England as the possessor of certain racial qualities

of mind which it might be profitable for Irishmen to emulate. These characteristics indicate the predominant passion for truth on the part of both men. Mgr. Benson felt that the Catholic faith is an element of strength for the preservation of a nation's life; whilst Canon Sheehan realized emphatically that the natural virtues are the support of faith and a necessary accompaniment of the right exercise of liberty. To judge their works aright, apart from the attraction of the setting and style, it is necessary to take into consideration their special prepossessions. It is so especially in the case of Canon Sheehan, who suffered from sharp but unjust criticism, particularly in his first and in his last work. I have said that he wrote to interpret the aspirations of the Irish people; but he felt that the realization and consequent appreciation of these ideals depended upon the removal of certain obstacles which were being held fast by men hardly aware of their existence, and therefore resenting the charge of being responsible for them. As for Mgr. Benson, he set out boldly to display the Catholic truth before the face of Englishmen, who thought themselves right in protesting against it; and with equal insistence, though with delicacy, he brought home to those who have the old inheritance of the faith the futility of escaping the self-denial and the cross which alone can save the followers of Christ. It was his constant effort, undisguised, to show his countrymen in the wrong, and whilst discrediting the efforts of the Reformation to revive the ideals of pre-Reformation times among his Catholic brethren. Neither of the two writers was beyond criticism. But their defects rose solely from the consciousness that the duty of the Catholic author is to instruct rather than to please. In the case of Canon Sheehan there was a negligence of that corrective element which makes for elegance of form and the perfect balancing of parts in literary expression. He never revised his manuscripts, and thus allowed repetitions to stand which a writer scrupulous of detail would have eliminated. Mgr. Benson, on the other hand, while very deliberate in the expression of written thought, at times neglects the sequence which prepares the reader for the conclusions drawn by the author. Intent on demonstrating the truth of one principle, he fails to give due consideration to its opposite. This made it necessary for him to reconstruct, or at times to reverse, his theories, as in the case of *The Dawn of All*, expressly written to counterbalance (one can hardly call it a supplementing) the effect of his previous work, *The Lord of the World*. Whilst the genius of both writers exercised itself upon a great variety of themes, each had some sphere in which he rose above his own level of literary excellence. Thus Mgr. Benson's leaning is toward the historic romantic. He loves the tragic, often gruesome forms, in which to depict the motives of self-sacrifice as contrasted with the

luxurious softness and superficial vanities of society. There is a gentle cynicism, less mordant, though quite as pitiless as that of Thackeray, in nearly all his novels.

Loneliness? is somewhat in this vein. It is the story of a gifted young girl who under the stress of circumstances is forced to employ her chief talent to gain a livelihood as an opera-singer. Thus engaged she gradually loses the finer sense of those high ideals which were her birthright as a Catholic. Her faith weakens and her affections spend themselves upon creatures, among whom a lover of gentle birth takes the central place. Then suddenly she comes to the realization of her idol-worship and its true value. The loss of her voice, the source of her income and attraction, reveals the weakness of her lover's attachment. The novel possesses all the author's vivid power of description, especially where he contrasts the shallow maxims of the world with the motives inspired by religion. The "loneliness" of the story, which he characterizes by a question, is that bereavement of earthly comforts which leads to the friendship of God; and that friendship, while it allows no rival, compensates to the full for the loss of all other things, and fills the void of the heart as no earthly possession can do. Those who have read Mgr. Benson's former volume, *None Other Gods*, will recognize in this a parallel. The character play is wholly similar, albeit the figures and the scenery differ.

Of quite another order, in scope, aim, and treatment, is Canon Sheehan's last novel, *The Graves of Kilmorna*. It pictures the rise and crushing of the Fenian uprising of 1867. The two local heroes, men of swift impulses, native determination, and noble aspirations, are defeated, partly through treachery, partly through the lack of sufficient foresight. They are both earnest men and lovers of their country. One, James Halpin, is killed in a brief encounter between his men and the English constabulary; the other, having been convicted of treason against the English government, is sentenced to hard labor for life in an English prison at Dartmoor. After ten years of durance vile he is released, returns home, and meets with a tragic death at the hand of some drunken men who had been roused to clamor for a Tory candidate at an election, against whom the returned prisoner, Myles Cogan, was peaceably warning his townsmen. The novel was not quite finished when Canon Sheehan found himself obliged to cease writing, and this may account for the rather abrupt ending, which leaves a note of hopelessness. On this account some critics have thought the story pessimistic in tendency. But as shown in his earlier books, Canon Sheehan deemed it the greatest service to his countrymen to point out to them the defective economic and edu-

cational condition at home that seemed likely to hinder the overcoming of political obstacles. If he had no faith in the optimistic promises that had for so long delayed a freedom for which his people had made every sacrifice, it was not that he lacked either confidence in the better element of Irish patriots or a deep love of his people's best interests. On the contrary, no man was more anxious to see Ireland governing herself than Canon Sheehan. This is borne out not merely by the testimony of his books, but far more by the evidence of that part of his history which has not yet been written and which reveals an activity for the welfare of Ireland which surpasses that of many of its most heralded patriots. So far as his influence reached, he directed the national spirit of his countrymen, especially by the proposal of educational and economic reforms. He brought about the independence of all the tenants under his control by urging them to purchase their lands and by personally negotiating with the landlords of his district in their behalf. In his own town he introduced electric lighting, water power, paving of the sidewalks, industrial schools, and other benefits that placed the municipal council entirely in his debt as a leader of progress and a public benefactor. What he did for his parish with its seven schools, its young people's societies and its homes, where a few years before there had been only discontented or hopeless tenant farmers, he would have gladly done for every parish in the land. But the obstacles against which he had to fight were the misapprehension of the experience that was intended to warn others. That misapprehension is but a repetition of the old story from the days of Moses to those of Christ.

Perhaps the best argument against the critics of Canon Sheehan is to be found in the fact that what he tells us in *The Graves of Kilmorna* is not fiction drawn from the past history of Ireland, but facts of his own personal knowledge. Nearly all the details and several of the personages of his story are drawn from life and from his early recollections. The town of Kilmorna is no other than the town of his birth, Mallow, by the Blackwater; the scenes he describes are those he witnessed as a young collegian when home on vacation from St. Coleman's College. The two or three priests he mentions in the story are drawn from life, and one of them is the young curate in Devonshire, himself as he was when at Exeter and Plymouth during the early years of his priesthood. Myles Cogan is the hero of his boyhood, whom he recognizes among the prisoners of Dartmoor; Agnes, Cogan's sister, who later on becomes a nun, and Mary Carleton who causes his arrest in order to save him from certain death in the attack of the Volunteers—all are persons who have figured in the life of our author. And so are the wrongs he portrays and the sorrows that consumed him as he realized that his people were being misled

by demagogues into wrong measures, and that the redress they sought was being frustrated by the fomentings of enemies on the one side and by the apathy of friends on the other.

Canon Sheehan, like Mgr. Benson, had something of the prophet and something of the reformer in his nature. And both qualities are easily misconstrued. If less so in the case of the one than of the other, it is only because Englishmen lack that finer fibre of sensitiveness which bristles at the slightest touch. If like St. John he warns his people, and in doing so points out the dangers of an overweening confidence in the value of mere applause, he is none the less a sincere forerunner of the true liberator. Only those who are selfishly blind can fail to see the deep and ardent patriotism, the high-minded desire to see his nation preserve its faith and virtue, so as to build upon it the prosperity of a future for Ireland. Indeed, affection for his race, above family and party, is the chief characteristic of this, Canon Sheehan's last book, as it was of his first work that gained him the approval of all unprejudiced minds at home and abroad.

Literary Chat.

The Bishop of Valleyfield, Mgr. Emard, has issued a pastoral letter to his clergy, entitled *Le Prêtre-Soldat.* The Bishop is a Frenchman who ardently loves his native country; but that does not prevent him from raising an eloquent protest against the maudlin and utterly false sentimentality raised in many Catholic journals about the heroism of the French priest soldier. He shows that it would have been much more glorious if many of the French clergy who have volunteered to serve their country as soldiers in the camp, had remained at their station to serve the abandoned Catholics of their missions. He admits that those who have been called by conscription under the law of an iniquitous government, are indeed to be excused and pitied, and the Catholic soldier who wishes to have a priest at his side on the battlefield may be thankful for the opportunity thus afforded him to receive absolution from a brother soldier. But he bids those enthusiasts who extol the heroism of the soldier, forgetting the outraged dignity of the priesthood, to be silent and to remember that, if heroism in the soldier forced to fight against his brother is a virtue, it is not so in the volunteer priest soldier, who as the representative of peace, by reason of the bloodshed he faces, incurs under ordinary circumstances the censures of the Church. He bids us remember that many of these priests are taken away from their pastoral offices, from their exercises of devotion, their daily Mass, their Breviary, leaving the flocks without shepherds, the tabernacles without guards, the pulpit a dumb protest, and the souls of men without spiritual consolation.

The Bible and Universal Peace, by George Holley Gilbert, is a thoughtful analysis of the Scriptural attitude toward war. The author points out that the seeming justification and approval by Jahwe, in the Old Law, of warfare cannot be construed into the maxim that God sanctions the claims of Christian nations to settle their differences by engaging in mutual combat. Not only has peace ever been the vision of the prophets of old, but it became the positive precept through the Messianic fulfillment. The author doubts that the Church

has been responsive to the teaching of Christ in this respect; but here we are confronted with the eternal law of God's tolerance with human perversity and weakness. (Funk and Wagnalls Co.)

The King, the Kaiser and Irish Freedom, published by the Devin-Adair Company, New York, reveals some startling statistics that throw light on Ireland's future in the event of either England's or Germany's ascendancy at the end of the present European war. The author is an American of Irish blood. His education, partly in German schools, partly under the care of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, has given him opportunities, it would appear, of becoming familiar with the temper and literature of the two chief nations in the present conflict. As mayor of a large Eastern city he had an insight into the political methods of national as well as municipal parties, and his book is apparently the result of a conscientious desire to warn Irishmen not to place too great a trust in the promises regarding the future of their country's independence, since it is plain that England needs Irishmen, not merely as helpers in her straits, but as subjects whom she can send to the front when in danger. The reader must form his own judgment from the evidence presented, since partisanship runs high in these matters on both sides.

Longmans, Green and Co. (New York) have issued a uniform edition of the Abbé Fouard's works. These include two volumes of the Gospel history under the title of *The Christ, the Son of God,* one volume entitled *St. Peter and the First Years of Christianity,* two volumes dealing with *St. Paul's Life, His Missionary Journeys,* his imprisonment at Rome, his Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, and Ephesians, and the brief period during which, having regained his temporary freedom, he journeyed and wrote at short intervals to the churches and friends who were to perpetuate his apostolic work. The second volume includes the history of St. James of Jerusalem, of St. Luke and St. Jude, and a sketch of the intimate companionship which linked the two great world apostles forever in the Christian mind through their united martyrdom at Rome. The sixth volume is devoted to *St. John and the Close of the Apostolic Age.* It is an engaging summary of the history of the New Testament and the foundations of the Christian Church. As a work of reliable information, furnishing abundant store for Scriptural and catechetical instruction, these six volumes deserve the continuous attention of every cleric. They are printed in excellent style and the whole set may be had at a reasonable price.

Although we have in English two good commentaries of comparatively recent date by the Jesuit Fathers Joseph Rickaby and Cuthbert Lattey, which cover the ground of Dr. McRory's more elaborate volume on the *Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (M. H. Gill and Son, Dublin), the latter will be appreciated as a painstaking study for theological students, the notes of which are both erudite and abundant. As a text-book it would seem too detailed and critical for the ordinary theological course, since our students cannot devote so much time to any single letter of St. Paul if they are to get a fair knowledge of general exegesis within the three or four years of the course. But as a reference book in a priest's library and for post-graduate study the volume has all the characteristics of special erudition and completeness.

The translation of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province is advancing with relative celerity considering the magnitude and difficulty of the undertaking. The latest volume, covering the first forty-eight questions of the *pars secunda,* has a special interest for students of moral theology, seeing that the subjects therein treated have to do with the fundamentals of that science—the treatise on the last end and, in part, the treatise on human acts. Needless to say, the translation keeps quite on the plane of excellence attained in the preceding volumes of the series (Benziger Bros., New York).

A propos of this topic, attention may be called to a brochure (of thirty-seven pages) embodying two articles—reprinted from the *Catholic University Bulletin* (Vol. XV, No. 4, and XVI, No. 8)—by Fr. Kennedy, O.P. The first paper, entitled "The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas," gives the salient characteristics and divisions of the great work; the second, under the title "Specimen Pages from the Summa," presents some of the aspects and bearings of St. Thomas's teachings. The booklet will serve admirably as an introduction to the study of the *Summa*. Seminarians will profit by it, whilst it might stimulate the educated laity to avail themselves of the treasures of wisdom and solid virtue stored up in the English translation referred to above. There are two schematic synopses—one in Latin, the other in English—which afford a bird's-eye-view of the entire *Summa*. (Published by The Rosary Press, Somerset, Ohio.)

Had St. Thomas lived in our day he would undoubtedly have been perfectly acquainted with the trend of modern philosophical speculation, and while rejecting its errors he would have assimilated to his own synthesis whatever elements of truth he discovered therein. Since, however, we have no Angelic Doctor with us it is incumbent on his followers to imitate his spirit of "actuality", by watching the streams of thought as they flow by, bearing along their burden of diverse values. A work that fairly takes account of the various currents of modern philosophy has recently appeared under the title *American Thought: from Puritanism to Pragmatism* by Woodbridge Riley. The author is professor of philosophy in Vassar College, and may be known to some of our readers through a former volume entitled *American Philosophy: the Early Schools*. The recent work condenses the matter of the latter volume and "continues the development of national thought until it emerges triumphantly in pragmatism—a typical American philosophy" (p. 5).

Whether pragmatism may be truly designated a "triumph" or a defeat, and whether or not pragmatism may be justly characterized as a philosophy at all, are questions which need not be here discussed. While there are some things in the book upon which reviewer and author must differ, and while the work contains some unfortunate omissions—defects that will be pointed out on another occasion—the book may be strongly recommended, especially to professors and students of philosophy, for its succinct and very readable account of American thought.

Professor Riley dedicates his book to "his first teacher in philosophy, George Trumbull Ladd". In the body of the volume the pupil gives an account of the master's teaching, an account, by the way, which flatters neither the one nor the other. However, more of this anon.

Professor Ladd's book on *What Can I Know?*, a review of which appeared in a preceding issue (December, 1914), has recently been followed by another volume from the same untiring pen under the title *What Ought I to Do?* As the sub-title indicates, it is "an inquiry into the nature and kinds of virtue and into the sanctions, aims and values of the moral life". A review of the book must be deferred to a future number. Suffice it now to say that, though one may differ from the author on certain points, one cannot but be impressed by the power of the work as a whole, by the sincerity it reflects, and by the pervading charm of its style (Longmans, Green & Co., New York).

Another work of philosophical moment that must be left for a future number is Professor Baldwin's *Genetic Theory of Reality*. Though an independent treatise, it is meant to be the completing volume of a large work, two volumes of which were described in this REVIEW some few years ago. A third volume which appeared in the meantime bearing the title *Interest and Art: Genetic Epistemology*, did not reach us. In this latest volume, which might be called the fourth of the series, Professor Baldwin reaches the final conclusion of

Genetic Logic—"Pancalism"—a theory that the Absolute, the fundamental Reality, is the Beautiful, and this Reality is attained by or in immediate contemplation, a state of consciousness which both in the individual and the race is gained through stages ascending from the prelogical to the logical and finally to the intuitional". The reviewer, while recognizing the truth of Professor Baldwin's conclusion that the Absolute is the Beautiful (plainly a very old conclusion, since it was familiar to St. Augustine), nevertheless differs widely from the author as to the path by which the human mind reaches that reality. But of this again. (Putnam's Sons, New York.)

It would be a great satisfaction if one might classify a recent book entitled *Is Death the End?*, by John Haynes Holmes, amongst works possessing a philosophical interest. The supreme importance of the subject, the immortality of the soul, as well as the position of the author, as "Minister of the Church of the Messiah, New York", would of themselves contribute to such satisfaction. Unfortunately, the work superabounds in statements that contradict anything like sane philosophy, inasmuch as they violate at once logic, psychology, and ontology. The naif manner in which Mr. Holmes accepts the utterly gratuitous assertions of sciolists, who by an abuse of language are called scientists, would be amusing were it not so serious and so absolutely destructive of the thesis which the book is meant to defend. That this judgment is not too severe will be patent from the following quotations: "It is a well known fact, of course, that science [*sic*], in the pursuit of its investigations during the last fifty or more years, has been able to trace the development of the physical organism from the lowest unicellular creatures, in the oozy slime of the primitive world upon the one hand, to the complicated mechanism of the human body upon the other" (p. 35). Needless to say, "science" has done nothing approaching to this wonderful feat of "tracing". The author continues: "It may, perhaps, be equally well known that a development of the mind, as distinguished from the physical brain, has been similarly traced [by "science", of course?]." Then, after a brief conjectural sketch of the asserted development, the author proceeds to affirm: "It is for reasons such as these, that the soul must be regarded not as a separate spiritual entity having an origin apart from the body, and existing independent of the body, but as one of the numerous specific functions of the body, and consequently dependent directly upon the physical processes of the body" (p. 36). Countless passages of this kind might be quoted from these pages, all pointing to the hopeless, because illogical, attempt to deduce the immortality of the soul from materialistic premises. The author, it need hardly be said, is unaware of the lack of sequence in his thought and very probably the sentimentality and the rhetoric will persuade some readers, even though the argumentation fail to convince. (Putnam's Sons, New York.)

On hearing of Frederick William Faber's entrance into the Catholic Church, Wordsworth is reported to have said that "Rome had gained a convert, and England had lost a poet". The latter half of the epigram registers a prophecy contradicted by the event—at least if the word *poet* be taken in the larger sense of the term. Modifying the aphorism somewhat, one might say that when the late Mgr. Benson after his conversion devoted his wonderful creative power to prose writing, the English language lost a great poet in the stricter sense of the term, however much the English-reading world profited by the literary loss. No reader of Mgr. Benson's novels can fail to see the poet writing prose. The various plays which the same gifted pen threw off apparently in the hours intervening between the building of his larger productions show no mean dramatic power. The slender volume of verses which he allowed to be published for the cause of charity, contains vestiges sufficiently obvious to prove that, had Mgr. Benson elected to write in verse rather than prose, he might have taken a place among the truly great poets. Frequently indeed his lines are faulty, but for that matter even his prose is not always true to the conventionalities of bookish English. In both cases, however, the flaws are due

to haste and to some perhaps unjustifiable disregard for those same conventionalities. His poems, originally unintended for the public eye, are the making audible to his own reflective ear the inner language of his soul as it communed with God and the things of God. They belong to the *vie intime*. One notices everywhere in them that piercing, subtle insight into the workings of the inner life, and that marvelous power of just, truthful portrayal of what his reflective eye discerned, which was one of the most characteristic traits of his other writings. One is tempted to quote instances of this; but the reader will find them for himself in the neat booklet: *Poems by Robert Hugh Benson.* (Kenedy & Sons, New York.)

Sweet-Scented Leaves is the title story of a collection of tales of conduct and character from the vivid and graceful pen of Mrs. Armel O'Connor (Violet Bullock Webster). They are reprinted from various periodicals, and for their literary form, their sound sentiment, and sane tendency are well worth preserving in their present unified form. (B. Herder, St. Louis.)

The latter two of the qualities just mentioned as justifying the preservation of these stories apply likewise to a collection of *Poems* by the same gifted author. The first, however, of the triplet—literary form—is not so much in evidence. The rhythmical mechanism does not always run smoothly. Here and there it creaks a bit. Still in face of the opening verses "To My Critic" it must seem hard-hearted to make so rude a comment. (B. Herder, St. Louis.)

The special edition, referred to elsewhere in this number, of *The Life and Writings of Saint Columban*, the great Irish missionary, is now ready.

Books Received

SCRIPTURAL.

THE CHRIST, THE SON OF GOD. A Life of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. By the Abbé Constant Fouard. Translated from the fifth edition with the author's sanction by George F. X. Griffith. With an Introduction by Cardinal Manning. Two volumes. New impression. Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. 1915. Pp. xxxvii-394 and xv-415. Price, $2.50 *net.*

SAINT PETER AND THE FIRST YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY. By the Abbé Constant Fouard. Translated from the second edition with the author's sanction by George F. X. Griffith. With an Introduction by Cardinal Gibbons. Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. 1912. Pp. xxv-422. Price, $1.25 *net.*

SAINT JOHN AND THE CLOSE OF THE APOSTOLIC AGE. By the Abbé Constant Fouard, Member of the Biblical Commission. Authorized translation. New impression, reissue. Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. 1915. Pp. xxxiii-250. Price, $1.25 *net.*

SAINT PAUL AND HIS MISSIONS. By the Abbé Constant Fouard. Translated with the author's sanction and coöperation by George F. X. Griffith. New impression. Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. 1915. Pp. xvi-431. Price, $1.25 *net.*

THE LAST YEARS OF SAINT PAUL. By the Abbé Constant Fouard. Translated with the author's sanction and coöperation by George F. X. Griffith. New impression. Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. 1915. Pp. xiii-326. Price, $1.25 *net.*

ERKLÄRUNG DER PSALMEN UND CANTICA. In ihrer liturgischen Verwendung. Von Prinz Max, Herzog zu Sachsen, Dr. theol. et jur. utr. Fr. Pustet & Co., Regensburg, Rom und New York. 1914. Seiten 528. Preis, $1.65.

THEOLOGICAL AND DEVOTIONAL.

A GARLAND FOR ST. JOSEPH. Devotions for the Month of March. Compiled by a Member of the Ursuline Community, Sligo. Benziger Bros., New York. 1915. Pp. viii-275. Price, $0.75 *net.*

SAINTS AND SAINTLY DOMINICANS. Daily Reflections on Their Lives. Edited by the Rev. Thomas à Kempis Reilly, O.P. John Murphy Co., Baltimore. 1915. Pp. 620. Price, $1.00 *net.*

DIE EXERZITIEN DES HEILIGEN IGNATIUS. Ausführlich dargelegt in Aussprüchen der heiligen Kirchenväter. Von Peter Vogt, Priester der Gesellschaft Jesu. Zweiter Teil. Mit Approbation des Bischöflichen Ordinariates Regensburg und Genehmigung der Ordensobern. Fr. Pustet & Co., New York. 1914. Seiten 626. Preis, $1.75.

IN DER GROSSEN SCHICKSALSSTUNDE. Kriegs-Predigten. Skizzen gesammelt von Bernhard Duhr, S.J. 2. Auflage (3. und 4. Tausend). Fr. Pustet & Co., New York und Regensburg. 1915. Seiten 110. Preis, $0.35.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

AMERICAN THOUGHT. From Puritanism to Pragmatism. By Woodbridge Riley, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Vassar College. Henry Holt & Co., New York. 1915. Pp. viii-373. Price, $1.50 *net.*

HISTORICAL.

THE FRIAR PREACHER: YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY. Translated from the French of Père Jacquin, O.P., by Father Hugh Pope, O.P. Benziger Bros., New York. 1915. Pp. vii-152. Price, $0.75 *net.*

RUYSBROECK. By Evelyn Underhill, author of *Mysticism, The Mystic Way,* etc. (*The Quest Series.* Edited by G. R. S. Mead.) G. Bell & Sons, London; The Macmillan Co., New York. 1915. Pp. 193. Price, $1.00. (2/6 *net.*)

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE LITTLE LADY OF THE HALL. By Nora Ryeman. Benziger Bros., New York. 1915. Pp. 118. Price, $0.35 *postpaid.*

THE YOUNG COLOR GUARD, or Tommy Collins at Santiago. By Mary G. Bonesteel. Benziger Bros., New York. Pp. 166. Price, $0.35 *postpaid.*

THE LITTLE APOSTLE ON CRUTCHES. By Henriette Eugénie Delamare. Benziger Bros. New York. Pp. 165. Price, $0.35 *postpaid.*

THE MADCAP SET AT ST. ANNE'S. By Marion J. Brunowe, author of *The Sealed Packet, Seven of Us,* etc. Benziger Bros., New York. Pp. 168. Price, $0.35 *postpaid.*

DADDY DAN. By Mary T. Waggaman, author of *The Playwater Plot, Nan Nobody,* etc. Benziger Bros., New York. Pp. 184. Price, $0.35 *postpaid.*

THE HALDEMAN CHILDREN. By Mary E. Mannix, author of *As True as Gold, Pancho and Panchita,* etc. Benziger Bros., New York. Pp. 154. Price, $0.35 *postpaid.*

HER HEART'S DESIRE. By Henriette Eugénie Delamare, author of *The Adventures of Four Young Americans, Nellie Kelly, Ronald's Mission,* etc. H. L. Kilner & Co., Philadelphia. 1915. Pp. 301. Price, $0.75.

THE WIT AND WISDOM OF JOHN AYSCOUGH. Chosen and edited by Scannell O'Neill, author of *Watchwords from Dr. Brownson,* etc. With Portrait. (*The Angelus Series.*) Benziger Bros., New York. Pp. xi-151. Price, $0.50 *net.*